FROM SOCIAL CLEAVAGES TO PARTY SYSTEMS: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND PARTY BUILDING IN THE ANDES

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Why, despite experiencing similar systemic shocks, has Bolivia embarked on a successful process of (partial) party system reconstruction while Peru's party system remains collapsed? This dissertation introduces a *theory of networked cleavage articulation* that explains this variation in party system reconstruction outcomes. This theory posits that the *social network structures* within which nascent parties emerge condition the *articulation of social cleavages* in the party system and define the extent to which cleavages become associated with party system consolidation or increased political instability.

The dissertation employs original interviews, surveys, and electoral data to evaluate this theory through a mixed-methods approach. It offers three central findings. First, it demonstrates that *social cleavages can consistently structure political behavior and nonetheless be associated with various party system outcomes, from consolidation to social conflict*. I show that, ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru have structured political behavior since their democratic transitions and throughout major party system transformations. Second, the dissertation demonstrates that *the degree of cleavage articulation explains variation in party system reconstruction outcomes*. In Bolivia, the MAS-IPSP produced a successful articulation of the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage, enabling partial party system reconstruction. In contrast, political parties' articulation offers for the non-indigenous in Bolivia and both the indigenous

and non-indigenous in Peru have thus far failed. Consequently, these ethnic blocs remain associated with political instability.

Finally, this dissertation shows that *the likelihood of cleavage articulation is conditioned by nascent parties' original network landscapes*. I find that, in contrast to other indigenous and non-indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru, which have emerged from networks with regional strength and limited paths to expansion, the MAS-IPSP emerged within a vast organizational landscape that provided it with diverse within-network paths to growth and enabled it to produce a successful indigenous bloc articulation.

This dissertation challenges current understanding of the relationship between social cleavages and party systems. By bringing attention to the challenges of cleavage articulation, its likelihood of failure, and the role of social networks in this process, the dissertation introduces new and important insights to existing literature on social cleavages, political representation, and party politics.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Mariana Giusti-Rodríguez is originally from San Juan, Puerto Rico. She received her B.A. from Bard College in Political Science with a minor in Latin American and Iberian Studies in 2007. After graduating from college, Mariana spent two years working in sustainable community development in Nicaragua. In 2009, she traveled to Bolivia and Peru with the support of a Fulbright Fellowship to research social movements and political representation before initiating her graduate work at Cornell University in the fall of 2010. She obtained her master's degree in 2013. Throughout her graduate work, Mariana obtained fellowships from the Fulbright-Hays DDRA and the Ford Foundation and spent a year as a Pre-doctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania. In the fall of 2018, Mariana will begin a position as Assistant Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

DEDICATION

Para mami y papi.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations	Original Term	English Term
AGC	Alianza por el Gran Cambio	Alliance for Great Change
ADN	Acción Democrática Nacionalista	National Democratic Action
AP	Acción Popular	Popular Action
APRA	Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana	American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
AQUI	Aymaras y Quechuas Unidos e Integrados	Aymaras y Quechuas United and Integrated
ASN	Alianza Solidaridad Nacional	National Solidarity Alliance
ASP	Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos	Assembly for the People's Sovereignty
CAN	Confederación Nacional Agraria	National Agrarian Confederation
CCP	Confederación Campesina del Perú	Peasant Confederation of Peru
CDAVCH	Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y la Vida de Cochabamba	Cochabamba Coordinator for the Defense of Water
CEDIB	Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia	Bolivian Center for Documentation and Information
CIDOB	Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano	Indigenous Peoples' Federation of Eastern Bolivia
CNMCIOB – B.S.	*Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas y Originarias de Bolivia – Bartolina Sisa*	Originary Peasant Women's National Confederation of Bolivia - Bartolina Sisa
COB	Central Obrera Boliviana	Bolivian Workers' Confederation
CODES	Centrales Obreras Departamentales	Workers' Departmental Centrals
COFECAY	Consejo de Federaciones Campesinas de los Yungas	Council of Yungas' Peasant Federation

COMUNAL	Coordinadora de Movilización Única Nacional	Unitary National Coordinator of Mobilizations
CONAMAQ	Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu	National Council of Ayllus and Markas of the Qullasuyu
CONDEPA	Conciencia de Patria	Conscience of Fatherland
Coordinadora (or COCA TROPICO)	Coordinadora de las 6 Federaciones del Trópico	Coordinator of the Six Federations of the Tropics
COR-El Alto	Central Obrera Regional de El Alto	Regional Workers' Central of El Alto
CPESC	Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz	Coordinator of the Ethnic Peoples of Santa Cruz
CSCB	Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia	Syndical Confederation of Bolivian Colonizers
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia	Unitary Syndical Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers
F2011	Fuerza 2011	Force 2011
FARTAC	Federación Agraria Revolucionaria Túpac Amaru de Cusco	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Agrarian Federation of Cusco
FCCT	Federación de Colonizadores de Carrasco Tropical	Carrasco Tropical Colonizers' Federation
FDCC	Federación Departamental de Campesinos del Cusco	Departmental Peasants' Federation of Cusco
FDMCOC – B.S.	Federación Departamental de Mujeres Campesinas Originarias de Cochabamba – Bartolina Sisa	Originary Peasant Women's Departmental Federation of Cochabamba - Bartolina Sisa
FDUTC-LP “TK”	Federación Departamental Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz “Tupac Katari”	Unified Departmental Federation of La Paz Peasant Workers - Tupac Katari
FECCH	Federación de Colonizadores de Chimoré	Chimoré Colonizers' Federation

FEJUVE-El Alto	Federación de Juntas Vecinales de El Alto	Federation of Neighborhood Councils of El Alto
FETCTC	Federación Especial de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba	Special Federation of Peasant Workers of the Cochabamba Tropic
FEYCH	Federación Especial Yungas del Chapare	Yungas del Chapare's Special Federation
FREDEMO	Frente Democrático	Democratic Front
FSAMBB	Federación Sindical Agropecuaria de Mamoré-Bulo Bulo	Mamoré-Bulo Bulo Agropecuarian Syndicate Federation
FSCC	Federacion Sindical Colonizadores de Cochabamba	Colonizers' Syndicate Federation of Cochabamba
FSUTCC	Federacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Cochabamba	Unitary Syndical Federation of Cochabamba Peasant Workers
FUCU	Federación Unica de Centrales Unidas	Unitary Federation of United Centrals
GP	Gana Perú	Peru Wins
IU	Izquierda Unida	United Left
MAS-IPSP	Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento por la Soberanía de los Pueblos	Movement Towards Socialism - Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples
MBL	Movimiento Bolivia Libre	Free Bolivia Movement
MDS	Movimiento Demócrata Social	Social Democratic Movement
MIP	Movimiento Indigena Pachakuti	Pachakuti Indigenous Movement
MIR	Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria	Leftist Revolutionary Movement
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario	Nationalist Revolutionary Movement
MNRI	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda	Leftwing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement

MNRV	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario - Vanguardia	Nationalist Revolutionary Movement-Vanguard
MRTA	Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru	Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
MRTK	Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari	Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement
MRTKL	Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación	Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement of Liberation
MSM	Movimiento Sin Miedo	Without Fear Movement
NFR	Nueva Fuerza Republicana	New Republican Force
PNP	Partido Nacionalista Peruano	Peruvian Nationalist Party
PODEMOS	Poder Democrático Social	Social Democratic Power
PP	Perú Posible	Possible Peru
PPB-CN	Plan Progreso para Bolivia - Convergencia Nacional	Plan Progress for Bolivia-National Convergence
PPC	Partido Popular Cristiano	Popular Christian Party
PS	Partido Socialista	Socialist Party
SUMA	Sentimiento y Unidad por el Mundo Andino	Sentiment and Unity for the Andean World
UCS	Unidad Cívica Solidaridad	Solidarity Civic Unity
UD	Unidad Demócrata	Democratic Unity
UDP	Unidad Democrática Popular	Popular Democratic Unity
UN	Unidad Nacional	National Unity
UPP	Unión por el Perú	Union for Peru

CHAPTER 1

SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND PARTY SYSTEM RECONSTRUCTION IN BOLIVIA AND PERU

On October 17, 2003, the Bolivian president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada ("Goni"), submitted his resignation and fled the country amidst a wave of massive indigenous social protests. The protests combined road blockades, hunger strikes, barricades, and a national strike that paralyzed the city of El Alto for nearly two weeks, blocking water, gas, and food supplies from reaching the capital city of La Paz.[1] These *Octubre Negro* ("Black October") protests opposed the export of natural gas to the United States through Chilean ports and demanded the nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada, and the convocation of a Constitutional Assembly to refound Bolivia and increase the inclusion of indigenous populations.[2]

The protests represented the culmination of an insurrectionary cycle that began with the Cochabamba "Water Wars" in 2000 and brought Bolivia to the verge of civil conflict. At the forefront of this insurrectionary cycle were indigenous populations that, while a majority, had historically been excluded from political decision-making processes in Bolivian society. In a context of limited institutional spaces for expression, the indigenous took to the streets to demand political change and inclusion by force.

The October 2003 protests represented the moment of collapse of the 'old' Bolivian political and economic order. Economically, the indigenous mobilizations defeated the pro-market

[1] For a chronology of the events, see "Cuando la 'guerra del gas' le ganó al 'diálogo del gas'" (Los Tiempos, 2003) and "La cronología de la caída del ex-Presidente" (Correo del Sur, 2003).

[2] These demands were part of a larger October Agenda put together by the various sectors involved in the protests. More than a unified wave of social mobilizations, the protests were a collection of parallel mobilizations led by numerous social organizations that shared a set of key goals—the nationalization of gas resources, the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada, and a Constitutional Assembly—but that were also mobilizing with their own set of sectoral demands.

economic model that had prevailed since 1985. Protesters demanded an economic framework that combined statism—particularly pertaining to natural resources—with economic and political sovereignty from transnational corporations and foreign governments. Politically, the expulsion of Sánchez de Lozada also put the final nail in the coffin of the traditional Bolivian party system. The three parties that had dominated Bolivian politics since the 1982 democratic transition—Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), National Democratic Action (ADN), and Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR)—all but disappeared from the electoral arena.[3] Moreover, the political elites associated with these and other established parties also lost their representational legitimacy, with the population calling for a total renovation of the country's political class.

The period that immediately followed this moment of collapse was an uncertain one. On the one hand, Bolivian society had cleaned the political and economic slates for the emergence of a more representative political system and statist economic model. On the other hand, however, this insurrectionary cycle had submerged Bolivian society into a seemingly permanent state of crisis—which Rojas Ríos (2007) calls the "abyss syndrome"—that jeopardized the democratic system and threatened social collapse.

With indigenous populations emboldened and radicalized, and non-indigenous populations fearing a loss of power, an armed conflict between these sectors remained within the realm of possibilities at the time. Felipe Quispe, then leader of the Unitary Syndical Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB)—Bolivia's most powerful indigenous peasant union—regularly called for the transition to an armed indigenous struggle and the foundation of the *Qollasuyu* indigenous nation (Quispe Huanca 2013). Leaders from political movements and labor

[3] Although Bolivians were protesting against the national government at the time, led by the MNR, they expressed anger against all political elites. The most symbolic expression of this collective anger with the party system came during a wave of protests in February 2003, when the national headquarters of the MNR and MIR, two of the three traditional parties, were burned down (Crespo 2003).

unions also threatened social conflict and proposed the organization of an indigenous army (Pinto and Pérez 2003). And in the eastern lowlands, the Santa Cruz Youth (*Juventud Cruceñista*), the Camba Nation (*Nación Camba*), and the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (*Comité pro Santa Cruz*), three non-indigenous groups from the Santa Cruz department in the eastern lowlands, used racial slurs and violence against the indigenous populations and called for the formation of a new *Camba* (and non-indigenous) ethnic nation.[4]

Yet, despite the heightened polarization and the eventual resignation of another Bolivian president in 2005 amidst more social protests, with the election of Evo Morales in December 2005 Bolivia entered what is arguably the most stable period in the country's democratic history.[5] Morales, Bolivia's first indigenous president and the leader of the coca growers' movement (the *cocaleros*), rose to power with a social movement party (Anria 2013; Van Cott 2005; Kitschelt 2006)—the Movement Towards Socialism-Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP or MAS)[6]—that gathered the most important indigenous, peasant, neighborhood, and labor organizations in Bolivian society. His election represented the political victory of the historically underrepresented indigenous majorities of Bolivia and, in that sense, symbolized a radical deepening of Bolivian democracy (Anria 2016).

[4] Peña Claros and Jordán Bazán (2006) narrate the parallel counter-mobilizations that occurred in Santa Cruz against the indigenous protests taking place in El Alto in October 2003. They write: "the resistance was now being actively organized: they invited retired military chiefs to organize an *Estado Mayor* ("Mayor State"). These excused themselves for multiple reasons, so the organizing was done instead amongst civilians." On October 17, 2003, "at 4:00 pm, the peasant march reaches the center plaza. The [Santa Cruz] FEJUVE group intercepts them […] the environment gets heated and insults are thrown around. […] The confrontations begin […] They produce a rush to get away, with the peasants running away chased with sticks and belts. Several fall wounded […] Later, at 8:30 pm, the *Comité pro Santa Cruz* releases a statement calling 'for a new Republic.' This statement includes the threat of Santa Cruz independence from Bolivia" (p. 68-71).

[5] Although rates of social mobilization have remained elevated in the years since, and the threat of conflict persisted through 2009, the nature of these protests has nonetheless shifted. Whereas the protests that characterized the pre-2006 period were largely driven by major mobilizations that called for the absolute transformation of the political and economic systems, the protest cycles of recent years have instead expressed a "street democracy" in which social protests—many of which have been targeted at local governments—have become normalized as a medium for making demands of the state (Rojas Ríos 2007: 201).

[6] Throughout, I use both MAS and MAS-IPSP to refer to this political project.

Since the 2005 election, Morales has won two other elections (2009 and 2014), both with more than 60 percent of the vote. As a result, the Bolivian party system has gained an unexpected degree of regularity and stability. While the opposition parties remain in flux (Eaton 2016), the rise of the MAS-IPSP can nonetheless be said to have triggered at least a partial process of party system reconstruction and stabilization (Carreras, Morgenstern, and Su 2015; Rice 2011). What explains this dramatic shift from a democracy on the verge of disintegration and social conflict to the partial reconstruction and stabilization of a new party system with nearly unprecedented levels of political support?

The political developments in Bolivia become even more puzzling when we consider the case of neighboring Peru, where an opposite process seems to have taken place. Like Bolivia, Peru experienced the collapse of its party system in the 1990s.[7] Without much warning, political parties that had emerged between the 1930s and 1960s rapidly lost electoral support and saw their national presence erode. At the same time, the Leftist political movements engaged in electoral competition—and which seemed, until the late 1980s, to be headed towards a successful unification—rapidly disintegrated by the 1990 election (Roberts 1998).

As in Bolivia, the clearing of the political slate in Peru created great uncertainty. On the one hand, it raised the possibility of a more representative political system. On the other, it also jeopardized an already fragile democracy that was not only submerged in an unprecedented economic crisis at the time but that was also facing the very real threat of the Shining Path and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) guerrilla insurgencies, which were beginning to expand into the capital city. But, instead of transitioning to a new phase of party system reconstruction and heightened political representation—as Bolivia had done—Peru descended into a deeper political crisis. Since collapse, Peru's political system has remained in flux (Levitsky and Cameron 2003;

[7] See Cameron (1994), Cotler (1995), Kenney (2003), Roberts and Arce (1998), Seawright (2012), and Tanaka (1998).

Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016; Tanaka 2005). Its political instability has persisted even in the presence of an ethnic cleavage and a sizable indigenous population that, much like Bolivia's, has continuously structured electoral support for nascent political organizations among indigenous and non-indigenous populations (Madrid 2011, 2012; Raymond and Arce 2011). Why, despite facing similar systemic shocks, has Bolivia successfully embarked on a new and stabilizing process of partial party system reconstruction while Peru has thus far failed in this endeavor? This is the central question driving this dissertation.

Existing scholarship on this puzzle has been grounded in one of two scholarly approaches: "bottom-up" and "top-down". Scholars in the structuralist "bottom-up" tradition emphasize the importance of salient social cleavages for shaping patterns of party system reconstruction. When sufficiently salient, social cleavages are argued to provide the underlying structures for the emergence of stable patterns of political competition, triggering the formation of political parties and enabling the stabilization (or "freezing") of the party system (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Scholarship within this approach has explained the differences between Bolivia and Peru as a result of shifts in the salience of the underlying social cleavage structures. Specifically, scholars posits that the erosion of previously salient class cleavages and class-based party systems in both countries was followed by the consolidation of a newly salient ethnic cleavage in the case of Bolivia (Van Cott 2005; Faguet 2017; Gisselquist 2005; Madrid 2012; Rice 2012; Yashar 2005) and the expansion of a cleavage-less society in the case of Peru (Cameron 1991, 1994; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Roberts 1996, 2002). They point to these cleavage-level dynamics to explain why Bolivia has experienced the reconstruction of a party system grounded in an ethnic cleavage, whereas Peru remains in a seemingly permanent state of party system collapse and is instead characterized by individualistic patterns of political behavior and the prevalence of personalistic politics.

A more top-down approach has focused instead on the role of strategic politicians in constructing and activating political identities to mobilize electoral support (Chhibber and Torcal 1997; de Leon, Desai, and Tugal 2015; Posner 2004; Raymond and Arce 2011; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). Rather than seeing political parties as reflectors of salient collective identities, this approach sees them as strategic architects. From this perspective, political parties can either craft social cleavages and afford them with salience and meaning or rely on personalistic types of appeals, sometimes identity-based, to mobilize support.

Top-down explanations for the variation in party system reconstruction outcomes between Bolivia and Peru suggest that, while ethnopopulist appeals grounded in ethnicity have existed in both countries, those implemented by the MAS-IPSP in Bolivia have resulted in the successful activation of an ethnic cleavage, whereas those in Peru have remained largely strategic, top-down, and intermittent in nature (Madrid 2011, 2012). From this perspective, Peru's elevated levels of electoral volatility and political instability are argued to reflect the malleability of voters and their high responsiveness to shifting top-down personalistic (and sometimes ethnopopulist) appeals (Madrid 2011; Raymond and Arce 2011).

Both the bottom-up and top-down approaches rest on an important assumption that there is a direct correspondence between party systems and social cleavages. Although using different starting points—with the bottom-up approach seeing cleavages as the drivers of political competition and the top-down one seeing political elites as the generators of social cleavages—both approaches nonetheless expect social cleavages (or their absence) and party systems to reflect each other. That is, whether generated from below or from above, salient social cleavages are expected to gain expression at both the voter and party system levels and both of these levels are assumed to represent mirror images of each other.

A central implication of existing approaches is that voters and party systems do not have independent characteristics of their own. The *mirror-image assumption* that underlies existing research negates the possibility that social cleavages, even when sufficiently salient, may structure patterns of political behavior amongst voters and yet nonetheless fail to become articulated in the party system. As this dissertation will show, however, this assumption conceals significant variation in political parties' capacity to reflect voter preferences even when these are grounded in consistently salient social cleavage structures.

In contrast to the bottom-up and top-down approaches, this dissertation focuses on the process of *social cleavage articulation*—the process through which social cleavages gain expression in the party system—to understand the conditions under which salient social cleavages contribute to the formation and stabilization of party systems or, alternatively, trigger increased levels of political instability. The dissertation posits that the articulation of social cleavages in the party system—even when cleavages are highly salient—is far from inevitable and is, instead, highly prone to failure and that this has important implications for patterns of party system reconstruction and stabilization.

This dissertation argues that the process of cleavage articulation occurs individually for each of the rival blocs within the social cleavage (for example, for workers and employers in a class cleavage or for indigenous and non-indigenous in an ethnic cleavage) and that it can fail for neither, one, or both social blocs and produce three distinct articulation scenarios: full, partial, or failed cleavage articulation. Each of these scenarios is associated with different party system reconstruction outcomes. Whereas the full articulation of a social cleavage should result in party system stabilization, its partial articulation should produce differentiated patterns of political stability for the various blocs. Failed cleavage articulation, for its part, should instead be associated with increased levels of political instability and even social conflict. Thus, similarly salient social

cleavages can undergo different articulation processes and result in divergent party system outcomes.

My dissertation introduces a theory of *networked social cleavage articulation* to explain the conditions under which salient social cleavages will be more or less likely to become articulated into party systems and stabilize patterns of political competition. This theory emphasizes the role of social network structures in conditioning cleavage articulation processes. Specifically, it posits that the social network structures within which nascent political parties emerge condition these parties' route to expansion and capacity for cleavage articulation.

The proposed networked cleavage articulation theory offers an alternative explanation to the bottom-up and top-down approaches for the variation in party system reconstruction outcomes between Bolivia and Peru. Instead of tracing the differences between these countries to the variation in social cleavage salience—as the bottom-up approach does—or to the prevalence of different personalistic appeals, as the top-down approach suggests—this framework argues that the differences between the two countries stems from the variation in the *degree of articulation* of these countries' consistently salient ethnic cleavages. Whereas Bolivia's ethnic cleavage has become partially articulated in the party system and enabled the partial stabilization of the party system, Peru's ethnic cleavage has thus far failed to become articulated and has therefore become associated with elevated levels of political instability.

This theoretical argument is developed in three parts. First, the dissertation posits that *social cleavages can exist in society and structure voters' political behavior without necessarily undergoing articulation and triggering the formation of stable party systems*. Bolivia and Peru have historically shared comparable and consistently salient ethnic cleavage structures. Since the colonial period, these cleavages have shaped processes of state formation (Barragán 2018; Platt 2016; Rivera Cusicanqui 1984; Stefanoni 2010) and provided the foundations for the emergence of

social, political, and economic inequalities, as well as patterns of social conflict and political behavior. Far from being "new", ethnic cleavages in both Bolivia and Peru have been an ever-present—yet remarkably dynamic—feature in these societies' histories[8] and have structured politics with macro-level regularity, even as political actors have shifted in unpredictable ways.[9] The dissertation shows that ethnic cleavages in both Bolivia and Peru have been consistently salient throughout much of their histories and that, since their democratic transition, these cleavages have provided significant stability to patterns of political behavior, shaping both voter behavior and programmatic and ideological preferences. I demonstrate, however, that this voter-level stability has nonetheless been associated with shifting articulation efforts and party system-level outcomes.

Second, the theory posits that what explains the variation in party system reconstruction outcomes between Bolivia and Peru is the degree of articulation of their ethnic cleavages in the representational arena. In Bolivia, the MAS-IPSP produced a successful articulation of the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage: its political ideology expressed the core programmatic, cultural, and ideological components of the indigenous identity and, for the first time, brought together Aymaras and Quechuas (and to a lesser extent, the indigenous from the eastern lowlands

[8] When do we get to call something new? Although this may seem like a small difference, it is far from an inconsequential one. If ethnic cleavages are newly salient, the question to ask is: how did this politicization happen? Yet, if ethnic cleavages did not become newly salient and, instead, were already politically consequential even before the emergence of an explicitly ethnicized political discourse, then the question turns into an organizational one. Why have some salient ethnic cleavages produced social mobilization and contributed to the stabilization of stable party systems while others have remained politically disorganized despite their salience? The first approach asks whether this politicization resulted from strategic, institutional, or international processes to decipher who activated a cleavage, how, and why. The second one instead asks why the organizational expression of the cleavage takes a certain form in one context and a different form in another; and it examines what the consequences of this variation in organizational capacity are for patterns of political representation.

[9] This is not to say that cleavage salience has not varied over time. Because cleavages are shaped largely by institutional and societal transformations, they can be expected to change both in terms of their composition and their political content. This is central to the conceptualization of social cleavages that I advance in this dissertation. The larger point here, however, is that variation in political outcomes cannot be explained exclusively by the differences in strength across social cleavages. Once cleavages are salient and politically consequential, their articulation in the political arena will produce varied expressions and shape representational and stability outcomes.

and the indigenous *mestizos*) under a single political umbrella. This successful articulation enabled the consolidation of the political party and the stabilization of patterns of political competition. Even though the non-indigenous bloc remains disarticulated, its political place in the party system is nonetheless clearly delineated. By contrast, both the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs in Peru remain disarticulated. This lack of articulation of Peru's ethnic cleavage has triggered elevated levels of electoral volatility and political instability.

But, what accounts for this variation in patterns of ethnic cleavage articulation? The third argument that this study advances is that social cleavage articulation is itself conditioned by the structures of the social networks from which nascent political parties and their articulation efforts emerge. Social networks offer a field of linkages that regulate the flow of information and resources between society and nascent political organizations, delineate parties' mobilizational capacity, and condition their possibilities for expansion. Variation in the *structures* of these social networks—and specifically, in their breadth and depth—plays a critical role in facilitating or hindering the successful articulation of collective identities in the political arena. In Bolivia, the robust social network structures associated with the indigenous bloc facilitated the articulation of the indigenous identity in the party system. Although MAS-IPSP—which was formed by the coca growers' movement—began as a small party in the tropics of Cochabamba, it rapidly expanded into the national arena through a diverse organizational landscape, which included regional and national indigenous peasant federations, amongst other organizations. The strong linkages that characterized the party's social network landscape enabled it to grow and drastically increase its articulation capacity, leading it to an explosive victory in the 2005 election. The same did not occur for the non-indigenous opposition, which has relied exclusively on local and regional networks and has thus far failed in its efforts to construct a political platform that effectively articulates the various political components of the non-indigenous identity.

A similar dynamic to that of Bolivia's non-indigenous parties has operated in Peru amongst both the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs of the ethnic cleavage. In this society, nascent parties have emerged from networks that have tended to lack structural depth, breadth, or both. The outcome has been a wide gamut of unsuccessful political projects that have failed to articulate either the indigenous or non-indigenous identities. Some of these organizations have experienced regional success but have disappeared while attempting to expand nationally; others have emerged in the capital but have failed to mobilize any meaningful support from any core groups in society. And yet others have been unable to transcend beyond even small pockets in the capital city or local provinces. The structures of the social networks that these parties have emerged from—many of them clearly grounded in particular ethnic cleavage blocs—reveal crucial details about these parties' development pitfalls, their structural weaknesses, and their likelihood of success.

Altogether, this dissertation aims to shed light on why party system reconstruction efforts frequently fail, a crucial question in the study of democratic politics. Party systems—and the political parties that compose them—are considered indispensable ingredients for a well-functioning democracy (Schattschneider 1942).[10] Yet, while indispensable, these party systems have also proven surprisingly vulnerable to the challenges of democratic competition (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016; Roberts 2014).[11] For Latin America, the 1980s and 1990s, far from being characterized by party system institutionalization in the context of consolidating democracies, were instead a period of generalized representational crises and political collapse.

[10] Party systems provide the institutional channels for expressing the deepest political fractures in society (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). They afford regularity and, therefore, predictability to patterns of political competition, constrain the interactions between political parties, and ease the decision-making process for voters. The political parties that make up these party systems, for their part, connect voters to the State and facilitate democratic engagement through party-voter linkages (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt et al. 2010) and party brands (Lupu 2016). For politicians, political parties enable coordination and decrease the costs of running for office (Aldrich 2011).

[11] Perhaps the greatest irony of Latin American politics is that authoritarian regimes' brutal persecution of political parties across the region proved to be less lethal than the ballot box for many political parties' survival (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016; Loxton 2016). Some of the most stable political parties in the region began to disappear with the expansion of democracy and after a few electoral cycles.

Across the region, party systems began to crumble not long after the democratic transitions (Lupu 2016; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Morgan 2011; Roberts 2014; Seawright 2012). From Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador—where party systems were weakly institutionalized at the time—to Costa Rica and Venezuela—two bulwarks of democracy during a period characterized by widespread and repressive authoritarian regimes—this period brought about the decline of traditional political party structures and the emergence of new political actors. Where established party systems survived, traditional parties often declined in significance and signaled the increased fragility of party system structures across the region.

Although we currently have a rather robust understanding of why party systems across the region collapsed—with scholars highlighting the implementation of ideologically disparate neoliberal reforms by parties of the Left (Roberts 2013, 2014), the erosion of party-society linkages (Morgan 2011) as well as of party brands (Lupu 2016), political pacts between historically opposing parties (Slater and Simmons 2013), and voter disenchantment (Seawright 2012)—we know less about the party system reconstruction processes that have ensued since collapse. This moment of systemic collapse, however, offers a unique opportunity to evaluate processes of representation building. By ridding the political arena of its traditional actors and networks, instances of party system collapse clear the political arena for the emergence of new structures of electoral competition, patterns of political representation, and party-voter linkages. My work uses this distinct political landscape to examine how party systems are reconstructed and why such processes seem remarkably prone to failure.

I. Contributions to the Literature

This dissertation makes several empirical and theoretical contributions to the literatures on political representation and participation. First, it contributes to the understanding of social

cleavages and their political expression. My work challenges the predominant mirror image assumption about social cleavage-party system correspondence and sheds light on the challenges of articulating social cleavages in the party system. By differentiating between salient social cleavages and their political expression, the dissertation elucidates instances of underrepresentation of salient collective identities and brings attention to the implications of this for patterns of political instability. To facilitate such analyses, I introduce an empirical approach that examines social cleavages independently from their attachments to, or expression through, particular political organizations. This approach allows for the identification of often-overlooked consistencies in the strength, composition, and programmatic content of social cleavages, regardless of the stability or representational capacity of the political parties seeking to articulate the cleavages. By treating the representational capacity of a political party as an empirical puzzle, this dissertation offers a different starting point for conversations about cleavage salience and activation and contributes to our understanding of the variation in party building efforts.

My work also contributes to the study of social cleavages by introducing a multi-dimensional conceptualization of cleavages and their process of articulation. The dissertation treats social cleavages as historically and contextually rooted, and sees their socio-structural, identity, and programmatic content as interconnected and integral to the political identities associated with the cleavage. The approach introduced to evaluate cleavage articulation therefore explores how political parties' *articulation efforts* weave each of these elements together into a coherent political ideology to determine parties' likelihood of consolidation. By recognizing and incorporating the complexity of social cleavages into the analysis of articulation processes, this dissertation introduces a more nuanced approach to understanding the challenges of building political representation for salient collective identities in society.

Additionally, the dissertation also contributes to our understanding of the interactions between social conflict and social organizations in party building processes. I build on recent work by Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (2016: 14-26) that highlights the role of *social conflict* and *organizational inheritance* in enabling successful party building. These scholars find that, of the eleven instances of successful party building in Latin America between 1978 and 2005, ten were born from 'extraordinary conflict' and ten also emerged from social organizations, whether of an authoritarian (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016; Loxton 2015), insurgent (Holland 2016), or social movement (Samuels and Zucco 2015b, 2015a) origin. My dissertation zeroes in on these two dimensions and deepens Levitsky et al's work in two key ways. First, I show that not all social cleavages (or conflicts) give rise to strong political parties. Whereas some social cleavages can be associated with party system consolidation, others have driven an increase in levels of political instability and social conflict. My work sheds lights on the conditions under which social cleavages are more likely to result in successful party building and explains why the articulation of cleavages in the party system can vary significantly both over time and across rival blocs within a social cleavage, with important implications for party building outcomes. Second, my dissertation finds that, while social organizations are fundamental in contexts of party system reconstruction—when the pre-established political networks have collapsed and nascent political parties must necessarily rely more on other types of social networks—not all social organizations are made alike. Network structures matter: whereas some social organizations are indeed conducive to successful party building, many others will actually hinder or short-circuit the party-building process. Network structures, I find, place crucial constraints on nascent political parties' capacity to articulate collective identities, construct effective representation, and mobilize electoral support. My dissertation introduces a framework for understanding how variation in the social network structures from which nascent political parties emerge shapes the likelihood that a social cleavage

will become articulated in the party system. In so doing, I find, network structures constrain and mold party system reconstruction outcomes in ways that have thus far remained under-explored.

Like Levitsky et al, my study also contributes to the study of party politics by incorporating into the analysis instances of failed party building efforts. Although such efforts tend to be short-lived—and, as a result, are frequently left out of studies of party system formation—they are nonetheless far from inconsequential and represent a fundamental component of the party system reconstruction process. Instances of party building failure reveal crucial information about the challenges that new political actors face in constructing political offers after party system collapse. When studied alongside cases of party building success, they shed light on both the sources of this variation as well as on system-level dynamics that are associated with the inclusion, exclusion, underrepresentation, or overrepresentation of key sectors in society.

Finally, this project also makes a contribution to the literature on ethnic politics by challenging narratives that treat ethnic cleavages and their political expression as fundamentally different from other types of social cleavages, such as class or religious cleavages (see, for example, Chandra 2004; Gunther and Diamond 2003; D. Horowitz 1985; H. Kitschelt 2001; Posner 2005). In contrast to these works, which have dominated the study of ethnic politics in Africa and Asia, this dissertation posits that ethnic cleavages—at least in contexts where they have historically structured state-society relations and become mapped onto inequality structures—can be associated with differentiated programmatic and ideological preferences and provide the foundations for the formation of programmatic party systems. This is the case even at times of striking political instability and elevated levels of electoral volatility. By highlighting the association between ethnic differences and programmatic preferences, the dissertation introduces new angles to ethnic cleavages, which are usually assumed to lack programmatic content and to be primarily conducive to clientelistic politics.

II. Research Design

The dissertation employs a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis and draws extensively from secondary sources and a wide range of data collected over more than three years of fieldwork in Bolivia and Peru.[12] The material gathered includes semi-structured interviews with leaders of social networks, elite survey-interviews, focus groups, participatory observation of meetings by social movements, communities, and political parties, and the collection of campaign, organizational, and news materials.

I carried out nearly 200 interviews with organizational leaders, politicians, intellectuals, and journalists (see Appendix for a list). The organizational leaders included leaders of social movements, market associations, labor and peasant unions, cultural groups, business associations, and community organizations, amongst others. I used a reputational sample and followed a two-pronged identification strategy. First, I talked to leaders of multiple political parties—both at the national and regional levels—and asked them about the more powerful social organizations in society and the organizations that their parties worked with most closely both during and in between election cycles. Second, I interviewed journalists and asked them to provide me with lists of the more relevant social events in recent times, the actors that participated in and organized these events, and other historically significant collective actors in their regions. I then implemented interviews with, or gathered data on, as many of these organizations as possible. Implementing interviews with network leaders was not always feasible, however, either because some organizations existed only in name or their leaders were not reachable or available. Whenever I was unable to obtain interviews with network leaders, I gathered information about them through interviews with journalists and politicians, as well as from primary and secondary materials.

[12] The bulk of the data were collected between 2013 and 2016. In addition, data was gathered during shorter trips to Peru and/or Bolivia in 2009 and 2011.

In addition, I also implemented interviews with politicians both at the national and regional levels. I focused these interviews on three groups of politicians: party leaders, political candidates, and elected officials. Conversations with *party leaders* were used to decipher party origins, strategies for growth, challenges identified in the process of party building, and patterns of interaction with various sectors of civil society. In Bolivia, I followed closely the process of party building and campaigning for three predominantly non-indigenous opposition parties: the Without Fear Movement (MSM), National Unity (UN), and Social Democratic Movement (MDS). The latter two would eventually join forces under the Democratic Unity (UD) electoral alliance, a process that I traced during my fieldwork. In Peru, the focus of the interviews with party leaders was regional. I interviewed representatives responsible for expanding the presence of parties in various regions across the country.

Interviews with *political candidates*, for their part, were implemented in Peru in the months leading up to the 2016 election as well as, to a lesser extent, with candidates competing in the 2015 Bolivian elections. These interviews centered on identifying party strategies for filling their candidate lists as well as politicians' and organizations' rationale for joining these lists. They also shed light on candidates' relationships to social networks in their particular regions and provided a more localized perspective on the process of campaigning. Finally, I also interviewed and implemented an original survey with elected members of the 2011-2016 Peruvian Congress. The surveys combined closed and open-ended questions and were implemented using an interview format, meaning that, for the closed questions, I would ask the question and provide response options, and they would select their answer from the list but elaborate as much as they thought necessary. These surveys were implemented in person and lasted anywhere from 20 to 90 minutes. The survey touched on political background, knowledge about voter trends, party and politicians'

linkages to society, as well as approaches to political articulation. A similar survey was not implemented in Bolivia due to logistical constraints.

In addition to elite interviews, the research also included a focus group component that was designed to examine collective identities and political views amongst indigenous and non-indigenous populations.[13] The focus groups were divided into indigenous and non-indigenous groups and were implemented in the cities of La Paz and Santa Cruz.

Finally, the fieldwork also included other components such as participatory observation of gatherings of social organizations and political party rallies; collection of materials from political campaigns, social movements and organizations, and news; and gathering of census and election data. I used a news archive from the Bolivia Center for Documentation and Information (CEDIB) that incorporated news articles from 14 different national and regional newspapers to build a dataset on intra- and inter-organizational interactions in Bolivia throughout 2003. I use this dataset to inform a portion of my analysis of network structures and party building processes in Bolivia.

I also constructed two original datasets, one for Bolivia and one for Peru, using census and election data. These datasets combine municipal-level electoral and census data since 1989 for Bolivia and 1980 for Peru.[14] I worked extensively with these data, as well as with survey data from the *Latin American Public Opinion Project* and the *Parliamentary Elites of Latin America* survey to analyze patterns of political behavior amongst indigenous and non-indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru.

[13] This component was implemented in collaboration with Rafael Loayza and was funded by the *Universidad Católica Boliviana*.

[14] For Peru, there is no municipal level election data available for 1995. For that year, the analyses were implemented at the provincial level for the country and at the municipal level in Lima.

III. Case selection

Bolivia and Peru's recent experiences with party system collapse, their sizable indigenous populations—the majority of which are of Quechua and Aymara descent—and shared historical experiences, and the perception that class, as opposed to ethnicity, structured their former party systems, make these most similar cases ideal for evaluating the proposed theory. The cases allow me to control for the potential influence of other confounding factors and thus hone in analytically on the differences in the articulation process in the two countries. Among the five cases of party system collapse in Latin America—Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela—Bolivia and Peru are the most similar yet represent the two opposite poles in terms of party system reconstruction outcomes (the dependent variable).

Whereas Bolivia is considered the most successful instance—if still partial—of party system reconstruction since collapse (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016; Madrid 2016), Peru represents Latin America's most remarkable case of "institutionalization" of party system collapse (Levitsky 2018; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016).[15] Dominant explanations for this variation, moreover, have turned to the underlying social cleavage structures, arguing for a successful instance of ethnic cleavage activation in the case of Bolivia and a failed case of this in Peru. In fact, according to much of the scholarship on party politics in Latin America (Cameron 1991; Van Cott 2005; Roberts 2002; Roberts and Arce 1998; Vergara 2015; Yashar 2005), Peru serves as the perfect Latin American example of a cleavage-less society, which Bartolini and Mair (1990) define as:

> A society which is characterized by the complete absence of historically structured cleavages, and in which individual political behavior is untrammeled by the history of past political or organizational struggles. Within such a context, the electorate as a whole lacks

[15] Levitsky and Cameron (2003) famously classified it as a democracy without parties and, thus, without a party system.

> any real sense of identification with the competing social or political groups; the translation of non-political roles into the political realm remains wholly unstructured; and voters are free to respond to each and every different stimulus. As such, the situation is one in which there is a wholly shared electoral market and potentially unlimited vote elasticity […] (p. 181)

Peru therefore provides the least likely scenario for the identification of a salient and historically consequential ethnic cleavage, and serves as a hard test for the articulation framework advanced in this dissertation. By comparing this case with that of Bolivia, I hope to shed light on the mechanisms driving the relationship between social cleavages and party system reconstruction outcomes.

IV. Concepts

1. *Social cleavages:* I define social cleavages as socio-structural fractures that divide society into two or more opposing groups—which I call (rival) cleavage blocs (i.e. workers versus employers, indigenous vs. non-indigenous, rural vs. urban)—and that consistently structure voters' political behavior. In line with Bartolini and Mair's (1990) widely accepted definition of cleavages, the definition employed here incorporates both socio-structural and identity components. But, in contrast to their definition, which takes the organizational dimension as an integral element of any social cleavage, I treat this dimension as an empirical puzzle and consider how the association between a social cleavage and different organizational structures shapes the expression of these cleavages in the party system.

The conceptualization advanced here emphasizes the historical and institutional roots of cleavage salience. I treat the salience of a social cleavage as the product of historical interactions between opposing cleavage blocs and between each of these and the State. These historical experiences—marked by moments of collective resistance and conflict, as well as by formative institutional, legal, and economic decisions—create the fractures that give the cleavage its political

content and its polarizing potential. In this conceptualization, politicians cannot construct cleavage salience; they only articulate it (or disarticulate it). Yet, neither is salience derived from social structures alone. Instead, it stems from the historical processes that polarize society and give cleavages their political content.

2. *Ethnic cleavages*: I define an ethnic cleavage as a type of social cleavage that divides the population along ethnic lines. In the context of Bolivia and Peru, I focus on the indigenous/non-indigenous ethnoracial fracture, which has linguistic, cultural, regional, and socioeconomic features.

This study uses ethnic cleavages to make a larger argument about the relationship between social cleavages and party system formation processes. The project challenges scholarship that treats ethnic cleavages as having a fundamentally different social and political behavior from other types of social cleavages such as class or religion. Whereas existing literature posits that ethnic cleavages lack programmatic and ideological content and are inherently conducive to clientelistic politics, in Chapter 4, I demonstrate that—at least for the cases of Bolivia and Peru—this is not the case and that, in fact, ethnic identities can be associated with much more than just voting behavior. Much like class cleavages, ethnic cleavages can provide strong foundations for the formation of stable and programmatic party systems.

3. *Indigenous*: What it means to be indigenous—and how to measure this identity—in Bolivia and Peru is a topic of significant debate. Scholars debate (1) whether to employ a linguistic or cultural definition; (2) whether indigenousness is an ethno-racial identity that others assign to you or that you choose to identify with; (3) whether this is an appropriate term to use when talking about Quechua, Aymara, or other native populations; and (4) whether we should instead be employing

terms that more clearly reflect self-identification.[16] These debates matter for drawing group boundaries and analyzing cleavage dynamics.

Yet, unfortunately, there are currently no good measures of ethnic identities in Bolivia and Peru that satisfactorily capture the complexity of this concept. Because of this, in my analyses, I focus on what I consider to be a conservative measure of ethnicity—self-reported native language—that reflects social and cultural proximity to the ethnic experience. Those respondents who grew up speaking Quechua or Aymara were categorized as indigenous while those who grew up speaking Spanish were categorized as non-indigenous.[17]

I opted to operationalize ethnicity using language as opposed to self-identification for four reasons (though I do include tests for self-identification in the Appendix). First, the focus groups implemented in Bolivia revealed a strong association between native language and ethnic identification. Both indigenous and non-indigenous respondents tended to define ethnicity using language first. They also tended to add other features associated with culture, physical traits, and relationship to the land when defining their own ethnic roots.[18] Second, native language also

[16] In Peru, for instance, someone from Quechua origin is significantly more likely to self-identify as Quechua than they are to self-identify as indigenous. The indigenous term has instead come to be associated primarily with native populations from the Amazon region as a result of historical processes, whereas Quechuas and Aymaras tend to identify with their particular ethnic groups or refer to themselves as *pueblos* or *pueblos campesinos* (peasant peoples). In this context, notably, the term *pueblos* means much more than just community and incorporates ethnic cultural elements and community practices.

[17] I exclude indigenous populations from the eastern lowlands from my analyses because the data available does not allow for a careful analysis of these populations' political behavior. These tend to be small communities, often located in remote regions of the Amazon. Because of this, they are generally either underrepresented or left out of surveys altogether. They also represent very small percentages in electoral and census data. These limitations, unfortunately, prevent me from examining how these groups' drastically different historical experiences of interaction with the state, vis-à-vis the indigenous majorities from the highlands and the non-indigenous populations, have shaped the salience and expression of their ethnic identities.

[18] For instance, one participant said: "I also consider myself Aymara, because of my parents, because that is my lineage and their lineage. It's the most beautiful thing. I've also gone to live in the rural areas and, you see, you learn many things. You learn to wake up early, to work whether you want to or not; you learn to make *chuño*, to harvest potatoes, to make cheese—which was really hard for me—and it is beautiful, very beautiful. My kids love that stuff, so I tell them, we're Aymara."
Because the focus groups were implemented in urban centers, some of the participants that were in the indigenous group were not native speakers of an indigenous language. However, they identified as Quechuas, Aymaras, or Guaranís and were the children of indigenous people that migrated to the city.

provides a more conservative test for the theory than self-identification because it excludes from the indigenous category those Quechua and Aymara respondents who grew up speaking Spanish as opposed to an indigenous language. This, in a sense, dilutes the contrast between the two ethnic groups and makes it harder to find evidence of differentiation.

Third, while self-identification is more in line with the broadly accepted constructivist approach to social identities than the linguistic operationalization I adopt here, it also has important setbacks. Importantly, self-identification in Andean societies is strongly biased towards the ambiguous category of *mestizo*, a product of nation-building projects that sought to blur ethnic lines and do away with the "backwards" indigenous populations. Until recently (and perhaps even to this day particularly in the case of Peru), indigenous populations that preserve cultural practices, language, and ethnic pride choose not to self-identify as indigenous (though they continue to identify as Quechua and Aymara) because the indigenous category in particular has historically been heavily stigmatized. Because of this, the *mestizo* category conceals significant variation in the perceived indigenousness or whiteness of respondents.

It is also a category that is used flexibly in these societies and means different things for different people. For instance, when asked to identify his race, one focus group participant said "[I identify as] *mestizo* because my parents are Aymaras." Another participant defined *mestizo* as "the mix that happens when you have a Quechua and Aymara family." And another one self-identified as *mestizo* because his father was a Quechua from Peru and his mom a Quechua from Bolivia: "even though we are Quechua, we aren't really because of that mix." Thus, racial self-identification conceals significant variation in the racial and ethnic background of respondents; it lumps together people who think of themselves as racially mixed but identify closely with a particular ethnic culture and identity with those who have no attachment to pre-colonial cultures and identify more closely with their European heritage.

Finally, self-identification also has limitations in its ability to capture how a respondent is perceived by others, a variable that might structure inequalities and trigger discrimination more than self-identification itself. As Telles writes: "since discrimination may be an important mechanism that leads to ethnoracial inequality in the current generation and because discrimination depends mostly on classification by others, self-identified race may poorly or incompletely estimate actual racial inequality" (Telles et al. 2015: 40). Language spoken is therefore a more adequate operationalization of the ethnic cleavage.[19]

4. *Cleavage articulation*: I define cleavage articulation as the process through which political parties identify salient cleavages, decipher their social, programmatic, and identity content, aggregate these elements into a coherent platform and discourse, and afford political representation to the relevant social bloc. Articulation is a multi-level process, occurring first at the level of the rival cleavage blocs—with political parties aiming to articulate a particular bloc's identity—and, second, at the level of the social cleavage, with the party system expressing the social cleavage as a whole. Bloc-level articulation dynamics on two sides of a social cleavage get aggregated to produce a cleavage-level articulation outcome, which may produce a full, partial, or failed social cleavage articulation. This dissertation posits that both bloc-level and cleavage-level articulation dynamics have consequences for party system formation outcomes.

[19] That said, there are nonetheless important limitations to the approach adopted here to measure ethnicity. First, language is a fixed category that assumes a clean break between different social identities. Yet, ethnicity is a fluid experience that varies in intensity across dimensions ranging from self-identification to perception by others, cultural practices, and within-group as well as out-group interactions. Ideal measures would successfully capture these distinct experiences and examine how variation in degrees and intensity along the various dimensions shape individuals' ethnic experiences. Unfortunately, studies of ethnicity in Latin America have thus far failed to incorporate such nuanced measures (Sulmont and Valdivia 2012), with a large majority of studies only capturing differences in language, self-identification, and dress. In lieu of more accurate measures, language serves as a useful if highly imperfect operationalization of *proximity to the ethnic experience*. Individuals that continue to speak indigenous languages in these societies are much more intensely immersed in the ethnic experience than those who do not speak an indigenous language. Moreover, those who speak Spanish face fewer challenges when they seek to engage with the mainstream culture. Centering on language can therefore help capture the distance between the various social groups.

5. *Social network structures:* I define social network structures as the pattern that emerges from the stable interactions within social organizations—between actors and levels—and between these organizations and their broader organizational landscape.[20] My focus is on understanding, first, the patterns of interaction that emerge *within* established (i.e., formal) social organizations—for instance, labor and peasant unions, neighborhood associations, and indigenous organizations—and, second, the ways in which these social organizations are embedded in larger social network landscapes. The latter includes both regular inter-organizational ties as well as more fluid and conjunctural interactions, for instance, at times of social mobilization.

My analyses focus on two features of social network structures (see Chapter 2): their breadth (national strength) and depth (community embeddedness), which together capture the geographical and social reach of these social organizations. Given that most political organizations are born from *some* social network, my interest is in discerning how the structures of the networks within which parties are born, and the organizational landscapes within which these networks are embedded in, facilitate the growth of nascent political parties and their capacity for articulating salient collective identities.

This framework builds on insights from the literature on social movement network structures (see, for example, M. Diani 1990, 1995, 2015; M. Diani and McAdam 2003). This literature has introduced network analysis to the study of social movements and made important contributions to the study of inter-organizational landscapes and their relationship to mobilization patterns broadly understood. My dissertation begins to introduce some of these insights into the study of party politics. However, despite drawing on this literature, this dissertation does not employ formal network analysis. Instead, I combine interviews with organizational leadership with

[20] This definition builds from the work of Diani (1990, 1995, 2015), Diani and McAdam (2003), and Knoke (1990).

primary and secondary material on social organizations to identify networks structural depth and breadth and map both formal organizational structures as well as formal and informal inter-organizational interactions. I then use these organizational landscape maps to evaluate nascent political parties' routes to expansion.

6. *Party system reconstruction*: I define party system reconstruction *efforts* as any party building initiatives that take place after the collapse of the party system. To identify instances of successful party system *reconstruction*, I focus on the consolidation of at least one political party with significant electoral weight and the regularization of patterns of political competition. Instances of failed party system reconstruction are therefore those where no significant political parties have successfully consolidated and where patterns of political competition remain volatile and unpredictable.

V. Dissertation Structure

Altogether, this dissertation argues that the articulation of social cleavages in the party system is conditioned by the structures of the social networks from which nascent political parties and their articulation efforts emerge. Chapter 2 develops this *theory of networked cleavage articulation* in greater detail. I describe further existing approaches to the study of party system formation, outline my critique of these approaches, and develop in detail each of the central claims of the networked cleavage articulation theory. These include the following: (1) salient social cleavages exist and structure political behavior independently from party systems, (2) an articulation process mediates the relationship between social cleavages and party systems and conditions the extent to which salient cleavages become associated with party system formation and stabilization, or alternatively, increased levels of party system instability, and (3) the likelihood

that a social cleavage will become articulated in the party system is conditioned by the social network structures from which nascent political parties appealing to cleavage-based identities emerge.

The remaining dissertation chapters test these various empirical expectations. Chapter 3 evaluates the expectations of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches that both Bolivia and Peru used to be characterized by salient class cleavages and, since the erosion of these cleavages, Bolivia has experienced the consolidation of a newly salient ethnic cleavage while Peru now represents an instance of a cleavage-less society. As an alternative to these approaches, the chapter argues that the ethnic cleavage is neither new in Bolivia nor absent in Peru. Instead, it has consistently structured political preferences and behavior in both societies. The chapter presents a historical overview of ethnic relations in the two countries and argues that the ethnic cleavage has been the central driver of social and state relations throughout history. It also traces the role of ethnicity in key moments of political mobilization before the transition to democracy to demonstrate its relevance for understanding patterns of political behavior prior to this transition. The chapter then shifts attention to the democratic period and evaluates the strength of the ethnic cleavage in structuring voter behavior in these societies. In contrast to the expectations of both the bottom-up and top-down approaches, the chapter finds that ethnicity has consistently structured voter behavior—both before and after the democratic transitions—in Bolivia and Peru. It also finds that the political moment that scholars have used to point to the rise of the ethnic cleavage in Bolivia instead reflected a shift in the articulation of this cleavage: from one in which the indigenous bloc was divided into Quechuas and Aymaras to one in which they became articulated by the same political organization. This articulation shift proved profoundly consequential for the Bolivian party system.

Chapter 4 then turns to evaluate the programmatic and ideological expression of the ethnic cleavage to shed light on broader patterns of political behavior and the potential foundations for party system reconstruction efforts. The chapter examines two implications of the networked cleavage articulation theory. The first is that salient cleavages shape political behavior in multidimensional ways. The chapter finds that in both Bolivia and Peru, being indigenous and non-indigenous is associated with clearly differentiated preferences for Left-Right ideology, the role of the state in the economy, the provision of services by the state, nationalistic views, social values, and support for democracy. This is crucial because it illustrates the multidimensional content of a social cleavage, a trait that complicates the process of articulating a salient collective identity.[21] Second, the chapter examines further the argument that the association between ethnic cleavages and political behavior can exist in the absence of strategic activation from above. I find that despite the differences in political context between Bolivia and Peru nowadays—with Bolivia being characterized by a strong indigenous party while Peru lacks any consistent efforts at ethnic activation—the ethnic cleavage in these societies is nonetheless similarly associated with differentiated programmatic and ideological preferences. This challenges a central expectation of the top-down cleavage activation literature and supports the notion that cleavages can exist without political representation. Together, Chapters 3 and 4 provide strong evidence in support of the first central claim of the networked cleavage articulation theory. They demonstrate that both Bolivia and Peru are characterized by a clearly delineated ethnic cleavage that has consistently structured political behavior throughout these countries' histories.

[21] This chapter lays the foundations for an analysis of patterns of articulation in these societies, demonstrating that mere symbolic appeals to an indigenous or non-indigenous identity either might not suffice for mobilizing electoral support or, alternatively, might be operating as a heuristic for a much broader and important set of programmatic and ideological preferences.

Chapter 5 then turns to the question of cleavage articulation and evaluates how nascent political parties in Bolivia and Peru are articulating the ethnic cleavage in the political arena. The chapter tests another central component of the networked articulation theory: that variation in the articulation of social cleavages is associated with varying patterns of party system formation and stabilization. The chapter analyzes political platforms and survey data to determine instances of successful, partial, and failed bloc articulation, and assesses the consequences of these outcomes for party consolidation and volatility outcomes. I find that, despite the salience of the ethnic cleavage and its remarkably consistent impact on voter behavior and programmatic and ideological preferences, political parties are nonetheless failing to articulate the multi-dimensional content of these cleavage blocs. Only the MAS-IPSP in Bolivia has succeeded in reflecting the content of the indigenous bloc identity in its political platform and this has, in turn, enabled the consolidation of the political party. The remaining political actors, on the other hand, have failed in their articulation efforts and, as a result, have generally experienced a rapid decline.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter 6, focuses on examining why articulation failures occur. The chapter argues that social network structures condition the likelihood of articulation by shaping the flow of information and resources, the mobilizational capacity, and the strength of the linkages nascent political parties have at their disposal. I find significant variation in the structural configurations of the social networks from which nascent parties emerge. Whereas the MAS in Bolivia emerged from a network structure that not only had tremendous depth but that was also embedded in a vast organizational landscape with diverse paths to national expansion, parties in the opposition—as well as other indigenous parties established at the time—were limited in their regional reach and lacked the network structures necessary for expansion. As a result, these parties' articulation capacity was significantly constrained and most of them were either unable to grow beyond their original spaces or have entirely collapsed. Something similar has happened in Peru,

where nascent political parties in the post-party system collapse era have tended to emerge from often deeply embedded localized networks that, while effective at mobilizing community support, lack the connectivity necessary to expand into the regional or national arenas through within-network linkages. Thus, most of these parties have had to resort to inter-organizational—and significantly weaker—linkages as they have sought to grow beyond their networks of origin. These linkages (or paths to expansion) have proven contingent and unsustainable and have ultimately driven most of these parties to failure.

Chapter 7 concludes by reflecting on the various contributions of this dissertation as well as its strengths and weaknesses. The chapter also considers the generalizability of the networked articulation argument and identifies areas for future research.

CHAPTER 2

A THEORY OF NETWORKED SOCIAL CLEAVAGE ARTICULATION

How are party systems reconstructed after collapse? Why has Bolivia succeeded in initiating its process of party system reconstruction while Peru has remained in a state of party system failure since collapse? Although the question of party system reconstruction has not been explored directly in existing scholarship, it is nonetheless closely connected to important research traditions on processes of party system formation and structuration. Broadly, existing scholarship on processes of party system formation and structuration can be organized into two theoretical approaches: a top-down and a bottom-up approach. This chapter introduces these approaches and then develops the theory of *networked social cleavage articulation*s advanced in this dissertation.

I. Top-down approach

The top-down approach to the study of party system formation emphasizes the strategic incentives that politicians have, on the one hand, to build political parties and, on the other, to construct and activate social cleavages for electoral gain. Politicians are seen as rational actors seeking to maximize their chances of electoral success. They build political parties because these provide solutions to the problems of social choice (in legislative arenas) and collective action (in the electoral arena) (Aldrich 2011). Likewise, they also stop building political parties when the benefits of running independently surpass those of running under an established party label or building a new political organization (Hale 2005; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016).

Beyond this, politicians also construct and activate social cleavages strategically in order to mobilize electoral support, establish ties to voters, and differentiate themselves from their political opponents (Chhibber and Torcal 1997; Posner 2004; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). This top-down cleavage activation, scholars argue, structures political competition discursively and at times even sociologically, and drives the identification of voters with particular political identities and programmatic platforms. Crucially, in this framework, politicians have sufficient agency and creative leeway to shape voters' political behavior, rather than simply reacting to the "given" structure of political preferences, as Downs' (Downs 1957) models presumed. They can activate (or de-activate) collective identities, mobilize (or de-mobilize) voters, and politicize (or de-politicize) political preferences. Voters, for their part, are seen as highly responsive to these elite-driven shifts.

De Leon, Desai, and Tugal (2015) develop this top-down approach in their recent work on the political articulation of social cleavages and party building. The authors see political parties as having significant "creative potential" and perceive them as the "most influential agencies that structure social cleavages." In this approach, political parties are uniquely positioned to strategically "politicize or 'articulate'" otherwise inconsequential social divisions "to build powerful blocs of supporters" (p. 2). The authors refer to this cleavage construction or activation process as *political articulation*. This term, which differs significantly from the *cleavage articulation* process introduced in this dissertation, is defined as "the process by which parties 'suture' together coherent blocs and cleavages from a disparate set of constituencies and individuals, who, even by virtue of sharing circumstances, may not necessarily share the same political identity" (p. 2). In this framework, then, political parties are powerful actors with tremendous influence over voters' issue preferences and collective identities, while voters are mostly responsive to the struggles for electoral gain amongst political elites.

II. Bottom-up approach

If the top-down approach treats political parties as social architects, able to influence societal fractures and to define the content of political competition, the bottom-up approach sees them as megaphones for politically salient collective identities in society. In the latter approach, political parties have little agency in shaping political outcomes. Instead, they merely provide an institutional expression for salient social fractures.

This sociological approach is grounded in the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), which traces the origins of party systems and the structures of electoral competition in West European countries to salient cleavage structures in these societies. The authors argue that two critical junctures—the national and industrial revolutions—produced four distinct social cleavages—center-periphery, religious, sectoral, and class—that then provided the foundations for the emergence of party systems across Western Europe. These social cleavages naturally crystallized into party systems, enabling their consolidation and "freezing" patterns of political competition (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). As a direct consequence of the crystallization of cleavages into party systems, voter-party linkages also became solidified (Kitschelt 2000) and levels of electoral volatility declined (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 197). Thus, the central expectation that has been derived from the Lipset and Rokkan framework has been that where strong social cleavages exist, strong and stable party systems should emerge and consolidate (see, for example, McAllister and White (2007)).

In this bottom-up approach, parties have merely an expressive and representational function. They "develop a rhetoric for the translation of contrasts in the social and the cultural structure into demands and pressures for action or inaction" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 5). Parties are thus largely stripped of political agency. Moreover, the translation of social cleavages into party systems is seen as a natural if not an inevitable outcome, the product of cleavage strength. Building

on these insights, other scholars have argued that the weakening of the historically salient social cleavages has triggered the erosion or unfreezing of traditional party systems in Western Europe (Russel J. Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Franklin 1992). They have associated this party system decline with the emergence of a "an independent ideological cleavage" (Knutsen, 1988: 349) as well as the formation of a new generation of issue voters (Russel J. Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984), single-issue parties (Kitschelt 1988), and value-based—as opposed to structural—social cleavages (Inglehart 1977).

III. Mirror-image assumption

Much like the top-down approach, the bottom-up approach sees party systems as mirror images of the electorate. Yet, while in the former, voters reflect the differences created by political elites (i.e., voters assume for themselves the beliefs/preferences adopted by their parties), in the latter, political parties express the sociological differences dividing voters.[22] This 'mirror image' assumption has significantly influenced research on political representation in both traditions. For instance, scholars who write within the bottom-up approach often turn to the party system—analyzing stability, political discourse, elite preferences, and partisan agendas—to decipher the ideological and programmatic content of social cleavages, as well as their salience. From this standpoint, unstable party systems are taken as indicators of the weakness or inexistence of social

[22] A third approach, the institutional one, gives less attention to the question of party system formation but nonetheless offers an alternative reading of cleavage activation—and, therefore, party system origins—that is at the heart of the debate between the top-down and bottom-up approach. This institutional approach, advanced by scholars such as Yashar (2005), emphasizes the role of shifting citizenship regimes in de-activating old social cleavages and activating new ones. Looking at ethnic cleavages in Latin America, Yashar writes: "Earlier citizenship regimes unintentionally enabled indigenous communities to carve out spaces of local autonomy, with limited interference from the state in matters of local governance. Subsequent citizenship regimes, however, threatened the autonomy that had been secured and, consequently, politicized ethnic cleavages […] Where autonomy was possible, ethnic cleavages were weak. Where autonomy was subsequently challenged, ethnic cleavages became more salient" (p. 54). The shift from a corporatist citizenship regime, which privileged class cleavages, to a neoliberal citizenship regime, which threatened the autonomy of indigenous populations triggered the activation of a previously dormant ethnic cleavage.

cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Cameron 1991, 1994; Roberts 2002) and clientelistic, personalistic, and catchall parties are said to result in—or perhaps from—the absence of such cleavages (Dix 1989).

Yet, this assumption of perfect correspondence between social fractures at the voter level and patterns of representation at the political one is problematic. It conceals significant variation not only in voter-level dynamics but also, and perhaps most importantly, in political parties' capacity (and even willingness) to reflect or influence voter preferences. Recent literature on congruence analysis and party system de-alignments speaks to the extent to which party systems and voter preferences can have dynamics of their own. For instance, recent work on party system collapse in Latin America reveals significant de-alignments between voters and parties, during which entire sectors of the electorate, despite having salient preferences and favoring particular sets of programmatic positions, nonetheless lose representation in the party system as political parties gravitate towards consensus positions (Lupu 2014; Morgan 2011; Roberts 2014; Seawright 2012; Slater and Simmons 2013). Similarly, scholarship on congruence analysis has demonstrated that there are significant differences between voter-level preferences and party system-level representation patterns. Like scholars in the party system collapse literature, congruence scholars find numerous instances of party system representation failures and voter-party de-alignments (Luna and Zechmeister 2005, 2010). Their findings show that party system oftentimes over-represent some sectors and underrepresent others based on factors like region (Lupu and Warner 2017), class (Carnes and Lupu 2015), and ethnicity (Madrid 2005). Political parties also actively articulate some issues that matter at the level of voters and opt to ignore and de-politicize others, regardless of their salience in society.[23] Thus, although not writing about cleavage articulation *per*

[23] Representation-building processes are messy. They are frequently distorted by power, money, special interests, and information access. For some political parties, emphasizing a cleavage and attaching themselves to a particular

se, recent scholarship nonetheless highlights the need to challenge the mirror image assumption and examine cleavage-level dynamics and party system articulations in independence from each other. Party systems do not simply reflect or map onto social cleavages. Nor do they construct social cleavages at will. Instead, the relationship between party systems and social cleavages is variable, contingent, and as I will argue, dependent on articulation processes.

IV. Cleavage Articulation

The present study examines processes of party system reconstruction to shed light on the relationship between social cleavages and party systems. I argue that, in order for social cleavages to facilitate party system reconstruction, they must undergo a process of articulation that reflects the extent to which the various components of a cleavage bloc become integrated into a coherent political platform and discourse. Political parties' capacity for articulation, however, is conditioned (and thus constrained) by the structures of the social networks from which they emerge.

The proposed theory is grounded within the bottom-up scholarly approach, which sees social cleavages as emerging from social, historical, and structural processes, rather than top-down activation. Yet, in contrast to this approach, I take the translation of social cleavages into party systems as an empirical question. Cleavages, I posit, are significantly more likely to result in party system instability and social conflict than they are to produce stable party systems. My work

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collective identity might make great sense electorally. For others, however, it might make much more sense to deny the existence of such cleavages and attempt to de-politicize them whenever they arise in political discourse. Such is likely the case, for example, in political systems where a minority group—whether economic elites or white minorities—has control of the political arena. In such instances, a discourse of inclusion (as individual citizens or clients of patrons, rather than as members of a social group or "bloc" deemed threatening to elite interests) that emphasizes the political irrelevance of particular identities may serve as a thin-veiled strategy for preventing the redistribution of power in society. Crucially, however, this does not necessarily imply the lack of differentiated cleavage blocs at the societal level. Instead, it might speak to the lack of institutional expression of these cleavage-based identities. .

therefore looks to shed light on the conditions that enable that process of cleavage articulation into party systems and the challenges that arise along the way.

This dissertation focuses on two key variables of the party system reconstruction process: social cleavage articulation and social network structures.[24] Together, I posit, these variables explain the conditions under which salient social cleavages become associated with successful party system reconstruction or, alternatively, trigger greater political instability.

In particular, my dissertation argues that t enable the formation of stable party systems, social cleavages must necessarily undergo articulation. When social cleavage articulation processes fail, so do party system reconstruction efforts. In such instances (i.e. where partisan alignments remain incongruent with politically salient social cleavages, rather than anchored in them), social cleavages become associated with party system instability, and partisan alignments remain 'unmoored,' as has been the case in Peru.

The likelihood that articulation processes will result in party system reconstruction failures is conditioned by the social network structures from which political parties emerge. These network structures provide political parties with channels for expansion, access to information about voter preferences, frames and identities, mobilization resources, and a political base. It is through social network structures and the larger organizational landscapes in which these are embedded that the linkages between nascent political parties and voters become defined and political parties' capacity for articulation gets molded.

[24] In this sense, my research is closely aligned with Levitsky et al's (2016) recent work on party building in Latin America. As I explained in the introduction chapter, the framework introduced by Levitsky et al. highlights the significance of what they refer to as 'extraordinary social conflict' (i.e. salient social cleavages) and organizational inheritance. Levitsky et al argue that, together, these two factors significantly increase the likelihood of successful party building. This provides an important starting point for my research. However, my work aims to extend this framework further by asking: under what conditions do social cleavages and organizations produce stable party system? I emphasize the interaction between processes of cleavage articulation and the social network structures within which these take place to shed light on how successful parties and party systems are built and why this process frequently becomes derailed.

Social network structures vary in significant ways and this variation has important consequences for the paths to growth and the linkages that become available to parties as they seek to expand into the national arena. Some social network structures provide nascent parties with diverse within-network paths to expansion. In such instances, parties use these internal networks to grow and, along the way, establish strong linkages to voters. As parties expand into the national arena, their capacity to gather information, mobilize supporters, and articulate the various identity and organizational components of the cleavage bloc through these linkages increases significantly.

Other parties, however, are constrained by their networks' structural limits, whether these stem from a lack of depth or breadth. Lacking within-network paths to expansion, nascent parties must turn to inter-organizational and political alliances that offer weaker, contingent, and more conditional linkages to voters. These linkages define parties' path to expansion by limiting nascent parties' access to information about voter preferences and identities, limiting the reach of their mobilization efforts, and reducing the strength of ties between them and voters. In so doing, social network landscapes that are limited in their breadth and depth significantly hinder nascent political parties' capacity for bloc articulation.

This argument is divided into three parts, which I summarize briefly here and develop further in the remainder of this chapter. The first part posits that *salient social cleavages can exist in society and be politically consequential without triggering the formation of stable party systems (or having been activated by political parties)*. In contrast to what existing scholarship suggests, social cleavages operate somewhat independently from party systems. They can structure political behavior without being captured by specific political parties and, although they are responsive to parties' articulation efforts, they can nonetheless remain disarticulated in the party system for extended periods of time. Second, the dissertation posits that *a cleavage articulation process mediates the relationship between social cleavages and party systems*. This process of cleavage

articulation—carried out by nascent political parties—is prone to failure and can enable both the successful reconstruction of a party system and its stabilization, as well as the failure of these reconstruction efforts and continued political instability.

Finally, this dissertation posits that to understand variation in cleavage articulation, we must turn to social network structures. Social network structures connect voters to political parties and both enable and constrain the exchange of information and political support between the two levels. I argue that *the social networks that political parties tap into to inform their agendas and construct electoral support significantly regulate parties' cleavage articulation capacity*. By constraining articulation processes, social network structures influence party system reconstruction outcomes. The remainder of this chapter develops in greater depth each part of the theoretical argument.

V. Social Cleavages without Party System Anchoring

As described in the Introduction, I define social cleavages as *socio-structural fractures that divide society into two or more opposing cleavage blocs and consistently structure voters' political behavior*.[25] Social cleavages can emerge from class, racial, ethnic, religious, or urban-rural social

[25] This definition differs from Bartolini and Mair's (1990) classic definition. In their seminal work on social cleavages, party systems, and electoral volatility in Western Europe, Bartolini and Mair introduce a definition of social cleavages that incorporated three components: a socio-structural foundation (such as class-based or religious divisions), a collective identity element, and an organizational component. Although an important definition for differentiating social cleavages conceptually from other lesser social fractures, the definition nonetheless ended up assuming what is arguably the most important and contingent question about social cleavages: how do they produce political organizations?
At their core, social cleavages are politically salient social fractures that threaten with social conflict. Their translation into stable party systems is therefore far from inevitable. On the contrary, the fact that cleavages can express tremendous polarization and nonetheless produce stable party systems is a remarkable puzzle in its own right. Bartolini and Mair's proposed definition, however, sets aside this puzzle by privileging only those instances of successful cleavage translation and turning everything else into "something less than" (Deegan-Krause 2007).
Although the high bar was established in order to differentiate conceptually different social phenomena, the criteria ended up limiting the relevance of the term to a few democratic societies, primarily in Western Europe, and a particular time period where unions and mass parties dominated the political landscape. Recent political trends, however, suggest that to the extent that cleavages inherently involve an organizational component, this component may be much more loosely expressed than previously assumed. That is, a cleavage cannot be considered as such only when it has a mass-based party or nationally strong labor union attached to it. If that were the case, then we might be observing the end of

structures, amongst others (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These social structures provide the foundations for the emergence of salient differences between social cleavage blocs that can then become associated with differentiated collective identities and programmatic demands. Structures do not produce social cleavages naturally. Instead, the salience and content of social cleavages results from the continuous interactions between cleavage blocs, the state, and each other. Such interactions define both in-group identities and inter-group conflict, and they produce the social, economic, and political inequalities that give social cleavages their ideological and programmatic content. When these interactions do not become mapped onto inequalities, the socio-structural fractures do not gain salience and therefore remain politically inconsequential.

The salience of social cleavages is preserved through both formal and informal institutions. Formally, social cleavages can become institutionalized in laws (Wacquant 2001), the privileging, discrimination, or even criminalization of particular sectors through policies (Alexander 2012; Oshinsky 1996), and the differentiated access to opportunities across groups (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). Informally, cleavages are also both expressed and strengthened through cultural stigmas, discrimination, and social exclusion. These interactions define the content of the cleavage and shape its salience over time. They explain not only why a particular social cleavage may be remarkably salient in one context and virtually inconsequential in another, but also why that cleavage may be associated with different programmatic and ideological preferences across space and over time. Because institutions vary across societies and change over time, cleavages can be expected to vary with them.

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cleavages as we know them (end of cleavage politics (Franklin 1992)). Yet, organizations can come in many shapes, forms, and sizes. If we assume a more flexible approach to the understanding of this organizational dimension and treat it as an empirical question, then suddenly the number of cleavages increases to incorporate essential instances of social polarization and conflict that are currently excluded because they have not produced stable political parties.
The definition advanced here widens the net to incorporate other instances of social cleavages. In so doing, it allows me to consider why social cleavages can in some instances be associated with stable party systems and, in others, trigger political instability and even outright civil conflict.

Although the study of cleavages focuses generally on electoral behavior and voter attachments to particular political organizations, the social conflict at the core of social cleavages can be channeled through both institutional and extra-institutional avenues. Social protests, rebellions, clandestine military organizations, political parties, as well as other legal and illegal arenas all provide a terrain for the channeling of social conflict grounded in cleavages. How a social cleavage is expressed is likely to be conditioned by opportunity structures (Tarrow 2011; Yashar 2005). This is a crucial point: cleavages do not arise from thin air, in response to particular political appeals in a given electoral cycle. Nor do they suddenly become salient when people start explicitly self-identifying under a particular label. Instead, social cleavages are strongly grounded in historical processes. They gain both their content and salience from these historical processes. And whether they are explicit or implicit at a particular time (Mendelberg 2001), attachment to one or another identity label is secondary to their salience and responds primarily to contextual opportunities.

Given this understanding of social cleavages, this study argues that social cleavages can be salient—consistently structuring voter behavior and programmatic and ideological preferences amongst voters—without triggering the formation of stable party systems or anchoring in particular political organizations. While the political anchoring of social cleavage blocs certainly places their salience in focus (makes them visible), cleavage blocs can nonetheless exist and shape behavior while remaining unanchored in the political arena. Thus, voters within a cleavage bloc will often vote collectively for or against particular political organizations, and have delineated ideological and programmatic tendencies, and yet not be affiliated to a particular political party. Unanchored cleavage blocs will often have a fractured political expression precisely because they respond to weak and often competing articulation efforts. Yet, when salient, they will, as a whole, shape

systemic outcomes and be an important variable for explaining the electoral outcomes of most political organizations.

VI. Cleavage Articulation and Political Stability

Whether social cleavages become institutionalized in the party system and stabilize political competition or, alternatively, remain associated with political instability and social conflict, is conditioned by their degree of articulation. Social cleavage articulation is defined as the process through which nascent political parties identify salient social cleavages, decipher their content, and translate this content into a coherent political platform and discourse that offers strong representation to the relevant social blocs.

The process of cleavage articulation takes places at two different levels: the *cleavage bloc* and the *social cleavage* that encompasses the conflict between these blocs. Cleavage blocs are thus the opposing social groups created by the deep social fracture that defines the social cleavage. A class cleavage for instance, pits the working class bloc against the employer bloc. Bolivia and Peru's ethnic cleavage, for its part, divides the indigenous bloc—in particular, Quechuas and Aymaras—from the non-indigenous bloc. Bloc-level articulation occurs largely independently and potentially asymmetrically for each of the social blocs within a social cleavage. This means that articulation outcomes can vary across cleavage blocs: while one bloc within a single social cleavage unit may achieve articulation, its challenger bloc might fail in its own articulation endeavors.[26]

[26] As Roberts pointed out in an earlier draft, the main point of reference for this is Duverger's (1954) notion of "contagion from the left," which produced different processes of articulation for the labor and elite blocs of the class cleavage. Whereas the articulation of labor occurred through mass-based union and party organizations, the opposing elites' articulation came mainly from the need to respond to the strength of labor. This forced elites to "imitate" the left and create stronger conservative party organizations.

Because of its complexity, the process of bloc articulation in the context of party system collapse is prone to failure. While the process affords nascent political parties with agency to construct representation offers and employ different leadership styles, this agency is nonetheless greatly constrained by the sociopolitical context within which it operates. When social cleavages are salient, they provide political parties with the raw material: a set of sociologically differentiated groups with opposing group identities (that, albeit often loosely organized, nonetheless draw differences between in-group and out-group), and differentiated programmatic and ideological preferences. Yet, political parties then have to identify these cleavages, decipher their ideological and programmatic content, and articulate them accordingly, weaving the various elements of the cleavage into a coherent political ideology and identity. In this sense, the likelihood of successful articulation is in many ways defined by political parties' ability to give expression to what is already there.

And yet, this process of cleavage bloc articulation is difficult to carry out. It involves key decisions about the organization and expression of political identities, the linkages that get built, the leadership styles, and the forms in which citizens become mobilized in both civic and partisan arenas. Political parties' seeming freedom to build representation offers as they choose also constitutes their most significant stumbling block when it comes to articulating cleavage bloc identities. Articulation failure becomes more likely, for instance, when parties seek to build electoral alliances that ignore central elements of the bloc identity or try to crosscut the existing salient cleavage structures with other identity appeals. They also result when a political party dilutes its appeals to a particular bloc in order to appeal to more broadly diverse interests and identities or to enter into compromises with rival actors (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). And they also occur when a party aligns itself with one cleavage bloc along some programmatic dimensions but advances the interests of the opposing cleavage bloc on other key dimensions. Coherence and

consistency are necessary for articulation to succeed. However, in a context of limited resources and political experience, nascent political parties are, more often than not, ill prepared to fulfill these expectations.[27]

Bloc articulation can succeed either fully, partially, or fail altogether. Each of these bloc articulation outcomes produces distinct representational dynamics. Figure 2.1 summarizes the expected relationship between bloc articulation and representation outcomes. Whereas *successful bloc articulations* are associated with low levels of bloc electoral volatility—defined as the shifts in vote choice that occur across election cycles *within* a cleavage bloc—and the consolidation of the aligned political party (or parties), instances of *failed bloc articulation* are associated with elevated levels of bloc electoral volatility and the weakness or disappearance of the nascent political parties that attempted the articulation. *Partial bloc articulation*, for its part, results when a political party succeeds in articulating some but not all of the key elements of the cleavage bloc identity. Although this could arguably produce a fairly stable outcome, it is more likely to be temporary. This is because the party will remain unanchored and, as such, will be more vulnerable to competition from other articulation offers.

[27] Politicians might choose to highlight some elements of a cleavage-based identity or programmatic agenda at the expense of others. They also have significant leeway when it comes to their choice of political appeals. Thus, while some politicians might display their representativeness through their leadership style, charisma, or background, others might do so exclusively through their programmatic platforms or their ideological commitment. The articulation efforts associated with a single cleavage bloc can therefore vary significantly over time and across politicians.

Figure 2.1 Cleavage Bloc Articulation Outcomes



Bloc-level articulation dynamics combine to produce distinct cleavage articulation outcomes (i.e. articulation dynamics for a labor bloc and a capitalist bloc, produce distinct articulation outcomes for the class cleavage as a whole). Figure 2.2 summarizes the three possible articulation outcomes for salient social cleavages—again full, partial, or failed—that result from the different combinations of bloc-level articulations. The figure also outlines expected relationships between these cleavage articulation patterns and party system stability and consolidation outcomes.

A *full cleavage articulation* results when all of the cleavage blocs within that cleavage unit achieve articulation in the political arena. This, I posit, is a rare political outcome that results in the consolidation and stabilization of a party system in which the various cleavage blocs are

represented by opposing political parties. Instances of full articulation can be found in the Western European party systems that consolidated in the early twentieth century in which cleavages that polarized these societies along class, religion, urban-rural, and center-periphery lines were successfully articulated into party systems and facilitated the stabilization of political competition for decades after (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Figure 2.2 Social Cleavage Articulation Outcomes



In contrast, instances of *partial cleavage articulation* result when there is an asymmetric articulation between the two core blocs in the social cleavage and thus only one of these achieves articulation. In such instances, the cleavage bloc that undergoes articulation becomes anchored in the party system and enables the consolidation and stabilization of a representative political party

(or parties). At the same time, the failed articulation of the opposing bloc should instead be associated with increased levels of bloc volatility. This is because disarticulated cleavage blocs lack anchoring in the party system; lacking representation, these blocs move continuously across political alternatives, rejecting those political offers that fail to embody their interests and identities.

Finally, instances of *failed cleavage articulation* are those in which both of the core blocs within the social cleavage unit fail to become articulated in the political arena. In the absence of articulation, cleavages tend to remain unanchored in the party system and become associated with elevated levels of electoral volatility—both at the bloc and systemic levels—and even an increased likelihood of social conflict. Significantly, in such contexts, volatility does not result from the absence of social cleavage structures that can help organize and stabilize the party system. Instead, it results from the articulation failures that leave already salient cleavages underrepresented, unanchored, and in search of articulation.

The articulation framework introduced here moves attention away from debates about cleavage salience or strategic identity activation—emphasized by the bottom-up and top-down approaches, respectively—and refocuses it on the process of cleavage articulation. It is through this process that the sociological meets the political to produce distinct representational outcomes. And it is also in this articulation stage that the effects of social cleavages on party system stability and configuration become defined.

Cleavage articulation processes help explain the key differences between Bolivia and Peru's party system reconstruction efforts. While both countries are currently structured by salient ethnic cleavages that continue to structure political behavior amongst voters, the articulation of these cleavages in the party system has varied across the two cases and over time. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 5, in Bolivia, the successful articulation of the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage

has transformed the political landscape, facilitating the consolidation of the MAS party, regularizing patterns of political competition and reducing levels of bloc volatility for a previously underrepresented (yet nonetheless persistently salient) indigenous bloc. The failed articulation of the non-indigenous bloc, on the other hand, has produced strikingly different outcomes, driving an increase in bloc electoral volatility levels since the collapse of the former party system—which overrepresented this sector of society—and leading to the emergence of numerous political parties that remain weak and prone to rapid extinction. Bolivia's party system represents an instance of partial cleavage articulation.

Peru's party system, on the other hand, is clearly an instance of failed cleavage articulation. Since the collapse of the former party system, both the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs have been associated with unstable political parties with short shelf lives. Although instances of partial articulation have occurred—in particular, the indigenous bloc became partially articulated in the 2006-2011 period—these have turned out to be temporary and have eventually transitioned to failed articulations. Peru's bloc articulation failures have produced elevated levels of volatility both at the bloc and cleavage unit levels.

VII. Social network structures

How do we account for variation in cleavage bloc and social cleavage articulation? Why are some cleavage blocs, such as the indigenous bloc in Bolivia after 2005, able to produce a stable political party while others, such as the indigenous bloc in Peru, seem to remain in a seemingly permanent state of disarticulation? *The likelihood of successful (or failed) social cleavage articulation in the party system, I argue, is conditioned by the structures of the social networks that nascent political parties emerge from.*

Social networks are widely recognized as being crucial for processes of party formation. Scholars have argued for social networks' central role facilitating the emergence of labor mass-based parties in Western European societies grounded in labor unions (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Labor-based social networks have also been found to have historically provided crucial foundations for some of Latin America's most successful cases of party building (Collier and Collier 2002; Kitschelt et al. 2010). Environmental organizations have been associated with the emergence of the new Left in Europe (Kitschelt 1989). And, more recently, scholars have looked beyond traditional network structures and found that the organizational foundations developed by authoritarian military regimes (Loxton 2015, 2016), insurgent guerrilla movements (Holland 2016), religious networks (Kalyvas 1996; Samuels and Zucco 2015a, 2015b), and social movements (Van Dyck 2016; Madrid 2016) have all provided crucial sites for successful party building (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016).[28]

Yet, despite the broad agreement over the significance of social network for party building success, we currently know little about how variation in the *structures* of these social network conditions the party building process. Social network *structures* matter for party building processes for a number of reasons. First, structures condition the strength of the linkages that ensue between voters and nascent political parties. Political parties are generally born within *some* social network—whether a labor union, a business coalition, a community association, or a social movement—and the network landscapes within which political parties are embedded in define their potential pathways to expansion. Parties can grow through within-network channels or establish

[28] The significance of social networks for party building processes is heightened in contexts of party system collapse, when the network structures—and the linkages between voters and the political class—that provided the foundations for the party system erode. Nascent political parties and politicians emerge and must operate within this void. If, before collapse, new politicians could join the ranks of established parties and take advantage of the pre-existing political networks to advance their careers, after collapse, no such shortcuts are available for political mobilization. Thus, social organizations assume a more prominent role and provide a central role in political parties' trajectories to the national arena.

external alliances with other social organizations or political parties; they can connect to these external networks at particular junctures or, alternatively, establish more lasting alliances. These dynamics condition the strength (and distribution) of the linkages that emerge between voters and political parties.[29]

Second, these structures serve as sites for the exchange of information and resources between voters and nascent political parties. Information within social networks enables the transmission of knowledge, collective preferences and identities, political appeals, and agendas both between voters and politicians as well as amongst voters. The structures of these networks determine how far this information travels and the density of the exchange. Third, social network structures also shape nascent political parties' behavioral and collective mobilization capacity. Whether by facilitating the exchange of information between network members (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Zuckerman 2005) through social pressure (Sinclair 2012), or by shaping collective identities (Tilly 2005), networks have been found to influence individuals' opinions, political preferences, and patterns of political engagement (Foos and de Rooij 2017; Klar 2014; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). They are also a precondition for collective action (Diani 1995; Diani and McAdam 2003; Passy and Monsch 2014; della Porta 1988) and, as such, can delineate the mobilizational capacity and organizational boundaries of political efforts.

The *structures* of social networks define the physical limits of the pathways through which information and resources are exchanged and mobilization and socialization occurs.[30] Networks

[29] Nascent political parties could also construct their own social networks and instances of this do about, particularly amongst politicians with more resources. An example of this is Alliance for Progress (APP) in Peru, a party that was created within a web of private universities constructed by the party leader, César Acuña. However, building a social network from scratch is an arduous process and requires resources that nascent political parties rarely have at their disposal. As such, this is the least likely route for party building. Nonetheless, the arguments advanced here apply to these cases of party building as well.

[30] Diani (2015: 13) describes the utility of analyzing social network landscapes (which he refers to as fields): "Fields can be analyzes as social networks, whose structure largely results from interactions between field members, the emergence of interorganizational structures of domination and cooperation, an increase in the information load, and a

can be large or small, localized or generalized, and superficially or deeply present at the regional and national levels. They can be embedded in broad social network landscapes or, alternatively, remain disconnected from other social organizations. These structural features constrain social networks' reach, defining their physical space and, with that, their capacity to influence and mobilize citizens for any given cause. Thus, whereas some network structures will allow for more robust information and resource exchanges and provide the necessary ties for sustained political mobilization, others will be significantly more limited in their capacity to serve as sites for exchanges between nascent political parties and voters.

My dissertation zooms in on this variation in network structures to shed light on party system reconstruction outcomes. I argue that by defining the reach and the strength of ties of social networks and shaping their effectiveness as sites of information and resource exchange, collective mobilization, and socialization, social network structures condition the articulation of social cleavages into party systems. Put simply, social network structures define nascent political parties' trajectory towards expansion and, in so doing, enable or constrain their capacity for cleavage bloc articulation.[31]

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mutual awareness among participants. When analyzing civil society, we should focus on the structure of the cooperative ties that develop between voluntary organizations (as well as between them and other types of actor); we should try to identify the lines of segmentation within civic networks as well as the positions within them that secure their overall integration (if any); finally we should explore the matches and mismatches between the characteristics of civil society actors and their network position."

[31] Although, as some scholars have argued, nascent parties can also resort to alternative mechanisms such as mass media that can provide shortcuts for mobilizing electoral support, these linkages are uniquely weak and reliance on them is actually relatively uncommon. Moreover, in some instances, the role of media as opposed to other networks employed by these parties can at times be exaggerated. For instance, in their work on coalitions of independents in Peru, Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016) highlight the case Mauricio Rodriguez and other elected regional governors and point to their connections to radio stations and their use of these mechanisms for winning elections. Yet, such a reading overlooks the deep roots that figures such as Rodriguez as well as the other governors had in the network structures that shaped Puno politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Vilca 2014a, 2014b). Rodriguez himself was deeply embedded in the network of the liberation theology Vicarías which facilitated the resistance against the penetration of the Shining Path into Puno and provided crucial underlying structures for the parties of the Left in the region. Rodriguez also worked extensively with the *rondas campesinas* (peasant safety rounds) in the Puno region. These network structures played an important role enabling Rodriguez' political success in the regional election. Regardless, however, the broader point here is that mass media is not only an unusual channel for party growth amongst nascent

This study focuses on two critical dimensions of network structures—*breadth* and *depth*—that I argue mediate the relationship between cleavage blocs and political parties and, in so doing, constrain party system reconstruction efforts. The *breadth* of a social network (and a social network landscape) refers to its geographical spread and the strength of its linkages at the national level. Social networks with extensive breadth are those with significant presence across large sections of the country. Those with limited breadth, on the other hand, are geographically limited to a particular national region. Network *depth*, for its part, refers to the networks' degree of community embeddedness and assesses the degree to which organizations have a meaningful grassroots presence in the communities where they operate, both amongst formal and sideline participants. Networks can be either deeply embedded or have only a shallow presence in a community. Whereas networks that are deeply embedded are characterized by significant community involvement and participation as well as local recognition, those with a shallow presence are characterized by a formal community presence but minimal community participation and engagement. The difference between these two degrees of embeddedness is the contrast between a network that everyone knows and many participate in regularly, and one that exists primarily on paper or perhaps only for ceremonial purposes.

Although these two dimensions both operate on a continuum, they can nonetheless be organized into a typology that produces four ideal types of network structures—robust, superficial, fragmented, and atomized. Each of these structures produces a distinct distribution of linkages and patterns of linkage strength. Collectively, these structures and their internal distribution of linkages define nascent parties' paths to expansion through their broader network landscape.

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political parties, it is also a largely ineffective one because it does not provide parties with the necessary roots in society to enable party growth.

Robust networks are those that are connected at the national level and deeply embedded at the local level. This network structure is the most effective for establishing strong linkages between cleavage blocs and nascent political parties because they enable parties to expand into the national arena through internal network structures without having to rely as much on external alliances. *Superficial networks* are those characterized by strong ties at the national level but shallow community embeddedness. Their national presence gives superficial networks significant capacity to exchange information and resources horizontally, but their limited embeddedness limits the strength of their linkages to voters and their capacity to gather information and mobilize grassroots support. When looking to strengthen their community embeddedness, superficial networks generally have to turn to external alliances. As such, their path to expansion becomes reliant on weak and contingent types of linkages.

Fragmented networks, for their part, are deeply embedded in their communities but are present only at the local or regional level. These networks tend to be locally and even regionally strong because of the linkages that they are able to establish with voters. They are highly effective at gathering information at the regional level and mobilizing local support. Yet, they face significant limitations in their efforts to coordinate and operate beyond these geographical borders. To the extent that fragmented networks have ties to the national arena, these are external to them and therefore significantly weaker. Finally, *atomized networks* are those characterized by both shallow embeddedness and regional/local presence. These networks are very limited in their capacity to connect voters with politicians and are poor sites of collective mobilization.

Figure 2.3 Social Network Structures Typology

		BREADTH	
		National	**Regional/Local**
DEPTH	**Deep**	Robust	Fragmented
	Shallow	Superficial	Atomized

My framework posits that, in many cases, political parties tend to emerge from one of these network structures. I argue that the structures of the networks within which political parties emerge condition parties paths to expansion and their capacity for articulation. For instance, parties that emerge from robust network structures tend to have access to stronger linkages as they expand through their organizational landscape. In contrast, parties that originate in atomized network structures have to stitch together their path to expansion using external alliances. These types of alliances, however, weaken political parties' growth and articulation capacity. They make parties more vulnerable to competition and more reliant on contingent and conditional associations. The more political parties have to resort to weak linkages for expansion, the more their capacity for gathering information, mobilizing support, and articulating collective identities decreases.

Given these dynamics, my framework expects the likelihood of articulation—and the challenges associated with this—to vary with network type. I expect robust network structures to be the most conducive to successful cleavage bloc articulation. This network structure allows parties to expand through strong within-network linkages (though the strength of these can vary), providing them with effective mechanisms for exchanging information, mobilizing loyal supporters, and articulating the network structures and the cleavage bloc identity into a coherent political platform and discourse. Robust networks are therefore highly conducive to successful

party building. In contrast, the other three types of network structures place crucial constraints on this process.

Fragmented networks, for their part, facilitate cleavage bloc articulation at the local and regional levels. However, their geographical reach hinders nascent parties' capacity for articulation and expansion. This is because fragmented networks oftentimes have to resort to external (and therefore) weaker linkages to continue expanding and mobilizing, Parties that emerge from fragmented networks therefore tend to struggle to elevate their regional success to the national level.

Superficial networks tend to have the opposite limitation of fragmented networks. Although these types of networks enable national connectivity, they lack the depth necessary to enable nascent parties to mobilize significant support and gather information and resources from the local level. This structural restraint limits the articulation capacity of parties associated with this network. To the extent that superficial networks are embedded within network landscapes that provide paths to greater depth, superficial network can compensate for their structural weaknesses (the same applies to the fragmented one), and facilitate articulation and party building. However, oftentimes, superficial networks will lack within network linkages to complementary structures. When this occurs, the networks that emerge from these structures will often resort to weaker and contingent alliances. When this happens the likelihood of successful articulation decreases.

Finally, atomized networks are highly detrimental to cleavage articulation efforts. They limit political parties' capacity to gather information about voter preferences, obtain resources, mobilize voters, and establish a political foundation. As such, parties that emerge from atomized networks tend to deviate their articulation efforts because they are themselves largely disconnected from their respective cleavage blocs both horizontally and vertically.

Of course, in reality network structures are more fluid than this typology would suggest. As I will show, for instance, a fragmented network structure can be embedded within a robust network but each level of the network can be associated with different linkage strengths. The strength of linkages will vary not only within networks but also between them and other network structures. The focus here then is on developing a framework which allows us to identify political parties' starting points to then be able to trace the types of linkages and structures available to them for expansion.

The association between social networks and party building processes remains surprisingly under-theorized in the field of political science. Scholars have long recognized the relevance of social networks for party building. Yet, despite their recognized significance, to my knowledge, no scholarship to date has theorized the association between social cleavages, social networks, and party system reconstruction outcomes. This project begins to fill this gap. It introduces the framework for exploring this association and explains why networks matter: because they shape the likelihood of articulation by providing nascent parties with paths to expansion with distinct geographical and linkage constraints.

Political parties are not born in social vacuums. They are attached to social networks of varying nature, from social movements to community associations, interest groups, religious groups, and academic circles. These networks provide political parties with their representational, communicational, and mobilizational strength. They represent political parties' starting point and, more often than not, their end point as well.

In Bolivia and Peru, network structures are at the heart of the variation in party system reconstruction outcomes. The successful consolidation of an indigenous party in Bolivia in recent years has been in no small part due to the social network structure within which the MAS emerged and the network landscape that the MAS' organization of origin—the Coordinator of the Six

Federations of the Tropics (*Coordinadora*)—was embedded in. The MAS began from a fragmented social network that was embedded within two different robust network structures, the Unitary Peasant Workers Confederation of Bolivia (CSUTCB) and the Colonizers' Union Confederation of Bolivia (CSCB). This diverse network landscape enabled MAS to grow through two different organizational structures with national strength, to overcome political challenges from other indigenous parties when they emerged, and to produce a successful articulation of the identity and organizations associated with the indigenous bloc. These network structures drastically strengthened the MAS' capacity to express the indigenous identity in all of its complexity. The result was an articulation offer that, for the first time, connected Quechuas with Aymaras in rural and urban spaces under a single indigenous identity.

Peru's indigenous bloc, for its part, has remained disarticulated because of the fragmentation of its social network structures. Although many nascent parties have emerged within fragmented networks with significant depth, their network landscapes have significantly constrained their capacity for expansion and articulation. This is because most nascent parties have either lacked connectivity to organizations beyond their regions of origin or have been connected to these networks through very weak linkages. This has constrained their articulation efforts both by pushing these parties to rely on external (and highly conditional) alliances for expansion and making them more vulnerable to political competition from other nascent parties appealing to the same sectors. Crucially, however, it is not Peru's lack of an ethnic cleavage, the lack of network structures, or the absence of articulation offers for the indigenous bloc what is hindering party system reconstruction in this society. Instead, my research suggests that the articulation failures and the state of party system collapse in which the country remains are the product of the social network structures that do exist, which constrain capacity for expansion, drive the formation of

many competing offers, and make nascent parties more vulnerable to this increased competition by making them reliant on weak inter-organizational linkages.

VIII. Considering Alternative Explanations

In this section, I briefly return to alternative explanations to specify their empirical expectations and outline the differences in expectations between the networked cleavage articulation theory and other approaches. Alternative explanations for variation in party system reconstruction outcomes between Bolivia and Peru can be derived from the top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approach hypothesizes that the difference between the two countries can be traced to the variation in leader-led cleavage activation dynamics (de Leon, Desai, and Tugal 2015). Whereas Bolivia's Morales has succeeded in activating an ethnic cleavage and mobilizing the electorate accordingly, Peru has not experienced a sufficiently consistent ethnic-based mobilization, instead relying on personalistic and clientelistic appeals—sometimes strategically ethnicized but oftentimes not—for political mobilization. The emergence of ethnic voting in such instances is considered to be strategically-driven from above and is thus expected to be fluid and inconsistent (Madrid 2008, 2012; Raymond and Arce 2011).

The bottom-up approach, for its part, suggests that Bolivia's successful process of party system reconstruction was the result of a transformation of the underlying cleavage structures—from class to ethnic cleavages—and the process of crystallization of the now salient ethnic cleavage (Faguet 2017; Gisselquist 2005; Rice 2012). In contrast, it sees the failed party system reconstruction efforts in Peru as a direct outcome of the lack of salient ethnic (or any other) cleavage structures in this society and, as a result of this, the responsiveness of voters to personalistic appeals as individuals rather than collectives (Cameron 1991, 1994; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016; Roberts 2002; Roberts and Arce 1998).

Thus, empirically, both the top-down and bottom-up approaches, at their core, expect to observe a well-defined ethnic cleavage in Bolivia and the absence of a similar cleavage structure in Peru. In the case of the top-down approach, it also expects that this cleavage structure will come up when strategic politicians activate it at times of elections and to disappear when such top-down activations do not occur.

Two scholarly extensions that have built on the bottom-up framework to develop additional expectations merit more in-depth consideration here. For both Levitsky et al. (2016) and Yashar (2005) it is not just the absence of social cleavages (or 'extraordinary conflict'), but also the lack of social networks what blocks the successful emergence of a political party or indigenous movement. Thus, although both scholarly approaches expect Bolivia to have an ethnic cleavage and Peru to lack one, they also expect Bolivia to have organizations that enable party (or movement) building, while Peru does not. My research demonstrates that both Bolivia and Peru *have* salient ethnic cleavage structures. However, it is worth pausing on the organizational dimension to consider the differences between this dissertation's empirical expectations and those of Levitsky et al (2016) and Yashar (2005). Both Levitsky et al (2016) and Yashar (2005) suggest that Peru, unlike Bolivia, lacks the social networks for party or movement construction. Yet, they treat this as a dichotomous relationship: whereas Bolivia has the social organizations to enable indigenous movement and party building, Peru lacks them, and Yashar traces the roots of this difference to the repression experienced by many social organizations in Peru during the Shining Path insurgency and the Fujimori regime.

My approach, in contrast, argues that it is not the absence of social networks but the structures of the networks that do exist what hinders party system reconstruction. Both Bolivia and Peru are characterized by vast social network structures that are playing an active role facilitating the emergence of indigenous parties. However, these vast organizational landscapes vary

drastically in terms of their organizational structures. Whereas *one* of Bolivia's indigenous parties emerged within a network structure that provided a within-network path to expansion and successful articulation, in Peru, political parties are emerging from within network structures that have limited paths to expansion. As a result, nascent parties in Peru continue to rely on weak conditional linkages, which further limit their capacity for articulation. This is an important difference: empirically, I expect indigenous mobilization to occur and articulation efforts to exist but network structures—and their respective linkages—to constrain the growth and effectiveness of these parties. I show that, in Bolivia, other indigenous parties underwent the same fate as those in Peru have to date.

A final question concerns potential endogeneity issues that are driving the formation of both the social network structures and the party system outcomes. One notable alternative explanation here could focus on identity dynamics and suggest that both organizational structures and political outcomes in these societies result from the cohesiveness of the collective identities that characterize these ethnic blocs. Thus, in Bolivia, a stronger or more cohesive ethnic identity could have made it easier to build organizational capacity and political representation. Although this is an explanation that merits more research (differentiating between the role of identities in the formation of networks and the role of organizations in shaping identities is a muddy and complicated process), I believe my research circumvents the challenges that it poses by considering variation in party building outcomes within each of the countries (and between parties that share similar social networks), where the cohesiveness of the identity can be held constant. In Bolivia, multiple articulation offers have emerged over time for both the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs. However, only one of these has produced a stable and representative political organization. The fact that numerous political parties emerge within the same social context to give expression to a

salient collective identity, yet only some of these succeed while many others fail, suggests that there is something else, beyond identity itself, driving party system outcomes.

IX. Conclusion

The theory of networked cleavage articulation developed in this chapter sheds light on the relationship between salient social cleavages and party system reconstruction efforts. The chapter advanced three central arguments: (1) that social cleavages can exist and structure political behavior consistently without necessarily triggering the formation of stable party systems and in the absence of political strategy, (2) that variation in party system reconstruction outcomes results from differences in the degree of social cleavage articulation, a process which takes place first at the level of cleavage blocs and then at the level of the social cleavage unit, and (3) that the process of cleavage articulation is itself constrained by social network structures, which provide the site for interaction between cleavage blocs and political parties and define the linkages at parties' disposal for gathering information, mobilizing support, and expanding into the national arena. This theory seeks to fill an important gap in existing literature by shedding light on why salient social cleavages have been associated with a range of systemic outcomes, from stable party systems to social conflict and everything in between.

The rest of the dissertation tests the different parts of this theory in the context of Bolivia and Peru. In the next chapter, I examine the central implications of the top-down and bottom-up theoretical approaches and introduce both a new historical lens for understanding the persistence of an ethnic cleavage in Bolivia and Peru over time and an empirical method for measuring its salience.

CHAPTER 3

ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND VOTER BEHAVIOR

> "The arrival of the 'Indians' to power [in Bolivia] is the product of a long—and multi-causal—process that includes both short and long-term sociological, political, and economic transformations of Bolivian society in which the indigenous are far from being a "sleeping giant" since the Tupac Katari rebellion of the eighteenth century that woke up in the 2000 to, finally, lead the anxiously awaited Pachakuti." (Stefanoni 2010: 19).

Are Bolivia's recent political transformations the result of the formation and activation of a previously politically inconsequential ethnic cleavage (Van Cott 2005; Faguet 2017; Gisselquist 2005; Madrid 2012; Rice 2012; Yashar 2005)? Did Peru, as existing theories suggest, become a cleavage-less society—highly responsive to top-down personalistic appeals—after experiencing the collapse of its party system (Cameron 1991, 1994; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016; Madrid 2008, 2012; Raymond and Arce 2011; Roberts 2002; Roberts and Arce 1998; Vergara 2015)? This chapter focuses on the question of social cleavage salience and uses a historical lens to examine the extent to which significant differences exist in the underlying social cleavages structures of Bolivia and Peru.

This chapter argues that Bolivia and Peru are both characterized by a salient ethnic cleavage that has historically and consistently provided the foundations for differentiated State-society relations and structured patterns of political behavior. This ethnic cleavage—which divides indigenous and non-indigenous populations into rival social blocs—is not new. It neither emerged from the ashes of previously salient class cleavages, nor did it become salient as a result of top-down strategic activation. Instead, both Bolivia's and Peru's ethnic cleavages are the product of historical interactions between ethnic groups and the State, and interactions between and within these ethnic groups themselves. These historical interactions underlie social, political, and

economic inequalities that, to this day, strengthen the political salience of ethnic cleavages in these societies and afford these cleavages their programmatic and ideological content. In both countries, ethnic cleavages have been consistently structuring political behavior throughout history and into the democratic era.[32]

The significance of ethnic cleavage in Peru and Bolivia is evaluated empirically in this chapter through a three-pronged approach. First, the chapter presents an overview of the historical processes that structured ethnic relations in these societies. After a background discussion on historical patterns of ethnic differentiation in Bolivia and Peru I highlight the ways that policies implemented during the colonial and post-independence periods shaped State-society relations along ethnic lines and, in so doing, provided the foundations for the consolidation of a salient ethnic cleavage. I also consider how the ethnic cleavage in Bolivia and Peru was expressed historically through indigenous mobilization and rebellion, and in the pushback of the non-indigenous elites and political institutions.

The chapter then turns to the democratic period to evaluate the salience of ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru since democratization and in the context of these countries' former and current party systems. To do this, I introduce a new measure of cleavage strength that analyzes ethnic cleavages in independence from party system dynamics. I also begin to examine how these cleavages have shaped party system outcomes over time. This section employs original datasets on census and electoral data at the municipal level in Bolivia (1989-2014) and Peru (1980-2011). In tandem with the historical overview, the cleavage-strength analyses provide strong evidence in support of the argument that the ethnic cleavage in both countries has been consistently salient,

[32] This is not to say that the salience of the ethnic cleavage has not varied in any way, but that, from a macro-historical perspective, ethnic cleavages have been steadily consequential, structuring political behavior across changing times and contexts. Political parties, for their part, have varied in their engagement with the ethnic cleavage. In some instances, they have played an antagonistic role. In others, they have sought to de-politicize it. And yet in others, they have sought to articulate it with different levels of success.

structuring political behavior both during the democratic and non-democratic periods, as well as in the context of the former and current party systems.

The argument and findings introduced in this chapter raise an important set of challenges to the *mirror-image* assumption that characterizes existing scholarship on party system formation outcomes. Both the top-down and bottom-up approaches predict a close correspondence between salient social cleavages and party systems. Whereas the bottom-up approach sees party systems as emerging from salient cleavage structures, the top-down approach sees political elites as strategic and influential actors with the capacity to activate latent social cleavages and provide them with their programmatic and ideological content. In contrast to these theoretical frameworks, this chapter demonstrates that salient social cleavages can exist and structure political behavior without necessarily eliciting effective political representation or triggering a process of party system formation. By differentiating between social cleavages and their expression in the party system, the analyses shed light on often overlooked incongruences and de-alignments between voters and parties that have traditionally remained concealed by the mirror-image assumption. The chapter's findings point to the importance of cleavage articulation processes for defining the extent to which social cleavages will contribute to the formation and stabilization of the party system or, alternatively, fuel greater political instability.

The remainder of the chapter will first provide a historical overview of the ways in which the ethnic cleavage has been expressed in Bolivia and Peru. I will then turn to an analysis of cleavage strength in the democratic era.

I. The Ethnic Cleavage in Context

The ethnic cleavages in both Bolivia and Peru trace their roots to historical experiences with State formation that have pitted indigenous populations against non-indigenous ones and

created the inequality structures that, to this day, continue to disadvantage indigenous populations. It is through these experiences that ethnic cleavages have gained their salience and programmatic content. An analysis of collective attitudes, state policies, and mobilization experiences throughout history sheds light on the centrality of ethnicity for these societies and its role shaping political behavior over time.

As Cánepa (2008) writes, "the conquest of the Inca Empire by the Spanish is considered to be the foundational event of ethnic discrimination and inequality in Peru, since the Spanish government was built on the distinction between the *República de Españoles* and the *República de Indios*" (p. 14). These two republics provided the framework for the foundation of the Bolivian and Peruvian states (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984) and established the underlying structures for the distribution of power and citizenship rights in these societies.

In this context, the view that indigenous populations were morally and intellectually inferior became deeply embedded. Amongst political and intellectual elites, these views became grounded in scientific racism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. René Moreno (1901), a distinguished Bolivian intellectual of the epoch, articulated this perspective:

> The indigenous brain and the *mestizo* brain are genetically incapable of understanding republican liberty with its deliberative and civic qualities. These brains weigh between seven and ten ounces less than the brain of a white of pure race. In the intellectual evolution of the human species, such cerebral mass corresponds physiologically to a psychic period today long decrepit; to a moral organism that is rickety for resisting friction and clash with the intellectual, economic, and political forces with which the modern civilization acts within democracy.
>
> That copper race has rendered its proofs. Its power and civilization did not resist the Peruvian empire at first contact with the power and civilization of the whites. Its heritage for us, today, is nothing […] The Incan Indian for us is worthless. But he nonetheless represents a live force, a passive mass resistance, a concrete induration in the guts of our social organism. The *mestizos*—a hybrid and sterile caste for the present ethnological tasks, like the mule is to the horse— […] represent in the human species a subaltern variety that corresponds with a confused degeneration of the Spanish impetuosity and the indigenous bashfulness (142-44).

The racism that characterized elite perspectives during the post-independence oligarchic period structured the Bolivian and Peruvian states' approaches to engaging with indigenous populations and permeated these states' institutional designs. Indigenous populations were denied rights and were construed as a "mortally wounded" race that was hindering the modernization of the state. The 1900 Bolivian Census stated: "whether the [disappearance of the indigenous race] is good can be determined by the reader, considering that if there has been a cause that has delayed our civilization, it must be the indigenous race, essentially resistant to all innovation and progress" (Bolivia 1901: 35-6).

To the extent that the indigenous were seen as useful for the countries' development, it was through their role as a potential source of free labor that, while needing white supervision, could nonetheless contribute to the advancement of non-indigenous elites' economic agendas. An 1898 official document that was written to increase white migration to Bolivia captures this perspective:

> The Indian race [...] are tall and lean, with strong and muscular meats, and very pronounced physical traits [...] Thus far uncared for and lacking instruction [the Indian race] will, when civilized or at least given the first elements of instruction and education, become a powerful agent for work, the industry, and general progress; it is a strong and sober race; hardworking under the vigilance of a patron (Ballivián 1898: 5).

The 'indigenous problem' thus represented one of the most fundamental challenges with which Bolivian and Peruvian states grappled as they sought to outline their development trajectories and modernization agendas. Across the colonial and post-colonial periods, these exclusionary views, embedded in deep and explicit racisms, dominated state agendas and defined the boundaries of citizenship regimes. Such views inevitably became translated into social and economic policies that further institutionalized the ethnic cleavage and strengthened its salience.

Amongst the most notable policies that institutionalized differentiated treatment for indigenous and non-indigenous populations and established the foundations for the emergence of ethnicized inequalities were the indigenous and labor taxes. The indigenous tax, originally called

the *tributo indígena* was a special tax that all indigenous men had to pay to the Spanish crown. It was established during the colonial period, briefly abolished in the early 1800s and reinstated soon after independence (Irurozqui 1999; Sanchez Albornoz 1978). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, in Bolivia, this tax underwent a change of face and became the territorial tax, but preserved much of its original nature.[33] This indigenous tax would continue sustaining and strengthening "the most densely populated departments in Bolivia both financially and administratively" well into the twentieth century (Platt 2016; Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 32-33).

The labor tax—originally called the *mita*—was a forced labor system that required indigenous communities to send some of their men to work in the mines for free for a period of time every year (Dell 2010). Although this tax was abolished in 1812, other forms of labor taxation took its place in the post-independence period. An example of this is the *ley de prestación vial* in Bolivia "which involved forced labor for a number of days every year on the construction of roads and bridges or demanded their equivalent in payments" (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 34).

Yet, perhaps the most consequential state policies, which would deepen ethnic inequalities and perpetuate ethnicized power hierarchies in these societies, were the agrarian laws—such as the *Ley de Exvinculación* implemented in Bolivia in 1874—that abolished communal property rights and declared private property as the only modern form of land tenure. These laws sought to, on the one hand, privatize indigenous land and transfer them into the hands of the non-indigenous elites and, on the other, provide these *hacendados* (hacienda owners) with a source of free labor. According to Rivera Cusicanqui, the laws provided "a judicial wrap to turn communal lands into large estates and community members into a free labor force ascribed to the haciendas" (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 42).

[33] Landowners would instead pay the *predial rustic* tax, "being careful not to be confused, even in fiscal policies, with those 'citizens' they considered their cargo beasts" (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984).

The hacienda system placed the repressive power of the State in the hands of the non-indigenous landowners. With the implementation of this system, the *pongaje* (peonage) system was instituted in both Bolivia and Peru and a class of *colonos* (hacienda indigenous workers), which was often heavily oppressed and denied even its most basic rights, emerged. The effects of these agrarian reforms on land tenure and other social inequalities were profound. In Peru, for example, 1.1 percent of the population owned 82 percent of the cultivable lands by the 1950s (Skidmore and Smith 1984: 341).[34]

In sum, collectively, these and other similar policies intentionally differentiated between indigenous and non-indigenous populations and sought to tailor state institutions to preserve the interests of the latter. Indigenous populations were legally exploited for their labor and economic resources, all whilst receiving limited rights. The social, economic, and political inequalities that emerged within this context shaped the evolution of the ethnic cleavages in these societies.

These ethnic cleavages provide the lens through which to understand not only the evolution of these countries' institutions across political periods, or the dominant mindset underlying these policies, but also the indigenous struggles for liberation, political access, and socioeconomic inclusion throughout history.[35] Crucially, in both Bolivia and Peru, indigenous communities—and particularly, Quechuas and Aymaras—have historically mobilized, albeit at times loosely, as an ethnic collective. During the colonial period, the Taki Onqoy (1560-1570), Atahuallpa (1750s), Tupac Amaru II (1780) and Tupac Katari (1781) rebellions employed an ethnic discourse to mobilize indigenous populations against the Spanish crown and to oppose the exploitative

[34] Arguments that suggest that it was only in recent decades that indigenous populations became integrated into the state and economy, and that the threats posed by such exposure—expressed primarily through urbanization and neoliberal policies—triggered the activation of the ethnic cleavage, tend to undervalue a history full of instances of state and private sector-led threats to control indigenous lands and implement servitude policies and targeted taxes.

[35] Although traditionally, scholars have portrayed indigenous populations as passive recipients of these policies and politically disengaged actors, recent research has begun to shed light on the numerous instances of collective resistance—whether through legal means, isolated acts of resistance and sabotage, armed rebellions, or revolutionary movements—that these populations have embarked on throughout history (see, for example, Walker (2015)).

economic and social policies targeted at these communities (O'Phelan 1995, 1999; O'Phelan Godoy 1985; Rivera Cusicanqui 1984; Tamayo Herrera 1982; Valcárcel 1946, 1947; Walker 2015). This tradition was continued into the post-independence era with the rebellions led by Juan Bustamante (1866-68), Zarate Willka (1899), and Rumi Maqui (1915) (Condarco Morales 1983; Flores Galindo 1977; Godoy Orellana 2015; Rénique 2004; Rivera Cusicanqui 1984). These last two indigenous rebellions are considered some of the largest in Bolivian and Peruvian history, respectively, and both called for the formation of autonomous indigenous states.

Throughout the twentieth century, the ethnic cleavage would continue to be expressed in social mobilizations. In Bolivia, one of its peak expressions came with the 1947 indigenous rebellions[36], described by Hertzog, the Bolivian president at the time, as "the gravest of all indigenous uprisings in [Bolivian] history" (*In* Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 69). In Peru, the numerous indigenous peasant land invasions that took place between the 1940s and 1980s can also be characterized as part of this long cycle of indigenous rebellion. Finally, most recently, major social mobilizations such as the Water Wars (2000) and Gas Wars (2003) in Bolivia and the Aymarazo (2011) in Peru have continued to provide extra-institutional expression to the ethnic cleavages in these societies.

In these major rebellions, as well as in all the localized but frequent mobilizations that occurred in between them (Flores Galindo 1977; Flores Marin and Pachas Castilla 1973; Godoy Orellana 2015; O'Phelan Godoy 1985; Valcárcel 1946), ethnicity has mattered both structurally—pitting indigenous populations against non-indigenous ones whether at the local, regional, or national levels—and discursively, with many of these political movements being marked by an

[36] This uprising began at the end of 1946, and rapidly expanded throughout La Paz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Oruro, Potosí, and Tarija, lasting throughout most of 1947 (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 69). Significantly, the first peasant cells within the MNR were "recruited from the independent communal leaders that had participated in the 1947 rebellions" (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 73).

ethnicized discourse. This ethnicized discourse has, in its more radical times, embraced an Inca and Aymara utopia (Walker 2015), calling for the formation of an independent Tawantinsuyo nation and the restoration of communal land rights and, in its more reformist times, demanded the transformation of social and economic inequalities grounded on ethnic differences.

Within the institutional arena, the ethnic cleavage also has a long history of expression, be it through the rhetoric of political parties or in the policies of revolutionary regimes. The work of Mariátegui—one of the most influential thinkers in Peruvian history and the inventor of Peruvian socialist thought—effectively captured the relevance of this cleavage for political thought during the early twentieth century. In the essay titled *The Indian Problem*, he declared:

> The propagation in Peru of socialist ideas has brought as a consequence a strong movement in support of indigenous claims. This new Peruvian generation feels and knows that the progress of Peru will be fictitious, or at least will not be Peruvian, as long as it does not bring about the wellbeing of the Peruvian masses, four fifths of which are indigenous peasants […] The solution of the indigenous problem must be a social solution. And its implementers must be the indigenous peoples themselves (Mariátegui 1928: 73-4).[37]

Political actors at the time recognized this dynamic. During the 1920s, the Leguía regime recognized indigenous populations' communal land rights and created several indigenous social organizations to advance the political interests of these sectors (Degregori 1978; Mallon 1983; Yashar 2005). In the election that followed (1931)—at a time when indigenous populations did not have the right to vote but had nonetheless become central to party and union politics—the Communist Party launched as its presidential candidate an indigenous peasant from the Puno highlands named Eduardo Quispe Quispe. Although a symbolic act, it was nonetheless revealing of

[37] The organization around ethnic issues continued after this period. In 1947, for example, the *Instituto Indigenista Peruano* (IIP) was formed in Peru. Its leader at the time was Luis Valcárcel, a prominent anthropologist who rejected theories of *mestizaje* as the solution for the indigenous problematic, arguing that: "cultural mestizaje only produces deformities" (Valcárcel 1927: 111). Valcarcel advocated for cultural protection and differentiation (Pribilsky 2010: 165).

the centrality of the ethnic issue to the socialist agenda at the time.[38] Ethnic politics were similarly manifest in Bolivia, where Marxist parties such as the POR incorporated self-determination rights for indigenous communities into their political platforms as early as the 1930s.

Amongst non-indigenous populations, the ethnic cleavage also gained salience through political rhetoric. Many of the above mentioned social mobilizations and political acts were characterized by the white elites as race wars seeking the "extermination of whites" (Condarco Morales 1965: 169). For instance, a landowner characterized the 1922 Puno rebellion as illustrating that the indigenous peasants in his region "praised the race war and the extermination of all whites, the abjuration of all religions, the reconstruction of the Inca empire, [and] national disaggregation" (cited in Kapsoli and Reátegui 1972: 125). This type of rhetoric has accompanied most instances of indigenous rebellions in these countries' histories. It reflects not only the fear, whether rational or irrational, that whites and even some *mestizos* had of the indigenous masses, but also the centrality of the ethnic cleavage for perceptions of social conflict in these societies.[39]

It is within this context of a historically salient ethnic cleavage—institutionalized in the political system, reflected in intellectual debates, and central to the most significant social conflicts in these countries' histories—that both past and present political developments in Bolivia and Peru can be put in focus. The application of such a lens enables more adequate contextualization of the class politics that ensued in these societies in the mid-twentieth century.

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[38] The Communist Party's campaign material for the candidate read: "Eduardo Quispe y Quispe, Quechua Indian, poor peasant from the Santiago de Pupuja ayllu (Puno). He was a leader of the Azángaro and Huancané insurrections through which the Indians tried to conquer land and liberty" (Gutiérrez L. 1986: 245-7).

[39] The Spanish crown and creole elites in the post-independence period recognized and worried about the threat posed by indigenous populations and implemented policies that undermined indigenous identities by limiting their expression and preservation through language and culture, destroying the symbolic power of their heritage and political leaders, and constructing a discourse of indigenous population as barbaric and in need of saving. For example, in the wake of the Tupac Amaru II rebellion, the Spanish crown sought to "root out all cultural elements of the neo-Inca nationalism that had emerged in the eighteenth century [prohibiting] clothing associated with the Incas, certain dances, the use of 'Inca' as a last name or title, literature that questioned the legitimate rights of the Spanish monarchy in the Americas […] and customary law" and curbing the use of Quechua" (Walker 1999: 53-4)

II. The Revolutionary Era

Most accounts of the recent party system transformation—or lack thereof—in Bolivia and Peru use the 1952 MNR-led Bolivian Revolution and the 1968-1975 Velasco Alvarado regime in Peru as starting points (see, for example, Yashar (2005)). These revolutionary periods represented critical junctures in these countries' histories. In Bolivia, the 1952 MNR-led Revolution brought about a dramatic transition from the traditional oligarchic elites to a corporatist state and a popular (though fragile and volatile) democracy. Once in power, the MNR nationalized mines, implemented universal suffrage, and carried out an agrarian reform, implementing one of the most progressive political agendas in the Latin American region at a time when democracy and political rights remained scarce throughout (Klein 1992).

A comparable revolutionary process ensued in neighboring Peru in the late 1960s, with the presidency of Velasco Alvarado, who was a Leftist military general who rose to power in a military coup. During the tenure of his Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, Velasco Alvarado carried out radical re-structuration projects geared towards strengthening the working classes and peasant sectors of Peru and increasing the economic independence of the country. The cornerstone policies of this project included the nationalization of industries and natural resources, the implementation of a major agrarian reform that redistributed 45 percent of all agricultural land (Albertus 2015: 192), the formation and support of labor and peasant unions with open access to government institutions, and a major overhaul of the education sector. Both the MNR and the Velasco Alvarado agendas set out to implement modernization projects that, amongst other things, sought to reduce social inequalities and incorporate indigenous populations as full citizens.[40]

[40] In Peru, the nation-building project that sought to construct a single Peruvian nation began earlier on. Degregori (1978) points to the Leguía regime (1919-1930) as a period of significant advancements. He posits that this nation-building agenda then slowed down and re-emerged full force with the Belaúnde regime after 1963.

One central component of these agendas was the transformation of indigenous populations into peasants. These regimes emphasized class-based identities[41] and rejected the use of terminology—words such as Indian and indigenous—that were considered to enable enabler ethnic discrimination. Moreover, to varying degrees, they also set out to modernize indigenous populations through cultural *mestizaje* projects. These projects aimed to incorporate the indigenous into mainstream society through Spanish education, participation in markets, and the construction of a *mestizo* national identity. Scholars thus point to this political period to mark the origins of the class cleavages and the class-based party systems that emerged in these societies with their democratic transitions in the early 1980s.[42]

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[41] Although much of the class-based discourse, particularly in Peru, was tightly interconnected with ethnic rhetoric, both symbolic and practical policies were implemented throughout this period to push against ethnic labels. One example of this was Velasco Alvarado's proclamation of the Agrarian Law on the Day of the Indian in Peru and his re-labeling of this official date as the Day of the Peasant. The reform sought to transform agrarian relations as well as to do away with a set of ethnic labels that served to discriminate against the indigenous populations. Velasco declared: "This Agrarian Reform Law gives its support to that large mass of peasants that make up the indigenous communities and that, starting today—and abandoning a racist classifier that allows for inacceptable prejudice—are to be called Peasant Communities." (Velasco Alvarado 1972: 43-52)

[42] Other scholars have argued that the transition from "indigenous" to "peasant" political mobilization began earlier on. They have pointed to the 1945-1964 land invasions as the period during which "the secular struggle of the communities, united with the generalized mobilizations of the hacienda colonizers, abandon their millenarian traits and assume as their central objective the struggle for the land, a goal that is definitively one of peasants" (Vargas Prada 1983: 17). However, it is necessary to question the extent to which the focus on an indigenous to peasant transformation stemmed from the *rapprochement* since the 1920s between the socialist intellectual tradition rooted in the works of Mariátegui and other scholars, on the one hand, and the indigenous 'cause', on the other. This intellectual trend moved away from "liberal" perspectives that, at least at the level of the elites, posited the cultural and ethical inferiority of indigenous populations and called for a sort of moral rescue.

The bridging of *indigenismo* and socialism pushed those perspectives towards the economic and political, or "class", sphere. Mariátegui (1928) wrote: "Indigenous vindications lack historical concreteness as long as they remain in the cultural or philosophical realms. For them to acquire this—that is, to acquire reality and body—they need to become economic and political vindications. Socialism has taught us to frame the indigenous problem in new terms. We have stopped considering it abstractly as an ethnic or moral problem and have started recognizing it concretely as a social, economic, and political issue. As a result, we have seen it, for the first time, gain a clearly delineated and clear frame" (64). Mariátegui rejected what he saw as a racist "mystification of the indigenous problem" carried out by a "mob of lawyers and literati, who consciously or unconsciously, joined interests with the landowners' caste" (64). His aim was to discredit arguments about the natural inferiority of indigenous populations—as well as arguments that emphasized education as the solution to the indigenous problematic—and to argue for the relevance of their economic, social, and political condition. He called for the rejection of "liberal" perspectives, which were predominant at the time, and for the embrace of socialist objectives. Yet, with the diffusion of indigenous socialist ideology, Andean scholars largely left behind the ethnic lens and placed their focus, almost exclusively, on economic issues. Indigenous populations became "peasants", at least through the scholarly and political lenses. Simultaneously, other social, cultural, or political vindications were either excluded or re-framed along class lines. See note 16 for details on the intellectual pushback

Yet, despite the significance of these revolutionary periods, their capacity to trigger the emergence of class identities devoid of their underlying ethnic content was rather limited. For one, although these regimes sought to transform the indigenous into peasants, their rhetoric nonetheless incorporated ethnic appeals. This was particularly the case in Peru, where the Velasco Alvarado regime actively recognized and embraced the overlap between class and ethnic structures. Velasco Alvarado proclaimed Quechua and Aymara official languages and promoted formal education in them. He also embraced Tupac Amaru as *the* symbol of his revolution. Mayer describes the extent of the use of this indigenous symbolism:

> Everything revolutionary and nationalistic during the Velasco regime had the name Túpac Amaru. New statues, plazas, and streets were dedicated to him in every city. The Ministry of Agriculture and its agrarian reform posters had Túpac Amaru on them. Expropriated haciendas with aristocratic Spanish names were renamed after him, and even the state-run food distribution system had a stylized stencil symbol of Tupac Amaru with a black-brimmed, tall top hat and a stern face (Mayer 2009: 43).

Thus, while the Bolivian and Peruvian regimes advanced a discourse that generally emphasized peasant-based identities and moved away from some ethnic terminology, they nonetheless continued to recognize (even if only for strategic purposes) the significance of ethnic identities for the mobilization of their new peasant communities.[43] Not surprisingly, the success of these *mestizaje* projects was limited:

> One of the fundamental contradictions generated by the 1952 Revolution was the failure of its cultural homogenization project. The country of Indians [*El país de los indios*] governed by *señores* was supposed to disappear with the revolution […] The Indian was supposed to disappear with *mestizaje*, education, urban migration, community parceling, and their vestiges were supposed to live only in the museums and cultural documents of the new nation. The word Indian was also expected to disappear from the official language to express this path towards citizenship that was so desired by the conductors of the revolution. Those dreams stumbled, however, with the stubborn reality (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 19-20).

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against Mariátegui's insistence on the indigenous "problem" and towards a class-based understandings of the indigenous peasantry's struggles.

[43] This occurred to a much lesser extent in Bolivia. Yet, much of the mobilizational strength of the MNR in rural areas came from networks that mobilized explicitly along ethnic lines just a few years earlier.

More accurately, then, the MNR and Velasco Alvarado projects succeeded in partially shifting the language of engagement for indigenous populations.[44] These indigenous populations became peasants in the eyes of the State and their *ayllus* (indigenous communities) became the new peasant communities (Velasco Alvarado 1972: 52), reflecting only in part ongoing transformations on the ground. While the political shift added complexity to the underlying ethnic cleavage structures, it did not transform them in profound ways.[45] "Even where there was a change in nomenclature to accommodate the MNR imperative of union organizing, indigenous communities at the local level often remained the predominant and central mode of governance" (Yashar 2005: 162). The new terms of engagement "fostered the fiction that the state had turned Indians into peasants and stripped indigenous ethnicity of its salience" (Yashar 2005: 61), but it had not. The ethnic cleavage remained alive and salient, particularly at the grassroots level.[46] As Rivera Cusicanqui (1984) explains, "the profound schism that cuts through this society—and that gets reproduced in the two republics inherited from the colony—[continued] to mediate class antagonisms and [was] expressed in the double nature of the relations of dominance that weighed over the large mass of rural workers, exploited as producers but, at the same time, oppressed as a society and culture" (16).

[44] Significantly, the working class did not suddenly become a political majority. Quite on the contrary, despite the discursive focus on the working class, unionization rates remained strikingly low in both countries. For instance, the total membership of the Bolivian COB in 1960, when it was at its mobilizational peak, was at 147,500. This represented four percent of the total population (Faguet 2017; Mitchell 1977) at a time when peasant and rural populations remained a significant majority in the country.

[45] These revolutionary periods also had a relatively short duration. The MNR government lost support from the indigenous peasantry as early as the 1960s (Anria and Cyr 2017) and was overthrown in 1968. The Velasco Alvarado regime, for its part, was overthrown in a military coup after only seven years in power.

[46] Their demands also remained largely the same. While indigenous populations temporarily stopped demanding rights to communal landownership and the more radical calls for an indigenous state subsided (after resounding loudly in 1915 and 1947), the focus on agrarian reform remained. Indigenous peasants demanded a transformation of economic relations in the rural space, the recovery of land, and an end to the hacienda system. These demands were not new and had in fact been integral, in one form or another, to the indigenous struggles of previous revolutionary cycles. "The contemporary conversations about land and territory was already established in 1918" (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010).

Thus, a more contextualized reading of this period's significance presents the MNR and Velasco Alvarado regimes, not only as projects that recognized (to varying extents) the ethnic foundations of class cleavages and were only partially effective at transforming the political language, but also as singular projects that were front- and back-ended by long periods when ethnicity provided the main lens through which to understand social and political transformations.[47] Rivera Cusicanqui (2010) reflects on this when discussing interviews carried out in indigenous communities in the early 1980s: "the elderly in the communities in a sense accused the younger generation—the union-centric MNR generation—of having gagged them and silenced them, and of not having heard their stories. And it was the third generation, the grandchildren, who were recovering and recognizing the value in these stories."

It is within this context that we can also better appreciate the emergence of *Katarismo* in Bolivia. The *Katarismo* movement was a political movement of Aymara intellectuals that emerged in the department of La Paz during the early 1960s. While the movement was divided into two

[47] This reading of a waning indigenous population that was transforming into a socioeconomic class (peasants) and becoming integrated into the nation-state as *mestizos* is deeply rooted in debates that were shaping politics and scholarship in both Bolivia and Peru at the time. These intellectual debates pit those that believed in emphasizing and preserving indigenousness (see, for example, Valcárcel (1946) Mariátegui (1928)) against those who argued for the incorporation of indigenous populations into modern society through economic participation, education, and racial and cultural mixing (see, for example, Dobyns 1970; Tschopik 1947). While the former scholarship was, more often than not, marred by utopian and essentialist readings of indigenous societies, the latter was itself often influenced by discriminatory or at least paternalistic views that saw the indigenous populations either as disappearing or as in need of rescue, as well as by a socialist theory that saw peasants—not indigenous populations—as political agents of change. The latter approach argued strongly against accounts that claimed a direct continuity between pre-colonial and modern day indigenous communities and which saw them as incapable of progress (Dobyns 1970: 33-35). Interestingly, however, it saw any shift away from these pre-colonial cultural practices—learning Spanish and adopting cultural and religious practices associated with Spanish society—as a step towards *mestizaje*, rather than as an ongoing re-articulation and re-definition of what it means to be indigenous. In general, advocates of the de-Indianization approach called for a modernization agenda that highlighted the role of *mestizaje* in the state-building project (Vasconcelos 1948).
Understanding these intellectual currents enables the contextualization of a large body of scholarship that declared ethnic politics irrelevant and instead highlighted the emergence of a new peasant *mestizo* politics. Such literature was not without philosophical and normative underpinnings that often led it to exaggerate and stretch—much like the *indigenista* scholarship that idealized Quechua and Aymara societies—the interpretation of political and identitarian processes. Furthermore, given that the story is not told by the indigenous communities themselves, it is especially difficult to discern the extent to which the indigenous-peasant transformation actually took place at the grassroots level or, alternatively, whether it was a transformation that occurred primarily in the space of scholarly analysis.

camps,[48] they had a common agenda: to foreground the ethnic cleavage in political analyses, to interpret social inequalities through an ethnic lens, and to demand the advancement of indigenous rights. Although *Katarismo* was unsuccessful in its efforts to translate movement-level strength into electoral votes, it nonetheless proved remarkably apt at organizing rural communities. In the 1970s, the movement successfully gained control of Bolivia's main peasant federation and, under the leadership of Jenáro Flores, renamed this federation CSUTCB. With its re-foundation, the peasant federation declared its independence from the government and establishment parties (which had successfully infiltrated it using patronage tactics), and incorporated ethnic demands into the organization's statutes, ideology, and political agenda (Yashar 2005: 178). *Kataristas*, moreover, established themselves as the leaders of the indigenous peasantry and utilized these networks to mobilize the population and advance the ethnic cause.

If scholars point to the MNR-led Revolution and the Velasco Alvarado regime to highlight the origins and historical salience of class cleavages and class-based party systems in Bolivia and Peru, they point to the *Katarista* movement in Bolivia (and the absence of a comparable movement in Peru) to signal the political origins of the country's ethnic cleavage and to explain the contemporary differences between the two countries (Faguet 2017; Gisselquist 2005; Rice 2012; Yashar 2005).[49]

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[48] The Katarista movement was divided into two camps. The *Indianists* represented the more radical of the two groups, focusing their organizing efforts on indigenous populations, framing inequalities strictly through an ethnoracial lens, and advocating explicitly for Indian rights (Hurtado 1986; Portugal Mollinedo and Macusaya Cruz 2016; Yashar 2005). This group "crudely denounced racism and power structures as strategies for maintaining 'caste privileges,' accusing even the groups of the Left of employing these strategies" (Portugal Mollinedo and Macusaya Cruz 2016: 25). Kataristas, on the other hand, emphasized the historical legacies of internal colonialism, but also saw ethnic and class inequalities as inherently intertwined. Their political discourse sought to integrate these identities explicitly, bridging indigenous culturalist issues with a more traditionally Leftist economic agenda, and opening political space for the participation of non-indigenous sectors of the Left within their ranks.

[49] Scholars contrast Katarismo's impact on Bolivian politics with the absence of similar political organizations in neighboring Peru. In the latter case, the expansion of the Shining Path and MRTA guerrilla movements is believed to have crowded out and undermined the extra-institutional political space that was necessary for the expansion of an ethnic movement, a factor that was key for the growth of Katarismo in Bolivia (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005).

However, as this chapter has thus far demonstrated, an ethnic cleavage was neither new in Bolivia nor absent in Peru. A salient ethnic cleavage has continuously structured collective attitudes, state institutions, and political behavior in both countries throughout their histories, even providing the underpinnings of a peasant-based discourse during the revolutionary era. A more historical outlook therefore suggests greater continuity between *Katarismo* and previous movements and rebellions similarly grounded in an indigenous agenda, albeit adapted to shifting political contexts and conditions. *Katarismo* provided contemporary expression to the ethnic cleavage. While in neighboring Peru, no such movement emerged, other political organizations such as the Shining Path and the established peasant federations nonetheless continued organizing indigenous populations and giving political expression to the ethnic cleavage; again albeit in different forms, to varying degrees, and not in electoral-party politics.[50]

III. The Ethnic Cleavage in the Democratic Era

In this section, I turn to the democratic era to describe the party systems that emerged in the two countries after their transitions and consider the extent to which ethnicity and class have structured voter behavior in Bolivia and Peru throughout this period. I introduce a measure of *social cleavage salience* that allows me to examine the strength of the cleavage independently from party system-level dynamics.

The cleavage salience measure employed here uses ecological inference methods to determine how the indigenous and non-indigenous vote was distributed across political parties and

[50] Indigenous communities provided guerrilla insurgencies with their core support. Yet, despite the Shining Path's and MRTA's incorporation of indigenous symbols into their political appeals and their use of indigenous languages to mobilize these communities, their programmatic platforms did not incorporate significant *indigenista* demands and, over time, actively sought to undermine traditional community structures.

establish whether support for the various political parties was differentiated along ethnic (or class) lines or not.

A cleavage is considered weak when support for the various political parties competing in a given election is similar across the various social cleavage blocs (i.e. both indigenous and non-indigenous populations vote at similar rates for the various political parties competing in an election). Alternatively, a cleavage is considered salient when support for most of the political parties competing in elections is significantly differentiated along ethnic lines (i.e. when one party obtains much more support from one ethnic group than the other).

The cleavage salience measure produces an index that reflects the extent to which the ethnic and class cleavages account for political behavior across each election cycle (the technical description of the measure and details on the operationalization of the variables are included in Appendix B). This index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning that the cleavage does not explain any political behavior in a given election and 1 meaning that all of the variation in electoral outcomes is explained by the cleavage. I then use this cleavage salience measure to identify cross-time variation in class and ethnic cleavage salience and determine the extent to which this variation is associated with party system transformations and levels of electoral volatility (in particular, party system collapse and reconstruction). The results of the analyses enable me to test a central difference in the expectations of existing approaches and the networked cleavage articulation theory advanced here concerning the relationship between cleavage salience and party system-level outcomes.

1. Bolivia's Party Systems

Bolivia initiated its democratic transition in 1980, with the election of Hernán Siles Suazo of the MNR (running under the UDP alliance), though a military coup delayed Siles Suazo's presidency until 1982. In 1985, the country held another democratic election and was able to

experience the succession of power without military intervention. Since then, there have been eight presidential elections, including the 1985 contest.[51]

Starting with the democratic transition and until the systemic collapse that took place between 2002 and 2005, Bolivia's party system was dominated by three political parties—MNR, MIR, and ADN—that had been formed between the 1950s and 1970s and survived (or led, in the case of the ADN leadership) multiple military coups. Although support for any one of these parties rarely surpassed 30 percent in a given election, they were nonetheless thought to represent the backbone of the Bolivian party system and to collectively express the primary axis of political competition. Other parties, which challenged the legitimacy of the political system to varying degrees, were seen as being outside of the established part system, regardless of their relative persistence.

Given Bolivia's historical experiences with political instability—the country underwent 190 coups in its first 190 years of independence (Dunkerley 1984; Klein 1992)—the resilience of the three traditional parties and the party system stability that ensued in the years after the democratic transition were seen as particularly remarkable, and taken as indicators of the political stability that would follow soon thereafter (Laserna 1990). Yet, 'outsider' parties signaled the party system's vulnerability.

'Outsider' parties varied across election cycles. In the 1980s, the most significant outsider parties were primarily parties on the ideological Left (e.g. Leftwing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNRI), Nationalist Revolutionary Movement-Vanguard (MNRV), and Socialist Party (PS)), explicitly *indigenista* parties (e.g. Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement (MRTK), Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement of Liberation (MRTKL)), and Conscience of Fatherland (CONDEPA), a personalistic party that appealed to Aymara populations. These "outsider" parties

[51] These include: 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2009, and 2015.

provided distinct alternatives to the established structure and, through different strategies, appealed largely to indigenous populations.

In the 1990s, two other important 'outsider' actors would emerge: Free Bolivia Movement (MBL), which represented an offshoot of the MIR establishment party, and Solidarity Civic Unity (UCS), which, much like CONDEPA, was a personalistic political organization that relied primarily on the charisma of its leader for its electoral support but that, in contrast to CONDEPA, appealed primarily to Quechua populations through its leader's cultural roots.

If the 1980s represented the era of promise of party system stabilization, the 1990s began to signal the fragility of this stabilization project. During this period, 'outsider' parties began to gain electoral ground. Between 1989 and 1997, CONDEPA and UCS expanded to become nontrivial threats to the established parties. Although both of these parties disappeared with the deaths of their leaders, by the early 2000s, new outsider alternatives—including the MAS and another personalistic party, New Republican Force (NFR)—would emerge rapidly to fill their voids. Established parties, for their part, rapidly lost their pillars of support during this same period and, by 2002, had either disappeared entirely from the political landscape—in the case of MIR and ADN—or were about to experience remarkable defeat through popular mobilizations, in the case of the MNR. The former party system had collapsed.

The 2005 election was the first election in the context of a new political landscape. In this election, the two main actors were both 'outsider' political organizations—MAS and Social Democratic Power (PODEMOS)—though the MAS was quickly positioning itself as the new establishment party, as it increasingly set the terms for political competition and became the most stable actor in the party system. MAS was a party constructed in the mid-1990s by an indigenous peasant federation that succeeded in garnering the support of Bolivia's social movements. PODEMOS, for its part, was the party of the non-indigenous elites and middle classes and,

although an 'outsider' party, it nonetheless gathered many of the traditional political elites that were left party-less with the systemic collapse. MAS obtained 54 percent of the vote in this election, becoming the first party since the democratic transition to obtain an electoral majority.

Since the 2005 election, two other general elections have taken place, in 2009 and 2015. In both of these elections, MAS has won overwhelming majorities (64 percent) and expanded its electoral reach. Opposition parties varied during this time. PODEMOS, MAS' competition in 2005, disappeared soon after the elections. In 2009, Plan Progress for Bolivia-National Convergence (PPB-CN) became the main opposition organization but, much like PODEMOS, it proved to be a very temporary electoral alliance. And in 2014, the UD alliance, which brought together two smaller parties, National Unity (UN) and Social Democratic Movement (MDS), became the primary alternative to MAS. While the Democratic Unity (UD) alliance did not last, both parties remain at the forefront of the opposition to the MAS in Bolivia.

How do we understand these party system transformations? The top-down, bottom-up, and networked articulation theories provide different explanations for these transformations, where each explanation is associated with a distinct empirical pattern. The top-down framework points to the strategic activation of an ethnic cleavage by the MAS and expects this cleavage to be inconsequential prior to the emergence of the party in 2002. The bottom-up framework, for its part, explains these transformations as the result of the decline of a class cleavage and the emergence of an ethnic one. Faguet (2017) articulates the starting point for the bottom-up analyses of party system transformations clearly:

> It is not just an important party or alliance that has died, but an enduring system of politics defined by a left-right axis of competition, arrayed between pro-worker and pro-capital opposing poles. In its place has risen a new system centered on one big, umbrella party (28).

Thus, according to Faguet and others, whereas the former party system was structured along ideological and class-based lines—with MIR representing the left, MNR the ideological center[52], and ADN the right (e.g., Centellas 2009; Faguet 2017; Malloy 1970; Sabatini 2003)[53]—the decline of class and the emergence of an ethnic cleavage drove the formation of an ethnicized party system. This bottom-up approach points to the 2005 election as the moment of crystallization of Bolivia's new ethnic cleavage.

Finally, the networked articulation approach emphasizes the historical roots and salience of Bolivia's ethnic cleavage and argues that ethnicity has been consistently significant throughout Bolivia's history. Furthermore, it sees class politics as an added layer, as opposed to an alternative identity, to the ethnic cleavage. As such, it predicts that Bolivia's ethnic cleavage will structure political behavior both in the former and current party systems, and for its significance to be greater than that of class throughout the period under examination.

Figure 3.1 provides evidence in support of the networked cleavage articulation theory's expectations. The figure visualizes the salience of the ethnic and class cleavages in Bolivia between 1989 and 2014. The results of the cleavage strength analyses reveal that Bolivia's ethnic cleavage is far from new. In contrast to what existing literature argues, Bolivia's ethnic cleavage significantly structured voter behavior not only in the current party system, but also, and crucially, in the former party system as well. What is more, the variation in voter behavior explained by the

[52] The MNR had emerged in 1941 as a party of the moderate-left, led by a small group of middle-class nationalist intellectuals. In the years that followed, the party moved further left through the establishment of key alliances with the working classes and peasantry, eventually placing itself at the forefront of the 1952 National Revolution (Mitchell 1977). Despite its implementation of reforms such as nationalization of the tin mines, universal suffrage (which gave indigenous majorities the right to vote), land redistribution, and educational reform, the MNR soon transitioned to the ideological center and adopted weak and mostly clientelistic linkages to the sectors of the left (Anria and Cyr 2017).

[53] Some scholars have been more hesitant to map Bolivia's party system onto a class cleavage. Dix (1989), for instance, characterizes the MNR as a catch-all party, defined as one that "one that eschews dogmatic ideology in the interests of pragmatism and rhetorical appeals to 'the people', 'the nation', 'progress', 'development', or the like, that electorally seeks (and received) the support of a broad spectrum of voters that extends the party's reach well beyond that of one social class or religious denomination, and that develops ties to a variety of interest groups instead of exclusively relying on the organizational and mobilizational assets of one (such as labor unions)" (26-27).

ethnic cleavage in the 2014 elections is the same as that explained by the cleavage in the 1989 election. In other words, levels of cleavage salience have not varied much at all since Bolivia's democratic transition. While the ethnic cleavage did peak in salience in the 2002 election—accounting for an impressive 56 percent of the variation in voter behavior—this level of salience was not sustained after that point and has since returned to its normal levels of salience (approximately 42 percent).

Figure 3.1 Social Cleavages in Bolivia, 1989 - 2014



The Figure also shows that while the class cleavage has also been significant for structuring voter behavior, its salience has never exceeded that of the ethnic cleavage. Interestingly, and contrary to expectations of existing scholarship, the salience of Bolivia's class cleavage did not decline before or after the collapse of the party system. On the contrary, the class cleavage seems to have reached its peak in the 2002 and 2005 elections, just as ethnicity was thought to be on the rise. This finding speaks indirectly to the strong association between class and ethnicity in Bolivian society, with the former cleavage seemingly being grounded in the latter one.

But, if the salience of social cleavages did not fluctuate with the party system transformations, what changed? The networked cleavage articulation theory posits that the party system transformations resulted from shifts in the articulation of the ethnic cleavage. In the former party system, the indigenous bloc of Bolivia's ethnic cleavage remained disarticulated. The three traditional parties articulated the non-indigenous bloc, providing little or no room for the participation of indigenous leaders and appealing primarily to non-indigenous population's identities and programmatic preferences. In this context, the indigenous vote became concentrated on outsider parties, which incorporated appeals to indigenous populations with greater regularity. The leader of CONDEPA, for example, appealed directly to Aymaras and to *cholo* identities, which were urbanized indigenous populations. Similarly, UCS's leader himself self-identified as a *cholo* and emphasized his Quechua origins to appeal to these sectors of the population. But beyond their appeals, collectively, outsider parties also represented the alternative to an established system that provided minimal representation for the indigenous majorities. Support for them implied the rejection of the establishment and a call for a different representational model.

With the collapse of the party system, this articulation dynamic was reversed. In the current party system, the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage has achieved articulation while the non-indigenous one remains politically unanchored, continuously supporting outsider alternatives. *Both Bolivia's former and current party systems represent partial articulations of the ethnic cleavage. Yet, whereas the former party system articulated the non-indigenous bloc and left the indigenous one unarticulated, the current party system has resulted from the opposite scenario: an articulated indigenous bloc and a disarticulated non-indigenous one.*

Figure 3.2 provides evidence in support of this argument. The Figure visualizes support for outsider parties across each election cycle by ethnic bloc.[54] The results show a dramatic shift in patterns of support for outsider political parties after the 2002 election. Until 2002, the indigenous vote was overwhelmingly concentrated in outsider political organizations, while the non-indigenous one remained focused on traditional parties. This is consistent with the notion that Bolivia's former party system only partially articulated the country's salient ethnic cleavage. Whereas it provided representation for non-indigenous populations—through the MIR, MNR, and ADN parties—it excluded indigenous populations from the political establishment. This shifted drastically after 2002, when the consolidation of the MAS enabled the inclusion of the traditionally excluded indigenous populations into the party system and brought their levels of support for outsider parties from an all-time high of 92 percent in 2002 to an all-time low of 6 percent in 2005. The current party system articulates the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage, but leaves the non-indigenous populations disarticulated. Since 2002, the vote of the latter population remains concentrated in outsider political organizations.[55]

[54] The analyses were implemented using ecological inference methods to calculate support for outsider and traditional parties in each election by ethnicity. For the analyses, the MNR, MIR, and ADN were classified as traditional parties in the former party system, and the MAS was classified as traditional after 2005. All other parties were classified as outsiders.

[55] In addition to speaking to articulation configurations, the figure also visualizes the underlying dynamics of party system collapse amongst the indigenous and non-indigenous populations. Interestingly, support for outsider parties increased significantly amongst *both* ethnic groups and at similar rates between 1997 and 2002.

Figure 3.2 Vote for Outsider Parties by Ethnic Bloc, 1989 - 2014



Figure 3.3 disaggregates support for outsider parties by ethnic group across each election in Bolivia's former party system (again, using the results from ecological inference analyses). The results show that between 1989 and 1997, outsider parties overwhelmingly concentrated support from indigenous populations. However, although both Quechuas and Aymaras were voting for outsider parties, until 2002, these ethnic groups were nonetheless voting for *different* outsider political organizations. Between 1989 and 1997, Aymaras voted consistently for CONDEPA. The Quechua vote, for its part, remained fractured between other outsider parties. In 1989, Quechuas concentrated their vote in IU;[56] in 1993, they distributed it between MBL and UCS; and in 1997, they divided it across all outsider options. Quechuas and Aymaras not only voted against the traditional parties, but also against each other's political alternatives. This pattern of a deeply

[56] In this election, Quechuas also voted for MIR, which was the only traditional party that at times succeeded in mobilizing indigenous votes.

divided indigenous vote—and a fractured Quechua vote—changed drastically with the rise of the MAS in 2002, when both Quechuas and Aymaras overwhelmingly turned to this party.

Figure 3.3 Support for Outsider Parties by Ethnic Group in Bolivia's Former Party System, 1989 - 2014



The shift also speaks to dynamics of bloc articulation. The analyses reveal that the MAS was the first outsider party to articulate the indigenous bloc in a manner that brought together Quechuas and Aymaras under a single indigenous party umbrella and incorporated them into the political system. Such a shift was, of course, electorally explosive because it allowed for the construction of an indigenous political majority and transformed the dynamics of electoral competition.

Figure 3.4 further assesses the Quechua-Aymara fracture within the indigenous bloc. It applies the measure of cleavage strength to determine the extent to which Quechuas, Aymaras, and the non-indigenous voted for different political alternatives in the former and current party systems.

The higher the value, the greater the differentiation is between the ethnic groups in terms of their patterns of voting behavior.

The figure confirms the argument that, despite concentrating their votes in outsider political organizations, Quechuas and Aymaras nonetheless voted for *different* political organizations in the former party system. They did so almost at the same rate as Aymaras and non-indigenous populations, a figure that seems particularly remarkable given the salience of the ethnic cleavage. This within-bloc fracture began to disappear with the rise of the MAS in 2002. The party's successful articulation of the indigenous bloc brought together Quechuas and Aymaras and eliminated these within-bloc fractures in the current party system.

Figure 3.4 Within-Ethnic Cleavage Dynamics in Bolivia, 1989 - 2014



I believe that the successful articulation of the indigenous bloc also explains, at least partially, the increased visibility of the ethnic cleavage after 2002. Yes, the MAS employed more *indigenista* rhetoric than many other outsider parties had. But, salience is also more visible and

easier to identify when one or two parties succeed in their articulation of a cleavage-based identity and manage to concentrate the vote of a single cleavage bloc. Disarticulation makes cleavage blocs harder to identify.

Collectively, the shifts in the articulation of the indigenous bloc—from a state of disarticulation and within-bloc fractures in the former party system to an articulation of the bloc that brought together Quechuas and Aymaras under a single party umbrella—were at the core of Bolivia's party system transformations. They explain not only the former and current party system's articulation configurations—both only partial articulations of a salient ethnic cleavage—but also the strength of the indigenous bloc within the context of Bolivia's current political landscape.

2. Peru's Party Systems

Peru's democratic transition began in 1978, but it was not until 1980, with the election of Fernando Belaúnde of AP, that the country elected its president democratically. At the time, Peru's party system, much like Bolivia's, seemed headed towards consolidation. Three political party institutions— American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Popular Action (AP), and Popular Christian Party (PPC)—all formed between the 1920s and 1960s, re-emerged with the democratic transition and structured patterns of political competition. Moreover, many of the old parties of the Left, which had traditionally remained fractured (Adrianzén 2011), also re-appeared in the political arena and toyed with the possibility of joining forces under a unitary alliance of the Left.

Although scholars recognized the vulnerability of the Peruvian party system—particularly in the context of the economic crisis that shook the country in the mid-1980s—the electoral successes of AP in 1980 and APRA in 1985, and the remarkable performance of United Left (IU)

in the 1985 election, nonetheless created a sense of regularity in Peruvian politics. Moreover, Peru's party system was believed to be structured along class lines, which for many observers represented greater political stability. In particular, the success of the parties of the Left—several of which actually traced their roots to Mariátegui's work—was seen as evidence of the importance of class for shaping political behavior in the country.

Thus, the rapid collapse of the party system in 1990 took many by surprise. In the midst of a devastating economic crisis and an expanding political insurgency, the established political organizations proved unable to cope or formulate feasible representational alternatives, and they rapidly disintegrated (Roberts 1998). In the 1990 election, the Left entered the electoral arena fractured; APRA entered it severely wounded after its weak government performance, which deepened the country's economic and political crisis; and AP and PPC ran in a coalition with *Movimiento Libertad* under the Democratic Front (FREDEMO) alliance. FREDEMO made it into the election runoff with Mario Vargas Llosa as its candidate, but lost the presidency to Alberto Fujimori of Cambio 90, an obscure political outsider who had been a respected university rector. Fujimori would put the final nail in the coffin of the Peruvian party system and remain in power until 2000.

The political landscape that ensued after the systemic collapse of 1990 has been profoundly volatile. While *Fujimorismo* has had a relatively stable presence since 1990—and, in recent years, has begun to lay the foundations of a political party—political organizations have, in general, been more akin to fleeting electoral alliances. Zavaleta (2014) refers to these alliances as coalitions of independents, which are alliances established by individual politicians as party substitutes at times of election. This dynamic replicates itself at the national, regional, and local levels, where parties emerge during electoral season and disappear soon thereafter (Levitsky 2018). It has held even among parties that have experienced tremendous electoral success, and which promised to

spearhead a stable party system. For instance, Possible Peru (PP) won the 2001 presidential election with a sizable political coalition, but by 2006, the organization had debilitated significantly and has since been unable to gather much support in general elections. This has also been the experience of Union for Peru (UPP), which came in second place in 2006, won the 2011 presidential election under the Peru Wins (GP) label, but then had to retire its candidate in the 2016 elections (when it ran as Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP)) in large part because of its abysmal performance in pre-electoral polls. Thus, Peru's party system remains fractured, unstable, and in constant flux.

However, despite the seemingly permanent state of collapse of Peru's party system, some degree of stability does exist in patterns of political behavior.[57] Scholars such as Raymond and Arce (2011) and Madrid (2012) have noted that ethnicity has played an important role structuring vote choice, particularly in the 2006 and 2011 elections, but also to a lesser degree in the 2001 election. Largely from a top-down perspective, they have argued that Peru's recent experiences with ethnic voting respond less to sociological ethnic cleavage structures and are more the result of strategic political activation from above. Madrid (2012), for instance, writes that ethnopopulist rhetoric and symbolism enabled politicians such as Fujimori, Toledo, and Humala to activate an indigenous political identity and mobilize political support accordingly. From this perspective, salient ethnic fractures do not drive patterns of ethnicized political representation; instead, they result from activation by strategic politicians that deem such fractures electorally convenient. Crucially, this reading of Peru's recent experiences with ethnic voting contrasts significantly with the bottom-up explanations employed to account for Bolivia's experience with ethnic politics. Whereas in Peru, the ethnic cleavage is expected to remain fluid and emerge only when evoked by

[57] There is also significant regularity in political parties' representational offers, with political platforms reflecting limited variation in economic and social proposals both across parties and over time.

political leaders, in Bolivia, this cleavage is seen as salient, stable, and the source of party system structures.

Two central hypotheses can be derived from existing explanations of Peru's recent experiences with ethnic politics. The first of these concerns the volatile nature of the ethnic cleavage. Existing scholarship expects that, to the extent that Peru has a salient ethnic cleavage, it is recent and intermittent. This reading sees Peru's former party system as reflective of a class cleavage that, much like Bolivia's, eroded with the economic crisis of the 1980s and the economic policies that followed, and contributed to the collapse of the party system. As the class cleavage declined, an informal economic sector—distinct from the traditional working classes—expanded, establishing the foundations for the rise of personalistic politics and individualistic patterns of voter behavior. It is within this context that most scholars explain recent patterns of ethnic voting: the result of top-down activation efforts by strategic personalistic politicians. This is why these scholars expect the ethnic cleavage to be intermittently salient. In their view, the ethnic cleavage gains relevance only when politicians deem it electorally useful, and lose it when politicians opt for alternative mobilization frameworks.

These expectations differ from those of the networked articulation theory in key ways. First, the networked articulation theory expects an ethnic cleavage to be consistently salient. Peru's ethnic cleavage cannot be strategically turned on and off by politicians. Because this cleavage has been central to the country's social, economic, and political development, it can be expected to matter across political periods and electoral cycles. Hence, while the precise degree of salience can vary somewhat, variations should be significantly less volatile than existing theories suggest. Broadly conceived, therefore, the salience of the ethnic cleavage should be relatively consistent.[58]

[58] This does not mean that the salience of the cleavage does not vary. Of course, when politicians articulate an ethnic identity more clearly or when they succeed in unifying a cleavage bloc, this ethnic cleavage can be expected to gain

Figure 3.5 visualizes an analysis of cleavage strength in Peru between 1980 and 2011. The figure allows me to evaluate empirically the expectations of existing theories—(1) a non-salient ethnic cleavage in the context of the former party system and (2) an intermittently salient ethnic cleavage since the collapse of the former party system—against those of the networked articulation theory, which expects a consistently salient ethnic cleavage across both periods. The figure employs an original dataset that combines census and electoral data at the district level in Peru.[59] It also includes a measure of the class cleavage that considers the extent to which the working class has different political behavior from informal workers, an expectation that scholars argue explains the loss of relevance of Peru's former party system.[60] The analyses were implemented using the election results for the first round of elections across each election cycle.

The results are consistent with the expectations of the networked cleavage articulation theory. First, they reveal that Peru's ethnic cleavage has been consistently significant since the democratic transition. Although the degree of salience has fluctuated somewhat, decreasing in particular for the 2000 election, the overall salience has been constant: for instance, the levels of

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greater visibility and organization. By contrast, the absence of political representation will inevitably limit the degree of organizational expression of that cleavage.

[59] These data has several important limitations. First, district-level electoral data is not available for the 1995 election. I therefore exclude these results from the analyses. Second, data is missing for entire Peruvian departments in particular election cycles. In the 1980 election, for example, the dataset is missing all of the census or electoral data for the departments of Apurimac, San Martin, and Ucayali, as well as significant portions of the data for Loreto. In 1985, it is missing most of the census and/or electoral data for Amazonas, Apurimac, Huancavelica, Loreto, San Martin, Tacna, Tumbes, and Ucayali (see Appendix for details of the dataset). These features place important constraints on the analyses. For instance, the absence of departments such as Apurimac and Huancavelica, two of the six departments in Peru that have an indigenous majority, can skew the results against the salience of the ethnic cleavage. However, a simple linear regression analyzing whether the proportion of indigenous at the district level is correlated with the percentage of districts included in the electoral data suggests that these data gaps are not significantly skewing the composition of the data (see Appendix).

Despite these limitations, the data provide an important window into patterns of political behavior for a period longer than current survey data allows us to analyze. This is particularly important for making claims about political behavior during the 1980s and 1990s, decades during which survey data remained scarce and imprecise but for which many claims have been made about the underlying dynamics of voter behavior. The dataset introduced here allows for an analysis of political behavior during this period through ecological inference analysis. Although with its own set of constraints, this dataset enables the analysis of voting dynamics for a longer period of time and with a consistent data foundation and methodology.

[60] I also attempted to operationalize the class cleavage differentiating between the working classes and employers. However, the small size of the employer class made such analyses highly imprecise and frequently pushed them off bounds. Extensions of this dataset will include other operationalization of the class cleavage.

salience identified in the 1980 election are equivalent to those calculated for the 2001 election, and those calculated for the 1990 election are similar to the salience levels identified for the 2011 election. This evidence supports the argument that Peru's ethnic cleavage did not remain latent in the context of the former party system, nor did it become intermittently salient in the years since party system collapse. Instead, it has consistently structured political behavior throughout the entire democratic era.

Figure 3.5 Social Cleavages in Peru, 1980 - 2011



Second, like Bolivia's, Peru's ethnic cleavage seems consistently stronger than the country's class cleavage (operationalized here as formal workers vs. informal sector), which was considered central to party politics in the context of the former party system. This does not mean that class did not matter, while ethnicity did. The lines, in fact, move together throughout most of

the period under examination. What this suggests is that the class cleavage mattered in large part because it was built upon the foundations of the ethnic cleavage. Not surprisingly, indigenous populations are more likely to work in the informal economy than non-indigenous ones (World Bank 2015). Peru's class cleavage did not replace, much less precede, the country's ethnic cleavage. Instead, it reinforced an already salient ethnic one and, in so doing, provided an alternative articulation framework for existing social fractures.

The findings demonstrate that neither sociostructural transformations—in the salience of underlying social cleavage structures—nor shifts in political elites' cleavage activation choices have been driving party system outcomes in Peru. Peru's ethnic cleavage has remained salient even as the country's party system has disintegrated and entered a highly volatile period. Such findings are consistent with the expectations of the networked cleavage articulation theory, which posits that the relationship between social cleavages and party system outcomes is conditioned, not by cleavage strength (whether from sociological or elite driven processes), but by cleavage articulation dynamics.

Figure 3.6 provides a closer look at how the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs have distributed their votes amongst political parties across political elections. Specifically, it visualizes support by each ethnic group for political parties that obtained more than five percent of the vote in the first round of presidential elections. The remaining parties are grouped in an "Other" category.

The figure uncovers several interesting dynamics. First, there is significant ethnic differentiation in the vote for most political parties and across all elections. While the difference varies in size depending on the party and the election, it is nonetheless consistently significant across most political organizations, with only one important exception in seven elections. For instance, in 1980, APRA obtained significantly more support from non-indigenous populations, whereas indigenous populations voted significantly more than the non-indigenous for AP and

outsider parties. In 1990, at the time of party system breakdown, the indigenous populations voted primarily for IU and other outsider organizations, whereas the non-indigenous vote went to APRA and FREDEMOS (a coalition integrated by AP and PPC). In 2000, the indigenous vote went to Toledo's PP and, to a lesser extent, to other smaller political organizations. The non-indigenous vote in that election concentrated on Fujimori's *Peru 2000*. And in 2011, the indigenous vote went exclusively to Humala's GP, whereas the non-indigenous one was split between Alliance for Great Change (AGC), National Solidarity Alliance (ASN), 2011 Force (F2011), and PP.

Thus, with few exceptions, the vote for most political parties has remained differentiated along ethnic lines across elections, even as Peru's party system has gone through remarkable transformations and has remained highly volatile. The one important exception to this otherwise consistent trend is the vote for Fujimori's *Cambio 90* in 1990. Both indigenous and non-indigenous populations seem to have voted at similar rates for Fujimori, a finding that suggests that the ethnic cleavage cannot explain the origins of Fujimori's support.

A second interesting dynamic concerns the degree of splintering or concentration of the bloc vote. Despite the ethnic differentiation in party support, the vote of both the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs has been splintered in most elections, with each bloc dividing its vote between two and sometimes three political parties in a given election. This begins to change for the indigenous bloc in 2000. Since that election, indigenous populations have been concentrating their vote in a single political party. In 2000 and 2001, they concentrated it in Toledo's PP, and in 2006 and 2011, it was in Humala's UPP and GP, respectively. In most of these elections, the non-indigenous vote remained highly splintered.

Figure 3.6 Support for Parties by Ethnic Group in Peru, 1980 - 2011



This difference in patterns of bloc splintering could be the result of different dynamics. It could result from bloc articulation dynamics. As the Bolivia case demonstrated, more successful articulation efforts are associated with greater concentration of the bloc's vote under a single party umbrella. This would imply that the indigenous bloc has been at least partially articulated in recent

election cycles, while the non-indigenous one remains disarticulated and, consequently, fragmented. Another alternative explanation could be that the differences in degree of bloc splintering result from the number of parties that are appealing to each ethnic bloc. That is, it may be that the political arena in Peru remains crowded with political parties that are targeting non-indigenous populations, whereas the number of parties that are targeting the indigenous bloc in the national arena remains limited. The simple availability of representational offers could be driving the concentration of indigenous votes in one party and the fragmentation of non-indigenous votes across multiple political options. Unfortunately, it is not possible to evaluate which of these dynamics is driving this pattern in political behavior. However, regardless of the mechanism driving this difference, the concentration of the indigenous vote in one party across these elections elucidates a pattern that, like in Bolivia, has contributed to the increased visibility of the ethnic cleavage and, in particular, the indigenous identity.

IV. Conclusion

Both Bolivia and Peru have salient ethnic cleavages that have consistently structured political behavior since these countries' democratic transitions. Their former party systems, while characterized by a more class-based discourse, nonetheless reflected ethnicized patterns of uneven political inclusion and representation.

It is at the moment of party system collapse that the differences between the two countries begin to emerge. In Bolivia, political parties—and, in particular, the MAS—have been relatively successful at articulating the country's ethnic blocs, while hardly disregarding their class dimensions. As a result, they have anchored themselves in the cleavage and stabilized patterns of political competition. In Peru, in contrast, articulation remains elusive and so the party system remains in a state of disarray. Although some scholars have argued that Peru's party system

instability has become institutionalized (Levitsky 2018), the analyses in this chapter suggest that such a state of institutionalized collapse need not be permanent; nor is it an indicator of the prevalence of top-down cleavage-less politics in this society. As this chapter demonstrates, Peru has strong cleavage foundations that could potentially enable the formation of a programmatic party system. The question, then, is why has it not?

In the next chapters, I analyze in greater depth the challenges of cleavage articulation. The following chapter examines the content of the ethnic cleavage in Bolivia and Peru to consider the extent to which ethnic identities structure programmatic and ideological preferences. I then turn to evaluate political parties' recent efforts at articulating these various dimensions of the ethnic cleavage into a coherent political platform. In the final empirical chapter, I evaluate the role of networks in constraining and enabling the articulation of cleavage-based identities in the political arena.

CHAPTER 4

GOING BEYOND CO-ETHNICITY: ETHNICIZED PROGRAMMATIC PREFERENCES IN BOLIVIA AND PERU

Despite the strong association between ethnic cleavages and voter behavior across the globe, ethnic cleavages are nonetheless considered to be largely detrimental to the formation of programmatic party systems (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Kitschelt 2001). Rather than enabling the formation of programmatic preferences along ethnic lines, ethnic cleavages have generally been said to reflect a competition between ethnic groups for the control of public goods and, as such, to be conducive to the emergence of patronage-based politics (Chandra 2004; Gunther and Diamond 2003; Ichino and Nathan 2013; Kitschelt 2001; Nathan 2016; Posner 2007).[61] This association between ethnic cleavages and patronage politics has driven the scholarship to focus on co-ethnicity—defined as ethnically differentiated support for a co-ethnic politician—to explain how patterns of ethnic voting ensue (Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004; Dunning and Harrison 2010; Habyarimana 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Posner 2005; Wantchekon 2003).

This chapter evaluates the programmatic and ideological content of ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru to determine the extent to which these cleavages provide a plausible foundation for the formation of programmatic party systems. The chapter posits that, in addition to providing the underlying structures for patterns of voter behavior and partisan loyalties, ethnic cleavages can also shape programmatic and ideological preferences. Ethnicized programmatic preferences, I posit, can also provide alternative channels to co-ethnicity for mobilizing ethnic votes.

[61] This treatment of ethnic cleavages stands in sharp contrast to the literature's approach to other social cleavage types, which have been associated with the formation of programmatic preferences (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset 2001).

Instead of responding to a patronage logic, patterns of ethnic voting in the Andes reflect clear differences in the programmatic and ideological preferences of indigenous and non-indigenous populations, themselves the product of historical between-group inequalities. Politicians, both co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics, can appeal to these ethnicized programmatic preferences to mobilize the ethnic vote. Nonetheless, the programmatic dimensions that become ethnicized, and the positions that the various ethnicities take on each of the dimensions, can vary significantly across societies. In line with recent scholarship, this study emphasizes the role of historical processes in shaping ethnic relations and creating the between-group inequalities at the core of ethnicized preference formation. A central implication of this argument is that ethnic cleavages are not incompatible with programmatic linkages or programmatic party system formation.

This chapter investigates these dynamics using cross-sectional survey data from Bolivia and Peru and matching analysis methods. Scholars argue that ethnopopulist appeals by strategic politicians drive ethnic voting in both societies (Madrid 2011, 2012). Yet, whereas Bolivia experienced the rise of its first indigenous president in 2005 and the consolidation of a strong indigenous political party, Peru's political system remains the least informative, most unstable, and most ideologically incoherent in Latin America. By evaluating the relationship between ethnicity and programmatic preferences in these contexts, I can consider how such preferences can vary across country borders, as similar ethnic groups engage with the state and each other in different ways.

The analyses focus on six programmatic dimensions: ideology, state intervention, liberal values, nationalism, democratic preferences, and populism. The results reveal that ethnic cleavages have consistently structured programmatic preferences along most of the examined dimensions in both Bolivia and Peru. Indigenous populations in these societies are to the ideological Left of non-

indigenous ones and support greater state intervention in the economy. They are also more nationalistic and socially conservative than non-indigenous populations. Across countries, however, I find differences in the direction of the association between indigenous populations, on the one hand, and state intervention in service provision, support for democracy, and preference for populism, on the other. This differentiation of programmatic preferences along ethnic lines reveals that ethnic cleavages in the Andes are not merely a reflection of strategic patronage networks. They reflect different ethnic groups' experiences with the state and the economy and provide likely foundations for the emergence of programmatic party systems in these societies.

This chapter makes several contributions to the literature on ethnic politics. First, it expands on recent literature that is challenging assumptions about the non-programmatic nature of ethnic politics (e.g. Horowitz 2016; Lieberman and McClendon 2013). Existing scholarship treats ethnic cleavages as a threat to democratic stability, public goods provision, and programmatic party system formation (e.g. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Habyarimana 2009). This chapter suggests that these associations are not inherently natural to this type of social cleavage. Much like class cleavages, ethnic cleavages can structure preferences and drive programmatic voter mobilization. In this sense, the findings provide indirect support to recent studies that look at variables such as group exclusion (Birnir 2007; Madrid 2005), institutional design (van Amersfoort and van der Wusten 1981), and historical processes (Singh and vom Hau 2016; Wimmer 2016) to explain why ethnic cleavages are so often associated with unstable and inefficient outcomes.

Second, the chapter also speaks to the importance of incorporating an analysis of historical contexts to develop expectations about the programmatic effects of ethnic cleavages. Ethnicized programmatic differences are not inherent to an ethnic cleavage. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, they are the result of processes of group differentiation that map these differences onto economic, social, and power structures. As such, they should be expected to vary, both in their dimensionality

and degree of salience, across societies. This expectation suggests that studies of the programmatic expression of ethnic cleavages should be heavily informed by country context and proceed cautiously when attempting to study preferences across multiple societies.

Finally, the study also contributes to the literature by evaluating ethnic politics in the Latin American context, a region that has remained largely on the sidelines of studies about ethnic cleavages, but that nonetheless has great potential for refreshing these conversations and moving them in new directions. Incorporating Latin American cases, such as Bolivia and Peru (but also Ecuador, Chile, and Colombia, among others) into the analyses of ethnic politics can contribute to a greater understanding of the effects of ethnic cleavages across a wide range of institutional and political contexts.

I. Ethnic Cleavages and Programmatic Preferences

The role of ethnic cleavages in structuring voter behavior in democratic societies has been broadly recognized in existing literature. Scholars have found that in societies from Zambia (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Posner 2007) to India (Chandra 2004), Bolivia, Ecuador (Madrid 2012), and even the United States (Branton 2007; Fraga 2011; de la Garza and Cortina 2007; Manzano and Sanchez 2009; Sanchez 2006; Segura 2012) and Mexico (Harbers, de Vries, and Steenbergen 2012), ethnic (and racial) cleavages have often served as the primary axes for structuring patterns of voter behavior and political competition. These cleavages have become essential for explaining not only the origins of party systems but also the nature of political competition and partisan strategies for engaging voters and mobilizing electoral support.

Despite the tremendous significance of ethnic cleavages in structuring political behavior across the globe, they are nonetheless thought to be relatively inconsequential for defining ideological and programmatic preferences in democratic societies and to be limited in their

capacity too facilitate the formation of programmatic party systems. This is because, in contrast to other cleavage types, ethnic cleavages are argued to be uniquely conducive to the emergence of clientelistic linkages between ethnic groups and ethnic parties (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Posner 2005).[62] This association produces a cycle in which ethnic parties engage in political competition primarily to gain access to power and control of public goods for the benefit of co-ethnics, and co-ethnics continue to vote for these parties to gain access to these material benefits (Chandra 2007). Ultimately, scholars argue, this ethnic-patronage cycle reduces the incentives for, and perhaps even impedes the formation of, programmatic appeals (Kitschelt 2000, 2001).[63]

Following this expectation of patronage-based ethnic politics, scholars have placed great emphasis on the role of co-ethnicity as the cue that voters use to define their political preferences. Chandra (2007) explains this logic in her work on patronage democracies. She argues that voters are "biased towards schemes of ethnic categorization in interpreting how past patronage benefits were distributed" and, as a result, expect that "politicians will favor co-ethnics in their distribution of material benefits" (99). The role of co-ethnicity is heightened in the literature by the belief that there are no other relevant dimensions of political competition that can provide alternative information shortcuts. Since voters' primary concerns involve gaining access to power and controlling state resources, co-ethnicity is the surest guarantee that they will increase their odds of success.

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[62] Gunther and Diamond (2003) write that: "The principal goal of the ethnic party is [...] to secure material, cultural and political benefits (and protections) for the ethnic group in its competition with other groups. As such, ethnic parties have an extremely low level of ideological or programmatic commitment and coherence [...] Lacking any functional interests or ideological agenda, the ethnic party tends to mobilize pre-existing clientelistic relations" (184).

[63] The reading that ethnic parties are by nature anti-programmatic and clientelistic is broadly accepted in existing scholarship. Kitschelt (2001) argues that the clientelistic practices of ethnic parties result from "the ascriptive and categorical nature of group membership [...] because it reduces the transaction costs of organizing, monitoring, and enforcing direct selective exchanges between politicians and followers" (59). In such a context, there are significant incentives for moving away from programmatic appeals and fulfilling voters' "widespread expectation that politicians will channel resources to members of their own ethnic groups" (Posner 2005: 89). Wantchekon (2003) similarly highlights this seemingly inherent association between ethnic parties and clientelism in Benin, and suggests that programmatic appeals may even be detrimental to party survival in such contexts.

Recent studies, however, suggest the need to reconsider both the relevance of co-ethnicity for ethnic voting and the propensity of ethnic politics to rely on patronage linkages. Chauchard (2016) and Horowitz (2016) point to the persistence of ethnic voting in the absence of co-ethnic politicians and highlight the strategic exchanges that occur between voters and non-co-ethnic politicians as the latter work to expand their bases of support. Lieberman and McClendon (2013), for their part, examine the ethnicity-policy preference link. They identify differences in the prioritization of policy issues across ethnic groups in a wide range of African countries.[64]

In line with these recent contributions, this chapter seeks to reconsider the association between ethnic cleavages and programmatic preferences. The central argument of the chapter posits that salient ethnic cleavages can go beyond their traditional effects on voter behavior and structure programmatic and ideological preferences along ethnic lines to provide the foundations for the emergence of programmatic party systems. This relationship between ethnic cleavages and programmatic preferences can provide politicians with alternative or complementary channels to co-ethnicity to mobilize ethnic groups by signaling ethnic proximity and alignment. Issue-based political appeals that tap into the programmatic content of these ethnic cleavages can therefore provide the foundations for the emergence of programmatic linkages between ethnic parties and ethnic groups. In so doing, they can also enable the persistence of ethnic voting even in the absence of co-ethnicity.

[64] The core argument advanced in this article is similar to Lieberman and McClendon's piece. However, it differs in some key areas. First, the strategy employed to examine these associations are different. Lieberman and McClendon's work looks at policy issues but focuses on a single valence issue dimension in the Afrobarometer. Their approach, moreover, focuses on a single survey year and, as such, is limited in its capacity to consider the salience of these differences over time. In contrast, the present article examines these dynamics over a 16-year period and across a broad range of issue dimensions. My findings suggest the need for more targeted approaches to analyzing the link between ethnic cleavages and preference formation that account for the different trajectories of ethnic groups and their interactions with the state across societies and over time.

Ethnic group differences often go beyond the cultural realm and impact patterns of social and economic inequalities (Baldwin and Huber 2010). In Latin America, race and ethnic differences have been associated with significant inequalities in socioeconomic status among blacks and whites as well as between whites, mestizos, and indigenous populations (Carey 2012; Hoffman and Centeno 2003; Telles and Paschel 2014). These inequalities have been demonstrated to affect a range of factors, including education opportunities (Telles, Flores, and Urrea-Giraldo 2015), returns to human capital endowments (Flórez, Medina, and Urrea 2001), access to public goods, and social mobility (Peter 2010).

In Bolivia and Peru, in particular, ethnic inequalities are tangible across a broad range of social and economic dimensions. For instance, almost 40 percent of Bolivia's indigenous populations are concentrated in the agricultural economy, compared to 10 percent of non-indigenous populations (World Bank 2015). This figure contrasts significantly with high-skilled labor statistics where indigenous and non-indigenous populations have different levels of participation (10 and 27 percent, respectively). Inequalities are also evident in education opportunities. Approximately 40 percent of indigenous populations in Bolivia have a primary education or less, compared to 10 percent of non-indigenous ones (World Bank 2015). Again, this finding contrasts with the 60 percent of non-indigenous populations with a post-secondary education in this society. A similar pattern holds in Peru, where 43 percent of indigenous populations have a primary education (compared to 20 percent of non-indigenous ones) and where 64 percent of the non-indigenous have a post-secondary education (compared to 42 percent of the indigenous).[65] Collectively, these inequalities shape the faces of the various economic sectors in

[65] Significantly, these inequalities are also pronounced in individuals' access to basic public goods such as electricity, piped water, and sewerage. The differences in access to public goods between ethnic groups in Bolivia and Peru range between 18 and 27 percentage points, with non-indigenous populations consistently having much greater access to these basic goods (World Bank 2015).

these societies and are both reflected and reproduced through the countries' educational, judicial, and political institutions.

The strong association between ethnicity, on the one hand, and social, economic, and political opportunities and grievances in these societies, on the other, means that ethnic groups have different interests and circumstances that drive their political demands. These inequalities provide the grounds for the formation of programmatic preferences that are differentiated along ethnic lines.[66] For instance, if indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru are primarily associated with rural areas and informal markets, then we can expect them to be more likely than non-indigenous populations to favor politicians that prioritize and seek to improve conditions in these sectors of society perhaps through land reform or lenient business formalization policies. While at surface level, these may seem like sectoral concessions operating within the realm of class politics, in reality, they are programmatic issues that directly benefit some ethnic groups over others.

From this standpoint, it is a mistake to assume that where class and ethnicity overlap considerably, class differences effectively replace the salience of ethnicity. Rather, in such contexts, ethnicity provides the foundations upon which class differences, as well as other social and political inequalities, develop. In so doing, ethnic cleavages exert an effect of their own that can be stronger and more widespread than that of class.

When politicians make programmatic appeals that tap into these ethnicized programmatic preferences, they are, even if implicitly, sending cues meant to appeal to specific ethnic groups. By doing this, moreover, they can succeed in mobilizing ethnic votes. In line with this, the central hypothesis of this chapter posits that in societies where ethnic cleavages are politically salient,

[66] A growing body of literature examines the effects of between-group inequalities on ethnic politics. In particular, these studies have considered how increased ethnic inequalities have led to the emergence of nationalist movements and the eruption of social conflict (Bolton and Roland 1997; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gourevitch 1979; Muñoz and Tormos 2015).

between-group inequalities should drive the formation of ethnicized programmatic preferences and provide the foundations for the emergence of programmatic party systems.

This argument has two central implications. First, it suggests that programmatic differences can complement or replace co-ethnicity as information shortcuts for mobilizing ethnic votes. By providing politicians—both co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics—with a larger toolbox of both implicit and explicit ethnic appeals, ethnicized programmatic differences widen the possible channels for representation and provide a foundation for the emergence of programmatic political alignments. In this sense, and in contrast to what the literature argues, ethnic cleavages can be expected to operate much like other types of social cleavages, structuring programmatic preferences, electoral competition, and political behavior.

Second, the argument suggests that what is distinct about ethnic cleavages vis-à-vis other cleavage types is not that the former produces patronage politics while the latter leads to programmatic platform formation. Patronage politics can exist within every social cleavage and are not antithetical to programmatic appeals or party platforms (Anria 2013; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Luna 2010). Instead, I argue, the uniqueness of ethnic cleavages lays in their historical and contextual specificity: their content is produced through historical, cultural, and structural processes and, consequently, varies significantly across societies.

Historical interactions between ethnic groups, and between these and the state, create the underlying between-group inequalities that come to structure political competition and enable the formation of differentiated grievances and preferences across groups. Because these inequalities emerge within a very particular context, we should expect them to vary across societies. Some ethnic groups may have, for example, more democratic cultural practices than their counterparts and, as a result, be more supportive of democratic values. Others may be associated with a particular sector of the economy and therefore be more inclined to support certain economic

frameworks over others. And yet others may have been favored by the state historically, while their counterparts experienced systematic disadvantages or exclusion, which in turn shapes their skepticism of the state. These historical and context-specific experiences can be expected to structure ethnic groups' perspectives on a range of issues, from beliefs about good governance practices to positions on the role of the state in the economy, and attitudes towards leadership styles and democratic values. But, because they are grounded in culture and structure, expectations about which issues matter cannot be assumed to be uniformly meaningful across societies or ethnic groups. Programmatic preferences that are highly polarized along ethnic lines in one context may be entirely insignificant in another. And the salience of any given issue preference may shift over time as relations with the state, as well as with other ethnic groups, evolve.

II. Ethnicized Programmatic Preferences in the Andes

Bolivia and Peru provide an ideal scenario for evaluating the relationship between ethnic cleavages and programmatic preferences. Beyond the similarities between the two countries (i.e. ethnic composition, historical experiences, and patterns of ethnic cleavage salience) laid out in Chapters 2 and 3, their recent experiences with party system reconstruction efforts—in particular, the success of an indigenous party and the partial reconstruction of a party system in Bolivia, and the absence of a parallel process in Peru—enable me to evaluate whether the association between ethnic cleavages and programmatic preferences is activated from the top-down by strategic politicians or, alternatively, can exist regardless of political mobilization and, as such, hold across different contexts of political uncertainty. In contrast to Bolivia, Peru currently lacks any credible party organizations at the national level that are actively seeking to organize and mobilize the country's indigenous populations. From this standpoint, Peru represents the much harder case of the two. Its political landscape is largely perceived as incoherent and lacking the social cleavages

necessary to structure identities and ground political competition (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Roberts 2002; Zavaleta 2014).

Existing theories of ethnic voting would expect Bolivia and Peru's patterns of voter behavior to be the product of strategic co-ethnic, patronage-based mobilization. In line with this, explanations of ethnic voting in Bolivia have pointed to the indigenousness of Evo Morales—Bolivia's first indigenous president, elected in 2005—to demonstrate that his co-ethnicity was an essential cue for driving the ethnic vote. In Peru, and in the absence of co-ethnics, scholars have instead highlighted the differentness of politicians that capture the indigenous vote vis-a-vis traditional white political elites (Madrid 2011, 2012; Raymond and Arce 2011). Madrid (2008, 2012) explains these patterns of ethnic voting as the product of ethno-populist strategies, through which politicians fuse inclusionary and populist appeals to activate ethnic cleavages for political gain. These explanations, however, have important limitations. First, the argument that "differentness" can play the role of co-ethnicity in a society with such drastic levels of political disorganization seems unconvincing at best. Such a weak signal, itself detached from access to patronage networks, is unlikely to trigger such clearly delineated patterns of ethnic voting, much less explain how this vote persists even as new and different politicians enter and exit the political arena. Second, even in the case of Bolivia, this argument has limited explanatory strength. While Morales' co-ethnicity certainly played a role in his election, this cue was nonetheless somewhat imprecise. Morales was a coca grower of Aymara descent. However, he grew up in a Quechua region and did not speak either indigenous language comfortably.[67] His identity, in this sense, did not transmit as clear a signal to voters as that of Felipe Quispe, an Aymara candidate that ran in that same election with a radical Aymara-centric discourse. Nonetheless, Morales successfully captured both the Quechua and Aymara vote in 2005.

[67] Aymara, however, was his native language.

III. Empirical Expectations in the Andes

This chapter expects ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru to structure programmatic preferences among voters—with indigenous and non-indigenous populations assuming different programmatic positions—and argues that these preferences can replace or complement co-ethnicity as cues for mobilizing an ethnic vote. Furthermore, given differences in historical processes—and specifically, in how indigenous and non-indigenous populations have interacted with each other and with the state over time—I expect that there will be variation in the programmatic dimensions that become ethnicized, with some dimensions gaining salience in one country and not the other, and with differences in the direction of these associations across borders.

Following literature on issue preferences and programmatic dimensions in Europe and Latin America (e.g. Bornschier 2013; Dalton 2015; Esaiasson and Wängnerud 2016; Kitschelt and Freeze 2010), I identify six key programmatic dimensions: Left-Right ideology, state intervention, nationalism, liberal values, democratic preferences, and populism. Collectively, these dimensions reflect the relevant economic, cultural, and political themes of electoral competition in Bolivia and Peru. Because they cover a broad range of issues, they should also reflect salient differences between ethnic groups where they exist and are politically consequential.[68]

In Bolivia and Peru, ideology and state intervention represent core dimensions of political competition that are associated with class politics, but that may be shaped by ethnic cleavages given the association between ethnicity and between-group inequalities in these societies. Within the state intervention dimension, I consider two sub-dimensions—state intervention in the industrial sector and service provision—that speak to different debates over the role of the state in

[68] It is important to highlight here that expectations about the relevance of these dimensions and the directionality of the association under study are derived with careful consideration of the country contexts. As such, they do not necessarily travel to other societies where ethnic cleavage salience may be reflected through other programmatic domains.

Latin American societies. Given existing between-group inequalities which place indigenous populations at a disadvantage vis-a-vis non-indigenous ones, I expect the indigenous in Bolivia and Peru to position themselves to the Left of the non-indigenous on the ideological spectrum and to favor greater state intervention in key industries. I examine whether this logic extends to the service provision sub-dimension, or whether instead, as recent research suggests (Morgan and Kelly 2016), historically disadvantaged groups reject greater state intervention in service provision because they tend to be more skeptical of the state.

The nationalism dimension focuses on debates over foreign, and in particular, U.S. intervention. While traditionally, the literature on ethnic politics associates nationalism with questions of secession, in the particular context of the Andes, positions on nationalism have been less associated with these debates and more closely linked to questions of state autonomy from the United States' political and economic influence.[69] Given this U.S. factor, I would expect that, where a relationship to exist between ethnic cleavages and nationalism in these societies, indigenous populations would likely emerge as more nationalistic than non-indigenous ones. This expectation stems from two reasons. First, as part of the War on Drugs, the U.S. has played an active role in the implementation of coca leaf eradication policies that have been uniquely detrimental to the livelihood of indigenous populations. Second, in popular culture, the U.S. is often blamed for the implementation of neoliberal reforms and conflicts over the exploitation of natural resources. Because indigenous communities have been severely impacted by these dynamics (i.e. the debates over whether to protect national culture and economic sectors in the face of outside challenges) I expect them to be more nationalistic than non-indigenous ones.

[69] Along the same lines, questions about relations with Chile tend to tap into similar sentiments of nationalism in these societies because of a history of conflict.

I also consider whether the ethnic cleavage in Bolivia and Peru is associated with differentiated positions on liberal values. These values have been identified as a new dimension of political competition that is loosening the grip of previously existing cleavages both by cross-cutting them and by introducing non-material interests into the political debate (e.g. Inglehart, 1977; Kriesi, 2010). In the case of Bolivia and Peru, cultural differences between indigenous and non-indigenous populations lead me to expect distinct preferences along cultural and value-based dimensions. Given the strong ties between indigenous populations and the Catholic Church in these societies, I expect indigenous populations to be more socially-conservative than non-indigenous ones.

Finally, the democracy and populism dimensions provide a lens through which to consider the effect of ethnicity on support for the democratic system and populist leadership styles, respectively. Much research has associated voter behavior in Bolivia and Peru, and especially among indigenous populations, with populist tendencies (Levitsky and Loxton 2012; Madrid 2011). In line with this, I would expect indigenous populations in these societies to be less democratic and have a stronger preference for populist styles of leadership.

To be clear, the expectation of this chapter is not that, if ethnic cleavages structure programmatic preferences, we should observe significant differences across all of these programmatic dimensions. Nor is it that these differences, where they exist, should be consistently sizable. Instead, it is that, given the diversity of issues that could be shaped by ethnic cleavages, and the contextual relevance of these particular issues for Bolivia and Peru, these six dimensions provide a sufficiently broad scope to evaluate whether ethnic cleavages matter or not for programmatic preference formation in these societies. As a starting point, I am interested in identifying whether ethnicity is associated with preferences along any given dimension. Finding differences along any of these programmatic dimensions already poses a significant challenge to

the assumptions of existing literature on ethnic politics. However, for those instances where a relationship between ethnicity and programmatic preferences is identified, these six dimensions can reveal important information about the content and political nature of the ethnic cleavages—and thus what needs to be articulated—in Bolivia and Peru. They can also highlight the issues that politicians could successfully tap into and polarize to mobilize greater support.

IV. Research Methods

I analyze the relationship between ethnic cleavages and programmatic preferences using individual-level data from the Americas Barometer. This survey is collected every two years by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) based at Vanderbilt University. For the case of Bolivia, I compiled nine nationally representative surveys implemented between 1998 and 2014. For Peru, I focused on five nationally representative surveys implemented between 2006 and 2014.[70]

The independent variable—ethnicity—is operationalized as a dummy variable using a survey question that asked respondents to name the language they first spoke at home. Those respondents who grew up speaking Quechua or Aymara were categorized as indigenous while those who grew up speaking Spanish were categorized as non-indigenous.[71]

The dependent variables examined are ideology, state intervention, nationalism, liberal values, democratic preferences, and populism. To measure each of the programmatic dimensions, I identified questions that were present and consistent across multiple survey years. Given some of the key limitations of converting individual surveys into a cross-time data set—mainly the variation in its questions over time—I adopted a few strategies for gaining some continuity across key

[70] This includes all of the available survey years for each country, with the exception of the 1998 survey in Peru.
[71] All other respondents were dropped from the sample. See Chapter 1 for justification of operationalization strategy. I include the results implemented with the self-identification measure in the Appendix.

dimensions. First, to gain cross-time traction in the State Services sub-dimension, I opted to include the 2014 survey in the coding of this variable even as two of the questions in the composite measure constructed for previous years were absent this survey year. To make sure this was not problematic, I ran confirmatory factor analyses between the three questions for each survey year. Given that the question responses move closely together every year, I decided that the loss of information from the elimination of the questions in 2014 was less problematic than the loss of an entire year in the analyses. Second, for the case of Nationalism in Bolivia, I incorporated and rescaled similar enough questions for the years in which these were available. I opted for this because, with the exception of 2012 and 2014 when the same question was included (and even then it was only asked of half the survey sample in 2012), there were no questions that related to this issue dimension and were repeated across survey years. The question, therefore, provides us with some insight into the dynamics on this dimension, but it should be interpreted with some restraint. Table 4.1 includes the operationalization of each variable by country.

As controls, I include Class, Urban-Rural location, and Education variables. The first two controls have traditionally been identified as drivers of programmatic preference formation in the literature (see, for example, Lipset (2001)) and are seen as alternative explanations for understanding political behavior in the Andes (Zuazo 2009). Education, for its part, is considered to be central for understanding differences particularly regarding preferences on the liberal values and populism dimensions (e.g. Inglehart 1977). The Class variable is operationalized using a composite measure of individuals' declared assets that ranges from 0 to 100 and increases with greater assets. These assets include items such as a television, cell phone, refrigerator, running water, and motorcycle. Following Davies and Falleti (2017), I identified those items that were included across all survey years and constructed a composite measure that weighs more heavily those assets that are rarer. Using assets as a proxy for class has the advantage of providing a more accurate measure

of an individual's purchasing power than self-declared income. The latter operationalization has been demonstrated to be prone to misreporting, and its classification levels have changed significantly over time in available LAPOP surveys. Tables C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix identify the years for which each dependent variable is available for Bolivia and Peru, respectively, and provide summary statistics on each dependent variable as well as on the independent variable of interest and other controls.

For the analyses, I first ran an OLS model regressing each of the dependent variables of interest (rescaled to [0,1]) on ethnicity with fixed-year effects. I then implemented a more rigorous strategy—Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) analysis—to examine whether the relationship between ethnicity and programmatic preferences identified in the first analyses holds under experimental conditions. Matching is a nonparametric method that reduces covariate imbalance between two groups, simulating a treated and control condition (in this case, indigenous and non-indigenous) (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012). For my purposes, matching enables me to focus on the differences between ethnic groups to determine whether these still matter after the data has been balanced along other key structural dimensions. I used CEM to match "treated" (indigenous) and "untreated" (non-indigenous) respondents on my measures of Class, Education, and Rural-Urban households. Unmatched observations—which did not exceed 100 in either country—were dropped from the dataset. Balance statistics are included in Tables C.3-C.8 in Appendix C.

Table 4.1 Dependent Variables. LAPOP survey questions

Variable	Question	Scale	Bolivia	Peru
Ideology	On a Left to Right scale where 1 means extreme Left and 10 means extreme Right. Where would you place yourself?	Right to Left (1-5)	X	X
State Industry	The state, instead of the private sector, should be the owner of the most important industries in the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase?	1-7, strongly disagree to agree	X	X
State Services	Composite variable: 1 - The state, more than individuals, should be the primary responsible for ensuring the wellbeing of the people. 2 - The state, more than the private businesses, should be the primary responsible for generating employment. 3 - The state should implement firm policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and poor.	1-7, strongly disagree to agree	X	X
Nationalism	2012-2014: In your opinion, the United States is: very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, not trustworthy at all?	1-4, less to more nationalistic	X	X
Democracy	It may be that democracy has its problems, but it is better than any other type of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this claim?	1-7, strongly disagree to agree	X	X
Populism	2006-2008: Do you believe there could ever be a sufficient reason for the President to shut down Congress, no reason sufficient for that?	0-1 dummy, increases as more populist	X	X
	2010-2014: Do you think that when the country faces difficult moments, it can be justified for the president to shut down Congress and govern without it?	0-1 dummy, increases as more populist	X	X
Values	Thinking about homosexuals, how much do you agree or disagree that they should be able to run for public office?	1-10 scale, less to more liberal	X	X

With the groups balanced, I regressed each programmatic preference on ethnicity. This enables comparison of the results between the balanced and unbalanced dataset analyses. Finally, I

ran an OLS model for each dependent variable using the balanced dataset and included Class, Education, Rural-Urban location, and survey year controls, in addition to the independent variable of interest, Ethnicity, in the model. These analyses allow me to compare the strength of the association between the independent and control variables, on the one hand, and each of the programmatic dimensions, on the other. To facilitate interpretation of this output, I calculated min-max predicted values, with Class going from 25 to 75 percent and Education from primary to college-level. Additional robustness checks, including different measures for class and ethnicity, an interaction term between ethnicity and class, and OLS multivariate analyses with the unmatched data, are included in the Appendix. Throughout, sample sizes range from 8,000 to almost 27,000 respondents based on response rates and available years for the survey question.

V. Results

Figure 4.1 plots the first difference and confidence intervals from the first set of analyses—regressing each programmatic dimension on ethnicity with fixed-year effects—using the un-balanced dataset. It represents the difference between indigenous and non-indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru across all programmatic dimensions. The results in Figure 4.1 provide strong initial evidence in support of the hypothesized relationship between ethnic cleavages and programmatic preferences. They reveal that, in both countries, the ethnic cleavage is an important explanatory variable for all of the policy dimensions included in the analyses. Ethnicity seems to have a structuring effect on ideological preferences, support for state control of key industries and state services, nationalistic views, support for liberal values and, and democracy and populism in Peru, but not in Bolivia.

In Bolivia, in line with expectations, indigenous populations emerge as more to the Left than non-indigenous ones on the ideological scale.[72] They are more supportive of state intervention both in key industries and service provision than non-indigenous populations, a finding consistent with the literature's expectations. They are also more nationalistic and less socially liberal. In contrast to the expectation, the analyses do not reveal significant differences regarding ethnic groups' support for democracy or populism. Altogether, these results suggest that, in Bolivia, ethnicity is a significant source of programmatic preference structuration.

Yet, if Bolivia represents a context characterized by ethnic cleavage organization and political expression—and thus leads us to expect an association between ethnicity and programmatic preferences—Peru represents the opposite scenario. In this sense, Peru is the more challenging case for this theory: it is widely perceived as a society lacking well-structured patterns in voter behavior and programmatic preference formation. Moreover, while scholars have recognized that ethnicity matters for voter behavior in Peru, they have nonetheless suggested that Peruvian voters mostly just 'follow the leader,' even through contradictory ideological shifts in discourse and platform (Madrid 2011). Given these expectations, the results of the analyses presented in Figure 4.1 are particularly remarkable.

In Peru, we observe a similar pattern to that of Bolivia but with a few key differences. Indigenous populations in Peru are, like those in Bolivia, to the Left of non-indigenous populations on the ideological scale. They are also more supportive than non-indigenous populations of state intervention in key industries. Much like the indigenous in Bolivia, moreover, the indigenous in Peru are also more nationalistic and socially-conservative than the non-indigenous, reflecting both

[72] In recent work, Moreno Morales (2015) found that indigenous populations in Bolivia tended to vote for candidates that were on the ideological Left, a finding consistent with the work of Madrid (2012) and Van Cott (2005). However, to my knowledge, the present study is the first to directly examine variation in programmatic preferences held by indigenous and non-indigenous populations along a range of issue dimensions.

a stronger sense of state autonomy and a rejection of more modern liberal social values. The latter figure is somewhat puzzling given these groups' placement on the Left-Right ideological scale, a position often associated with a socially liberal agenda. As such, the figure suggests that a representative Left in Bolivia and Peru will likely differ significantly from the Left elsewhere.

Three important differences emerge between the two countries in this first set of analyses. First, in contrast to Bolivia—where we did not observe any differences along the democratic dimension—indigenous populations in Peru seem to be less supportive of democracy than non-indigenous ones. A similar pattern emerges on the populism dimension, with the indigenous in Peru being somewhat associated with more populist preferences than the non-indigenous, though this relationship seems weaker than for other programmatic dimensions. Third, although the differences between indigenous and non-indigenous populations in their support for state service provision are significant in both countries, in Peru, the relationship moves in the opposite direction as that in Bolivia. That is, in Peru, indigenous populations are less supportive of state intervention in the provision of social services than the non-indigenous. Before exploring the potential sources of these differences between the two countries, however, I first examine whether these results hold under a significantly more rigorous test.

Figure 4.1 Ethnicity and Programmatic Preferences (Unbalanced Analysis)



Figure 4.2 plots the results of the same analyses using the dataset balanced with CEM.[73] Like Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 includes the first differences after regressing each programmatic dimension on ethnicity—and confidence intervals for both indigenous and non-indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru across the various programmatic dimensions of interest. The results are highly consistent with those in Figure 4.1. Indigenous and non-indigenous populations seem to have significantly different preferences in their ideological placement, their support for

[73] The analyses were implemented using *Zelig* (Imai, King, and Lau 2007, 2008), *MatchIt* (Ho et al. 2007a, 2007b), and CEM methods (Iacus et al. 2012)

state intervention in key industries as well as in service provision, their views on nationalism, and support for liberal values. Differences also emerge in ethnic groups' support for democracy, but only in the Peruvian case. In contrast to Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 suggests that there is no significant difference between indigenous and non-indigenous populations in their support for populist leadership in either country. The relationships hold across all other dimensions. In line with expectations, indigenous populations in both countries tend to be to the Left of non-indigenous ones and to favor greater state intervention in the economy. They are also significantly more nationalistic and socially conservative. The differences persist along the remaining two dimensions—democracy and state intervention in service provision—with indigenous populations in Bolivia supporting state-led service provision and producing no significant differences on the democracy dimension, whereas those in Peru were significantly more likely to reject democracy and oppose state intervention in the provision of social services.

The finding that indigenous populations in Peru are less likely to support state intervention in the provision of social services is particularly surprising given the natural complementarity of the two sub-dimensions of state intervention: industry and service provision. Nonetheless, this difference may be explained by Morgan and Kelly's recent work (2016) on the effects of between-group inequalities on support for redistributive policies in Latin America. The authors find that between-group inequalities between indigenous and non-indigenous populations increase the former's skepticism of the state's redistributive efforts. This negative association was not present in Bolivia likely because, as Morgan and Kelly argue, in countries where party systems are programmatically structured and have meaningful parties of the Left—such as the MAS in Bolivia—support for redistribution increases among historically disadvantaged indigenous populations. In other words, the difference between Bolivia and Peru regarding indigenous groups' support for state intervention in service provision may stem from their distinct relationships with

the state at the moment. Whereas the rise of an indigenous party in Bolivia may have decreased indigenous groups' skepticism of the state's redistributive capacity and increased their support for state-led redistribution in the new political period, the absence of stable representation of indigenous populations in Peruvian politics may be having a negative effect on this population's support for the same redistributive policies.

This framework—which highlights how variation in state-society relations can mediate the effect of ethnicity on programmatic preferences—also suggests an explanation for the differences between Bolivia and Peru along the democracy dimensions. The rise to power of the MAS brought about major transformations in state-society relations in Bolivia. Most significantly, it resulted in the unprecedented political inclusion of this country's historically underrepresented indigenous populations. These important shifts may help explain why the indigenous in Bolivia, in contrast to those in Peru, are no different from the non-indigenous in their support for democracy. Their greater political inclusion—and the fact that an indigenous president rose to power through democratic means—likely drove an increase in their support for the democratic model. In Peru, on the other hand, no such shift in the political inclusion of indigenous populations has occurred. Instead, indigenous populations continue to be underrepresented in the political system, a dynamic which seems to influence ethnic group's attitudes towards democracy. Although, unfortunately, the data available do not permit such analyses, the dynamics are nonetheless suggestive of the importance of taking state-society relations into account when making predictions about the effects of ethnic cleavages on political preferences and behavior.

Figure 4.2 Ethnicity and Programmatic Preferences (Post-Matching Analysis)



Altogether, the results presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 lend significant support to the argument about ethnicized programmatic preferences advanced in this chapter and stand in sharp contrast to the expectations of existing literature on ethnic politics. The central finding, that programmatic preferences can be collectively structured by ethnic cleavages, is a novel and important one. First, it speaks to the unrecognized potential of ethnicity as a social identity that can provide the foundations for the emergence of programmatic politics. Second, it sheds light on the unique role of context for shaping the content of ethnic identities. The differences identified here in the preferences of various ethnic groups cannot be explained away by class inequalities. Instead,

they speak to the independent association between ethnicity–mediated by cultural, economic, and political experiences—and political behavior in these societies.

But, how strong is this association? And how does it compare to class, education, and rural/urban household location? Figure 4.3 plots the first differences calculated from the OLS analyses implemented with the balanced dataset. The figure allows us to assess the substantive implications of the proposed argument by comparing ethnicity to other traditionally significant socio-structural variables such as class and education. Specifically, Figure 4.3 presents the predicted change along each of the programmatic dimensions when moving from non-indigenous to indigenous, urban to rural, college to primary-level education, and 75th to 25th percentile along the class variable.[74]

Several important trends emerge from these results. First, ethnicity stands out as the most significant and consistent variable explaining variation in programmatic preferences in both countries. In Bolivia, the strength of the association between ethnicity and programmatic dimensions surpasses that of class, education, and rural-urban households in four of the seven programmatic dimensions: Left ideology, state industry, nationalism, and state services. It matches education on the liberal values dimension and suggests no association on the democracy and population dimensions. A similar trend arises in Peru, where the ethnic cleavage seems to be the primary factor (of those included in the analyses) structuring programmatic preferences along four key dimensions: Left ideology, nationalism, state services, and democracy. Ethnicity matches class on the industry dimension and education on the liberal values dimension, and comes second to rural/urban location on the populism dimension, where the association comes up as salient again.

[74] Note that the last two variables are flipped (i.e. going from high to low education and from upper to lower class) to facilitate interpretation when comparing to ethnicity.

Altogether, ethnicity emerges as a surprisingly strong predictor of differences in programmatic preferences in both societies, surpassing the effect of class, education, and rural/urban location.

Second, the structuring capacity of ethnicity holds stable even as we move from a context of ethnic-based representation—such as that of Bolivia—to one characterized by party system collapse and in which ethnicity is not prioritized as a political identity, as in Peru. Figure 4.3 reveals that ethnicity matters even in the absence not only of co-ethnics, but also of ethnic-based representation and stable party politics.

Finally, Figure 4.3 suggests that the content of the ethnic cleavage varies somewhat between Bolivia and Peru. Whereas Bolivia's ethnic cleavage is primarily associated with distinct views on ideology, state intervention in key industries, and nationalism, Peru's is more closely tied to views on ideology, nationalism, values, and democracy. This indicates that ethnic politics should take somewhat different forms in these societies.

The differences between Bolivia and Peru cannot be understood without these contextual considerations. Context contributes to the underlying structures of between-group inequalities and shapes the sociocultural dynamics that give ethnic cleavages their programmatic content. Ethnic cleavages will manifest very differently in societies with distinct historical trajectories. Moreover, their expression in political behavior will vary with changing dynamics in state-society relations. Taking this into account can thus reveal unique trends in the political expression of ethnicity.

Figure 4.3 First Differences: Comparing Social Cleavages in Bolivia and Peru



VI. Conclusion

Ethnic cleavages have long been associated with patronage politics and deemed highly detrimental to programmatic representation. The treatment of ethnic cleavages as an exception to otherwise standard expectations of social cleavages and their structuring effect on issue dimensions has driven scholars away from systematically examining the links between ethnic identities and

issue preferences. However, recent works on the inequality structures that result from ethnic polarization suggest the need to revisit this important question and consider the extent to which ethnic cleavages—which are uniquely positioned to impact individuals' perspectives across a broad range of issue dimensions—can structure voter preferences beyond the electoral arena. Identifying the policy reach of ethnic cleavages can shed light on the likelihood of programmatic ethnic mobilization and reveal alternative channels to co-ethnicity for targeting ethnic groups through programmatic appeals.

The analyses presented in this chapter reveal that ethnic cleavages have a more significant and broader impact on issue preferences than previously thought. Ethnic cleavages, it turns out, are neither antithetical to programmatic preferences nor necessarily conducive to the emergence of patronage politics. Survey analyses between 1998 and 2014 in Bolivia, and between 2006 and 2014 in Peru reveal that the effect of these countries' ethnic cleavages on voters' programmatic preferences has remained consistently significant over time, exerting an independent and more consistent effect than class. In both countries, being indigenous is associated with having a more Leftist ideology and supporting greater state intervention in the economy. It is also associated with having more conservative social values and supporting nationalist policies. In the case of state services, indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru seem to move in opposite directions, with the former supporting greater state intervention and the latter opposing it, likely a product of crucial differences in the interactions between these populations and the state. What is perhaps most remarkable, however, is how consistent these dynamics are across the two countries despite the important differences between their current political systems. The fact that ethnicity not only structures voter behavior in Peru—where the political system is inchoate and marred by great volatility—but also shapes issue preferences across every dimension examined in this chapter (with the exception of populism) is uniquely telling of the structuring force of ethnic cleavages. Even in

the absence of stable political representation, and in a context of low information, ethnic groups are nonetheless able to hold stable and clearly delineated preferences with clear programmatic implications. What is more, the fact that ethnicity does not shape views on populism in Peru suggests that the current emphasis on ethnopopulism as a mobilization strategy that is particularly effective with indigenous populations may be misguided. The programmatic component of ethnic-based appeals seems to be doing most of the legwork, and the support for Verónika Mendoza—a non-populist, Leftist and highly programmatic candidate—among indigenous populations in the recent Peruvian elections may be the strongest evidence of this.

Of course, the differences that exist in the preferences of ethnic groups in Bolivia and Peru do not result merely from cultural differences nor are they somehow primordial to these identities. Despite the consistent association between ethnic cleavages and programmatic preferences in Bolivia and Peru, there are nonetheless key differences between the two countries' programmatic alignments. While indigenous populations in both Bolivia and Peru share positions on the ideological spectrum, support greater state intervention in the economy, and are more nationalistic and socially conservative than non-indigenous ones, they differ in their views on state intervention in service provision and their support for the democratic model and populist leadership styles. These cross-border differences highlight the role that context and historical processes play in giving ethnic cleavages their content. Historical interactions between the various groups and the state have created and solidified between-group inequalities, favoring non-indigenous populations over indigenous ones throughout history and setting the foundations for the existence of ethnically-grounded inequality structures.

Together with Chapter 3, this chapter demonstrates the salience if the ethnic cleavage in Bolivia and Peru and its significance for understanding political behavior associated with voting tendencies and programmatic and ideological preferences. These features—which I take to define

the content of the ethnic cleavage in these countries—provide the foundations for the discussion of articulation efforts. In the following chapters, I turn to the political arena to consider how ethnic identities are being articulated by political parties, what the consequences of articulation and disarticulation of these identities are for party system stability outcomes, and why such differences in likelihood of articulation occur.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL ARCHITECTS OR SOCIAL MEGAPHONES: THE ARTICULATION OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

> *They want to remove Evo, remove the pollera, the poncho, and the social organizations. They want to end our social organizations; they want to bring back the gringos, these sellouts. They are ashamed of the pollera, of the poncho, of our skin color, and they want to remove the President; they want to remove you so that they can return and, like in the colonial period, have it so that there are no more ponchos or polleras in the National Assembly or the National Palace.* – Alvaro Garcia Linera (Cuiza, *La Razón*. 2018)

The previous chapters demonstrated that salient ethnic cleavages have consistently structured political behavior in both Bolivia and Peru. Across every election cycle since these countries' democratic transitions, ethnic cleavages—which gained their salience and content from historical processes and their resulting inequalities—have shaped voters' electoral support for, and rejection of, political parties. Moreover, beyond structuring vote choice, these cleavages have also become associated with distinct ideological and programmatic preferences. In both Bolivia and Peru, ethnicity underpins political engagement and stabilizes political behavior.

Notably, the consistency that ethnic cleavages have introduced to patterns of political behavior amongst voters contrasts sharply with the remarkable instability that has characterized these countries' party systems. Since its democratic transition, Bolivia has experienced party system stability, decomposition, collapse, reconstruction, and stabilization. Peru, for its part, underwent systemic collapse and has since remained in a state of institutionalized decomposition (Levitsky 2018), characterized by elevated levels of electoral volatility and seemingly unpredictable patterns of electoral competition.[75] This chapter examines this striking lack of

[75] These volatility levels are associated with significant representational uncertainty. Unknown political actors populate each election cycle. These actors rise to prominence more often than not as outsiders without any political experience, force the reconfiguration of alignments, and disappear soon after the end of the election cycle. Moreover, the

correspondence between voter-level and party system dynamics. How do salient social cleavages—which provide stability to political behavior—co-exist with fluctuating political landscapes? Why, if social cleavages can structure and stabilize voter behavior and programmatic preferences amongst voters, do they fail to stabilize party systems?

Existing literature offers little in the way of explanations for the incongruence between a stable cleavage structure and its volatile expression in the party system. In contexts where salient social cleavages shape political behavior, though from opposing vantage points, both the top-down and bottom-up approaches expect that political parties will naturally recognize these patterns and align themselves accordingly.[76] Hence, neither approach can account for alignment failures and patterns of representational instability.

This chapter aims to fill this gap. It introduces a cleavage articulation theory that explains how consistently salient ethnic cleavages can be associated with varying levels of party system stability. The theory posits that a social cleavage articulation process—which occurs independently for each rival bloc within the social cleavage (i.e. workers versus employers in a class cleavage or indigenous versus non-indigenous in the ethnic cleavage)—mediates the relationship between social cleavages and party systems, and defines the extent to which cleavages will become institutionalized in the party system or, alternatively, remain associated with political instability and social conflict. Whereas the full articulation of a social cleavage—when both rival blocs achieve articulation—is associated with the stabilization of the party system, its failed articulation—when neither bloc achieves articulation—is associated with significant party system

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seemingly unpredictable flux in which highly volatile party systems find themselves in also limits politicians' and voters' capacity to exchange information and become familiarized with each other. For new politicians, this unpredictability undermines efforts at constructing political organizations that effectively transmit their political platforms to voters. For voters, it limits their ability to learn about parties, identify those platforms that are most programmatically and ideologically proximate, and inform their vote choice.

[76] When the bottom-up approach has identified such incongruences between voters and party systems, it has interpreted these as temporary and assumed that parties would align in due time (e.g. McAllister and White 2007; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

instability and an increased likelihood of social conflict. When cleavages achieve only partial or asymmetric articulation—that is, when only of the blocs achieves articulation while the other one remains disarticulated—party system stability becomes differentiated at the level of blocs, with the articulated bloc becoming associated with decreased levels of bloc electoral volatility while the unarticulated one remains in flux.

This chapter examines this framework in three stages. The first stage begins to examine why articulation processes are prone to failure. Focusing on political elites, this stage argues that, at least in contexts of party system collapse, assumptions about elites' capacity to identify and articulate cleavage-based identities do not hold. Elites have limited experience and lack access to information and resources. These conditions significantly constrain their capacity for articulation. The section employs an original elite survey implemented with members of the 2011-2016 Peruvian Congress. It demonstrates that there is vast disagreement amongst political elites about the collective identities that structure political behavior in society. Elites' divergent interpretations of voter behavior speak to the challenges of building representation in the context of party system collapse..

The chapter then introduces an approach for measuring cleavage bloc articulation. This measure aims to capture the extent to which political parties effectively express the *structural*, *programmatic*, and *identity* content of ethnic cleavage blocs and weave these together into a *coherent* political platform. Once the rationale behind the measure is outlined, I turn to evaluate bloc articulation dynamics in Bolivia and Peru.

The analyses of bloc articulation patterns in Bolivia and Peru first employ survey data to evaluate programmatic congruence and then turn to a more robust analysis of party platforms to determine how the various political parties are articulating the multiple dimensions of the ethnic cleavages. I show that despite the salience of the ethnic cleavage in both Bolivia and Peru, only the

indigenous bloc in the former has achieved articulation in the party system. Bolivia represents an instance of partial, or asymmetrical, cleavage articulation. Peru, on the other hand, represents an instance of failed cleavage articulation. This section also presents three case studies of articulation, using the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS-IPSP or MAS) as an example of successful bloc articulation, Peru Wins (GP) as one of partial bloc articulation, and Plan Progress for Bolivia - National Convergence (PPB-CN) as an example of failed bloc articulation.

Finally, in the third stage of the chapter, I examine whether different patterns of bloc articulation are associated with variation in levels of bloc electoral volatility. The results show that there is indeed an association between bloc articulation and bloc volatility. I find that the successful articulation of Bolivia's indigenous bloc has drastically reduced levels of volatility for this bloc. In contrast, unarticulated blocs in both Bolivia and Peru all remain associated with significantly elevated levels of bloc volatility.

Collectively, the analyses highlight the ways in which articulations can vary and the effects of such variation on party system stability outcomes. The framework introduced here moves attention away from debates about cleavage salience or strategic identity activation, and refocuses it on the articulation process. It is in this terrain where the sociological meets the political to produce distinct representational landscapes. The remainder of the chapter evaluates each of these stages.

I. Political Elites: Perceptions about Voter Behavior

The process of cleavage articulation involves agency. While social cleavages can exist and structure political behavior consistently, political parties construct the articulations that give these cleavages expression in the party system. To articulate these cleavages, political elites must identify them, decipher their content, and construct representational offers accordingly, weaving

the various elements of the cleavage into a coherent political identity and party platform. Yet, in contexts of party system collapse, such processes of articulation are fraught with roadblocks. In such contexts, more often than not, nascent political parties will lack the political experience and the economic, political, and organizational resources necessary to formulate effective articulation offers. This changes the logic of the representation building process. Instead of having extensive access to information about voter preferences and political behavior and responding to these trends—or alternatively, strategically activating and de-activating political identities to their advantage—political elites often improvise there representational strategies. These dynamics increase the likelihood of articulation failures.

I explored these constraints to articulation in my interviews with candidates for the 2016-2021 Peruvian Congress. Most of the candidates interviewed were relatively new to politics and had close to no experience designing political campaigns, analyzing voter preferences, or testing the appeal of their proposals among constituents. Instead of relying on formal knowledge and expertise, they mostly built their campaigns surrounded by friends, colleagues, and family members that had similarly limited knowledge of the process of building a campaign. Political strategies were few and far between.

Their resources for carrying out campaign efforts, moreover, were also drastically limited. The politicians interviewed generally had little strategic or financial support from the national leadership of the political party that they were running under. Moreover, instead of having access to their political parties' regional networks or political machines and using these to build and expand the reach of their campaigns, more often than not, the politicians were expected to provide political parties with their own local networks. That is, parties tapped into local politicians to gain community access; if politicians wanted to reach beyond their own networks (which they were expected to), they had to do it on their own. As a result, they either relied on their own connections

to community-based and professional organizations to build their campaigns or, alternatively, established collaborations with oftentimes-dubious political operatives in local communities.

Beyond constraining politicians' ability to build effective political campaigns, the limited political and economic resources available to candidates also affected their capacity to gather information about voter preferences and increase their understanding of trends in political behavior. Politicians, as it turned out, varied remarkably in their understanding and interpretation of patterns of voter behavior. To evaluate this dynamic more closely, I implemented a survey with members of the 2011-2016 Peruvian Congress that included a component evaluating elite perceptions of trends in voter behavior at the national level. Because these politicians had designed and run successful campaigns throughout their regions (in support of both their own candidacy and their party's presidential candidate), they were better positioned than most to provide an accurate reading of trends in political behavior in Peruvian society. The survey asked them about their perspective regarding the extent to which a range of social cleavages and other social variables influenced voter behavior in national elections in Peru. The questions included cleavages that were politically salient—such as the ethnic one—as well as others that were not salient—such as gender.

Figure 5.1 summarizes the results of the elite survey. The results illustrate Peruvian elites' degree of knowledge—or interpretation—of voter behavior patterns and sociopolitical fractures in Peru. Two dynamics stand out. First, Peru's political elites are in significant disagreement regarding which social divisions matter in Peruvian politics. Survey respondents were divided down the middle on their perceptions of the political salience of five of the fourteen dimensions included in the analyses. These five dimensions, moreover, include crucial social cleavages such as class, ethnicity, and state-market relations, for which we would traditionally expect significant agreement on whether they are politically consequential or not. Yet, despite the potential programmatic and structural importance of such cleavages, Peruvian political elites do not seem to

agree on whether these issues even matter or not for structuring voter behavior in Peruvian society. This finding speaks to the challenges of identifying salient cleavage structures, much less deciphering their content, in the context of party system collapse.

Figure 5.1 Peruvian Elites' Perceptions of Voter Behavior



Second, the survey results reveal that, to the extent that political elites agree on the significance of particular patterns of voter behavior in Peruvian society, it is on the belief that the Peruvian electorate is primarily driven by, and responsive to, personalistic or charisma-based appeals. In fact, the only dimension where *all* of the surveyed Congress-members agree on is the "Image-Platform" dimension, which asked whether the image of a leader matters more than his or her political platform. Three quarters of respondents also agreed that the image of a leader matters more than political discourse and that it is better to have access to media than to have a consolidated political party. Furthermore, when asked whether the Peruvian vote is consistent across election cycles or not, 76 percent of political elites chose the latter option.

Political elites' portrayal of the Peruvian electorate as volatile, disorganized, and highly responsive to populist and personalistic appeals is inconsistent with the trends in political behavior observed in this study; trends that have remained relatively stable since the country's democratic transition in 1980 and that have been increasingly recognized by scholars in recent elections (Madrid 2012; Raymond and Arce 2011). Political elites' disagreements over the relevance of particularly significant social cleavages for political behavior—and their agreement over the importance of a politicians' image—suggests, if not a problematically narrow understanding of patterns of political behavior dynamics, then, at least, an unexpected clash of visions about what matters in Peruvian politics amongst political elites. Such divergent views seem incongruent with the expectations of existing scholarship but are closely aligned with the networked cleavage articulation theory as they speak to the structural and informational constraints and opportunities that politicians face when seeking to understand and articulate sociopolitical dynamics in contexts of party system collapse.

In sum, nascent political parties cannot be assumed to have either distinct access to information about voter preferences nor a unique level of knowledge about patterns of voter behavior in society. Their inexperience is combined with their limited access to information and resources to place significant constraints on their representation building capacity. In this sense, political elites in contexts of party system collapse will more closely resemble regular voters in terms of their knowledge and articulation capacity than traditional political elites. This matters for articulation processes precisely because it highlights their likelihood of failure.[77]

[77] Of course, there are other ways of achieving political success. Across Latin America, many political parties rely on clientelism, personalism, and/or valence issue appeals to draw political support. Individual candidates can also experience remarkable success playing the role of political architects. But, to the extent that cleavages play a crucial role structuring social inequalities, political behavior, collective identities, and programmatic preferences in a given society, they constrain the representational landscape. In so doing, they provide the most reliable and sustainable way out of cycles of political instability. In such instances, political parties will, on average, experience more success as articulators or social megaphones than as social activators or architects. With this in mind, the next section sets out to

II. Articulating Social Cleavages in the Political Arena

The differences in the current political landscapes of Bolivia and Peru arise, not from variation in cleavage salience, but from variation in cleavage articulation outcomes. Both Bolivia and Peru are defined by salient ethnic cleavages. However, whereas the party system that has taken shape in Bolivia since collapse has emerged from the partial (and therefore asymmetrical) articulation of this cleavage, in Peru, the ethnic cleavage remains disarticulated.

This section explores this argument through an analysis of articulation dynamics in Bolivia and Peru. Towards this end, I develop a strategy for measuring and classifying bloc articulation efforts. The approach focuses on four dimensions of the articulation process: programmatic appeals, sectoral appeals, identity appeals, and overall coherence. I combine survey analysis with platform analysis to develop a complete picture of the articulation landscape in both Bolivia and Peru. After describing this articulation measurement approach, I then turn to an analysis of articulation efforts the two countries. The analyses include four components: (1) a programmatic congruence analysis implemented using elite- and citizen-level survey data, (2) a platform analysis of recent election cycles, (3) three in-depth case studies of political platforms to illustrate instances of successful, partial, and failed bloc articulation at work, and (4) an analysis of the relationship between bloc articulation patterns and bloc electoral volatility trends.

A. Measuring Bloc Articulation

Articulation involves the formulation of a coherent political agenda that through both discourse and practice coherently weaves together the defining components of a cleavage bloc into a political identity. Social cleavages manifest across multiple and complementary dimensions that

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identify how political parties in Bolivia and Peru have sought to articulate ethnic cleavages in the political arena over time.

can range from socioeconomic and regional structures to programmatic and ideological preferences to cultural and value-based codes. Given this, an assessment of political parties' articulation efforts must necessarily consider how parties engage with the various dimensions that shape a particular cleavage and evaluate the extent to which these parties are able to give expression to these dimensions through their discourse and agendas.

With this in mind, the approach developed here to measure bloc articulation concentrates on appeals along four dimensions that fundamentally define the content of social cleavages: socio-structural (or sectoral) appeals, programmatic appeals, identity-based appeals, and political coherence.

The *sectoral dimension* captures the sector-specific interests of cleavage blocs. Oftentimes, cleavage blocs will be associated with different country regions, economic sectors, positions in the socioeconomic ladder, or other structural advantages and disadvantages. These sectoral characteristics provide the underlying structures for the formation of divergent social, economic, and political interests amongst the rival cleavage blocs. When political parties target sectors of the country or the economy that are associated with a particular cleavage bloc, they are, whether explicitly or implicitly, appealing to that particular bloc. Similarly, a political party's silence on sectoral issues that negatively impact one group (for instance, environmental issues affecting indigenous communities), their criminalization of sectors of the economy or communities (for example, the informal economy or the coca growers) again associated with particular cleavage groups, and the defense of an inequality-enhancing status quo that benefits one sector over another, all serve not only as implicit appeals to particular cleavage blocs but also as symbolic rejections of rival groups in society. Whether explicit or implicit, then, sectoral appeals (or attacks) reveal essential information about which sectors of the population political parties are appealing to (or rejecting) and how they are thinking about these sectors when devising their platforms.

The second dimension of articulation that I consider focuses on programmatic and ideological appeals. Social cleavage blocs will oftentimes be associated with differentiated programmatic and ideological preferences that define much of the political content of the cleavage. This dimension considers the extent to which political party platforms and the programmatic preferences of the elites that make up these parties are congruent with the programmatic and ideological preferences of particular cleavage blocs. The questions this dimension considers are: to what extent do political parties align themselves with a cleavage bloc along the various programmatic issues that define it? And, how consistent are these appeals? The more consistent political parties are in their alignments with the programmatic and ideological preferences of a particular bloc, the stronger the articulation of this particular dimension will be.

The third dimension of articulation focuses on identity-based appeals and considers the extent to which the identity of the ethnic group gets incorporated into the political platform and discourse. Politicians use identity appeals to signal proximity to particular groups in society. At the most superficial level, politicians may dress up in ways that signal their belonging to particular groups (for instance, put on indigenous hats or ponchos) or talk about the social value of a group's cultural heritage. At a deeper level, they may incorporate central elements of the group's cultural identity into the political platform as well as create spaces for the celebration, protection, and/or spread of that group's cultural values. These appeals may therefore operate either explicitly—through direct mentions of a group and their defining cultural traits—or implicitly, through the use of social codes that serve as heuristics for group referencing.[78]

[78] In American politics, there is an extensive body of literature on these types of social codes. Scholars have found that terms such as "welfare queen" or discussion of crime rates and gun violence tend to trigger stereotyped images of black populations. These associations then go on to shape people's support for particular policies aimed, for instance, at welfare or criminal reform (Mendelberg 2001).

Finally, the fourth articulation dimension adopts a macro-level lens to evaluate the degree to which the three previous dimensions are woven together into a coherent political platform and identity. I think of a coherent platform as one that effectively draws the linkages between a cleavage-based collective identity and the sectoral and programmatic preferences associated with it. This dimensions asks, for instance: are political parties appealing to the same sectors in the sectoral and programmatic dimensions? Do they establish associations between these dimensions and a collective identity? Do political parties and elites signal belonging and present themselves as members of these groups that they are appealing to?

Political parties often grapple with the incentives and disincentives of aligning themselves clearly with one social bloc. On the one hand, representing particular social groups in an effective manner that is tightly aligned with their interests and identities serves to guarantee their political support and attachment. On the other hand, political parties oftentimes need to reach beyond those groups—and therefore, dilute their appeals—to increase their likelihood of electoral success (Kirchheimer 1966; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). The coherence dimension aims to identify those instances where, as a whole, the appeals to particular cleavage blocs are evident, consistent, and strong.

In conjunction, these dimensions capture the complexity inherent in cleavage-based identities and reflect the challenges of articulating cleavages in the political arena.

III. The Ethnic Cleavage: Articulating the Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Blocs

The previous chapters have demonstrated that the ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru share similar historical experiences, political salience, socio-structural features, and programmatic, ideological, and identity content. In this section, I use the insights regarding the content of these cleavages along each of the dimensions to measure articulation efforts.

The *sectoral interests* of indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru are defined by a particular set of structural and economic differences. For instance, indigenous populations—and, in particular, Quechuas and Aymaras—tend to be geographically concentrated in the highland and Amazon regions. They reside primarily in rural and peri-urban spaces and are also poorer, on average, than non-indigenous populations. In the economy, these populations tend to reside in the periphery: informal markets, the resource extraction industry, and subsistence farming. Finally, they have limited access—relative to non-indigenous populations—to public goods such as education, health services, and labor opportunities.

The *ideological and programmatic* content of the ethnic bloc in Bolivia and Peru differentiates significantly between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. Indigenous populations tend to position themselves on the ideological Left. They favor greater state intervention in strategic industries, are heavily nationalistic, and tend towards social conservatism. In Bolivia, indigenous populations also favor greater state intervention in service provision. In Peru, however the indigenous tend to show greater skepticism of the state's capacity in this task. Non-indigenous populations have positions that contrast with those of the indigenous along each of these programmatic themes.

The differences between the indigenous and non-indigenous along the *identity dimension* are harder to specify. They include more tangible elements such as everyday cultural and culinary practices, clothing styles, community practices, historical symbolism, and language differences. But they also go much deeper than that and can be found in cleavage blocs' differentiated relationship with nature, their philosophies of life, definitions of wealth, attitudes toward work and leisure and many other differences that are difficult to summarize and are often intangibles.

Given these dynamics, the coherence dimension considers the extent to which these various features are interconnected and expressed through a political identity.

IV. Data and Methods

I adopt a mixed-methods approach to determine the extent to which political parties succeed in articulating cleavage blocs. This approach first uses survey analysis to assess programmatic and ideological congruence between political parties and particular social cleavage blocs. Congruence analysis (see, for example, Russell J. Dalton 1985; Russell J Dalton 2015; Luna and Zechmeister 2005, 2010; Lupu, Selios, and Warner 2017; Lupu and Warner 2016) provides a coarse measure of articulation efforts. Although it focuses only on the programmatic dimension of the articulation process, it nonetheless sheds light on the practical alignments between political elites and voters. In so doing, it allows for the identification of inconsistencies between political parties' discourse or platforms. This gains importance when we consider the incentives for diluting a political discourse to appeal to larger sectors of the population: political elites may recognize their weakness amongst particular sectors of society and adjust their platforms accordingly, tailoring their discourse to appeal to larger swaths of the population, while nonetheless holding their preferences and support for particular policy positions constant. Congruence analysis provides a starting point for identifying those inconsistencies.

The congruence analyses in this chapter are implemented with data from the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) survey and the Americas Barometer survey, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The analyses focus on the 2010 cycle of surveys, which includes the 2010-2015 Bolivian Congress and the 2011-2016 Peruvian Congress. In this cycle, PELA and LAPOP implemented questions a set of matching questions that enable me to implement the congruence analyses. I focus on four dimensions: ideology, state industry, liberal

values, and state services[79] and, for each country, I discuss first the distribution of political elites preferences on these dimensions[80] and, second, their alignments with voters.

The measurement approach combines the insights of the congruence analysis using survey data with content analysis of political platforms. Political platforms provide a crucial resource for understanding political parties' identities and the targets of their appeals. Parties tend to use platforms to establish a vision and party motto that differentiates them from competing political organizations. They also frequently organize their agendas around themes that connect to this macro-vision, revealing important information about their diagnoses of social, economic, and political issues, and their proposed strategies for engaging with such dilemmas. Platform gaps can also be telling, as they suggest issues that political parties care about and what they either do not care about or choose to steer clear from. All in all, then, party platforms—even if rarely read by voters—provide a textured, detailed, and holistic illustration of how parties' positions and ideas are tied together. The proposed articulation measure therefore combines a platform analysis that evaluates political parties' appeals to social cleavage blocs along the various dimensions with a congruence analysis focused exclusively on programmatic alignments. Such an approach taps into underlying dynamics of representation-building to shed light on the challenges of articulating complex cleavage-based identities and identify instances of successful and failed cleavage bloc articulations.

[79] I exclude the populism and democracy dimensions because, although they reflect political preferences, these are not policy preferences per se. Because of this, the platforms can speak very little to party positions on these issues.
[80] In these first analyses, I include a *Nationalism* dimension as well. However, I exclude it from the congruence analysis because none of the relevant questions associated with this dimension were included in both the elite and mass surveys.

V. Results

In this section, I introduce the results of the congruence analysis for Bolivia and Peru, providing, first, details on the distribution of elite preferences along the programmatic and ideological dimensions of interest and, second, the difference in means analysis between the positions of political parties and those of the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs. These analyses begin to shed light on the programmatic dimension of articulation appeals. As noted earlier, they provide a rough measure of the extent to which particular parties are recognizing and aligning with ethnic blocs along policy-relevant dimensions.

The section then turns to the platform analysis, first providing an overview of the articulation dynamics identified at the systemic level and then illustrating variation in bloc-level articulation through three in-depth case studies that represent instances of successful, partial, and failed articulation. Finally, I consider the relationship between variation in articulation patterns and bloc-level electoral volatility trends both before and after party system collapse.

Part A. Congruence Analysis

1. Programmatic Articulation in Bolivia

The two main parties that competed in the 2009 presidential election in Bolivia were the MAS and PPB-CN. These parties obtained 64.2 and 26.4 percent of the national vote, respectively, with the MAS concentrating the vote of indigenous populations (along with indigenous *mestizos* and some sectors of the Left). For its part, PPB-CN captured, primarily, the vote of non-indigenous white populations, with their support being greatest in the eastern lowlands of Bolivia.

Figure 5.2 maps the distribution of ideological and programmatic preferences of MAS and PPB-CN. The figure uses data from the PELA survey and includes the four dimensions of interest—*Ideology*, *State Industry*, *Liberal Values*, *State Services*—as well as two other

dimensions, *State Economy* and *Nationalism*, that are not included in the congruence analysis (due to lack of data availability) but nonetheless help provide a fuller picture of the programmatic agenda of political parties. The *Ideology* dimension considers political elites definition of their own parties' ideological placement and goes from far Right to far Left. The *State Economy* dimension captures elite support for a state-led economy (as opposed a market-led economy) and moves from less to more support for a statist economy. The *State Industry* dimension refers to respondents' support for greater State intervention in strategic industries and moves from less to more support. The *Nationalism* dimension considers attitudes towards the United States and moves from less to more support affinity towards the United States. The *State Services* dimension accounts for political elites' support for State-led provision of public goods and moves from less to more support for the state. Finally, the *Liberal Values* dimension, which is operationalized using support for same-sex marriage, ranges from less to more support for liberal values.

The results reveal a clear differentiation in the programmatic preferences of the MAS and PPB-CN. The MAS is positioned significantly to the Left. It is supportive of a statist economic model, favors extensive state intervention in strategic industries, and is significantly nationalistic. The party also supports a significant role for the state in the provision of public goods and holds very conservative social values but, in these two dimensions (*State Services and Liberal Values*), it is not too different from PPB-CN. This is because, at least until recently—and with the exception of a few moment of heightened social mobilization associated with these dimensions—these issues remain largely de-politicized in Bolivian society, as political parties have largely agreed both on the need for extensive state-led public goods provision and socially conservative positions. On all other dimensions, however, the PPB-CN holds views that are opposite to the MAS. That said, on average, political elites in the PPB-CN tend to gravitate more towards the center. The party positions itself right-of-center on the ideological spectrum; it favors a larger role for the market in

the national economy and tends to oppose state intervention in strategic industries. Finally, in contrast to the MAS, PPB-CN is strongly anti-nationalistic, which means that the party holds favorable views of the United States and its role in the Bolivian economy. Altogether, Figure 5.2 displays a very neat programmatic differentiation between the main parties in Bolivia's current party system. They also reveal a tendency by the MAS to pull politics towards the far left and by the PPB-CN to pull to the right but, at the same time, gravitate towards more middle-of-the-road positions.

Figure 5.2 Programmatic Preferences of main Parties in Bolivia (2010)



Figure 5.3 turns to the congruence analysis, which reflect articulation appeals along the programmatic and ideological dimension. Specifically, the figure maps programmatic alignments between the MAS and PPB-CN, on the one hand, and the indigenous (left side) and non-indigenous

(right side) in Bolivia, on the other, on the *Ideology*, *State Industry*, *State Services*, and *Liberal Values* dimensions. The results presented in Figure 5.3 are based on a difference-in-means analysis. The figure visualizes both the size of de-alignment and its direction. The dashed line represents the position of the respective ethnic group (detailed in Chapter 4). When parties are to the left of the dashed line, then, it means that they have higher values on that dimension than voters (i.e. party is to the left of voters).[81] Similarly, when parties are to the right of the zero line, it means that the party has lower values on that dimension than the ethnic bloc. In the Appendix, I include congruence analyses implemented using the Earth Mover's Distance (EMD) approach (Lupu, Selios, and Warner 2017). EMD is more precise but does not capture the directionality of the de-alignments (i.e. whether a party is positioned to the left or the right in relation to an ethnic bloc on a given dimension), which I consider important to understand cleavage articulation dynamics.

The results of the congruence analyses between the MAS and PPB-CN, on the one hand, and indigenous populations, on the other, reveal significant programmatic proximity between the MAS preferences and those of indigenous populations along the *State Industry, State Services, and Liberal Values* dimensions.[82] The MAS' positions on state intervention in strategic industries and the provision of public goods are closely aligned with those of the indigenous bloc. It is also relatively close to indigenous populations on the *Ideology* dimension, although it positions itself to the Left of the average indigenous voter. On the *Liberal Values* dimension, it also holds views that are relatively close to indigenous voters (like PPB-CN), but these are, on average, more conservative than that of the average indigenous person.

[81] All of the variables are coded the same way as in previous plots, the values increasing as respondents move to the Left (*Ideology*), support greater state intervention in strategic industries (*State Industry*) or the provision of services (*State Services*), or hold more liberal values (*Liberal Values*).

[82] The only dimension where MAS seems more distant from the indigenous than PPB-CN is the Ideology (Self) dimension. However, this is because parties on the Right have a tendency to position themselves as centrist, which creates a likely inaccurate representation of alignment between them and voters (who also have a tendency to concentrate in the ideological center). This is in contrast to parties on the ideological Left, and in particular the MAS, which position themselves consistently on the Left.

PPB-CN, for its part, tends to position itself to the Right of indigenous voters on the *Ideology* dimension and supports significantly less state intervention in strategic industries than this cleavage bloc. Like the MAS, it is programmatically aligned with indigenous populations along the *State Services* dimension and holds more conservative social values than the average indigenous person.

Figure 5.3 Congruence in Bolivia: Indigenous Bloc (Difference in Means)



The right-side panel visualizes the results of the congruence analyses between the MAS and PPB-CN, on the one hand, and non-indigenous populations, on the other. The results show programmatic proximity between PPB-CN and non-indigenous populations along all of the dimensions. That said, PPB-CN tends to favor less state intervention in strategic industries than the non-indigenous bloc.

Altogether, the results suggest a relatively effective articulation of the ideological and programmatic dimension of the ethnic cleavage. This provides an initial raw description of the distribution of cleavage articulation amongst political parties in Bolivia. Interestingly, despite the significant differentiation between indigenous and non-indigenous populations along each of these dimensions, political parties in Bolivia seem to hold positions that are pulling indigenous and non-indigenous populations even further into their respective opposite poles on several key dimensions. This degree of differentiation seems like a natural by-product of effective party system structuration, however. When political parties hold clearly defined political visions, the programmatic positions of their political elites will be relatively consistent with each other and will therefore vary much less than those of voters who, on average, tend to gravitate to the center. This should push political parties to the opposite corners, away from the average voter, but in directions that are consistent with the differences across cleavage blocs.

2. Programmatic Articulation in Peru

In the 2011 Peruvian general election, four political organizations obtained more than five percent of the vote: *Gana Perú* (GP), *Fuerza 2011 (FP)*[83], *Alianza por el Gran Cambio* (AGC), and *Perú Posible* (PP). GP obtained 31.7 percent of the vote in the first round of elections and mobilized the indigenous vote. FP gathered 23.6 percent in that first round and received most support amongst non-indigenous populations. AGC and PP, for their part, obtained 18.5 and 15.6 percent of the national vote and, like FP, concentrated their support amongst non-indigenous sectors.

[83] In 2016, Fuerza 2011 became Fuerza Popular (FP) so I use the latter abbreviation to refer to the party throughout the remained of the chapter.

Figure 5.4 maps the distribution of ideological and programmatic preferences of these four parties along each of the dimensions of interest: *Ideology*, *State Economy*, *State Industry*, *Nationalism, Liberal Values*, and *State Services*. The figure employs PELA survey data and presents parties' mean positions on these issues. Like Figure 5.2, the plot moves from less to more support on each of the dimensions and includes two dimensions—*State Economy* and *Nationalism*—that are excluded from the congruence analysis due to data unavailability but that speak to themes that are nonetheless divided along ethnic lines amongst voters.

The results visualize several interesting and interrelated dynamics. First, they reveal significant proximity in the ideological and programmatic positions of FP, AGC, and PP and a tendency towards positions that are right-of-center on most dimensions. Thus, these parties are ideologically right leaning,, support a market economy model, oppose increased state intervention in strategic industries, and reject nationalistic views. Nonetheless, they hold relatively more varied views on the *State Services* dimension, with PP and FP supporting a larger role for the state in the provision of public goods than AGC. Only on the *Liberal Values* dimension do the parties share political views with GP: they all hold socially conservative values.

GP, on the other hand, holds strikingly different positions from FP, AGC, and PP along most of the dimensions (with the exception of the *Liberal Values* dimension and, to a lesser degree, the *Social Services* dimension). The party is positioned to the left on the *Ideology* dimension. It supports a more statist model, favors greater state intervention in strategic industries as well as a larger role for the State in the provision of public goods, and holds significantly more nationalistic views than the other political parties that dominated in this election. That said, GP is also positioned close to the center on all of these dimensions. That is, despite the remarkable differences between GP's positions and those of FP, AGC, and PP, GP elites nonetheless seem to hold

relatively moderate views, filling only partially the party system's programmatic void on more traditionally Leftist positions.

Thus, while the results reveal programmatic differentiation in the Peruvian party system, they also display a striking concentration of parties in more economically and ideologically conservative positions. In contrast to Bolivia, the current structure of the Peruvian party system is pulling politics to the Right. GP balances the party system from the Left. However, much like Bolivia's PPB-CN, GP's balancing act is nonetheless done from a position that is closer to the middle-of-the-road than that of the parties that it has positioned itself against.

Figure 5.4 Programmatic Preferences of Main Parties in Peru (2011)



Figure 5 presents the results of the (difference in means) congruence analysis associated with the programmatic and ideological appeals dimension of the articulation framework. To

facilitate interpretation, and because FP, AGC, and PP share similar positions on most dimensions, the figure maps programmatic alignments between GP and FP—the two parties that competed in the election run-off—on the one hand, and indigenous and non-indigenous populations, on the other. The results of the congruence analyses associated with the indigenous bloc are presented in the left panel, whereas those of the non-indigenous one are included on the right side. Again, the dashed line in these two figures represents the position of the respective ethnic group.

Looking first at the left panel, the congruence analyses reveal significant programmatic alignment between GP and the indigenous bloc along all of the dimensions evaluated. These include *Ideology*, *State Industry*, *State Services*, and *Liberal Values*. However, while on some dimensions GP pulls indigenous populations to the left, in others, it pulls them to the right. For instance, whereas on the *Ideology* and *Liberal Values* dimensions, GP emerges as more to the left and more liberal than the indigenous bloc, respectively, on the *State Industry* and even the *State Services* dimensions (where the indigenous in Peru tend to favor less state intervention than the non-indigenous), the party seems to have positions that are less statist than those of the indigenous populations. This is somewhat surprising given that, in a well-differentiated party system, we would expect parties to pull voters in opposite directions. But this does not seem to be happening in Peru, particularly when it comes to programmatic dimensions associated with the role of the state.

Turning to the right panel, which presents the results of the congruence analysis associated with the non-indigenous bloc, the results are even more surprising. Specifically, they show that, despite this bloc's concentration of votes on FP, AGC, and PP, the non-indigenous bloc is nonetheless remarkably aligned along all of the programmatic dimensions, not with these three parties, but with GP. This programmatic alignment seems even more consistent than that between GP and the indigenous bloc. This is telling, on the one hand, of the anti-statist bias amongst

political parties in Peru and, on the other, of the lack of programmatic and ideological structuration of the Peruvian party system.

Figure 5.5 Congruence in Peru: Indigenous Bloc (Difference In Means)



Altogether, the congruence analyses reveal a striking concentration of Peruvian parties on positions that are much to the Right of the preferences of both the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs. This is the case despite there being significant differences in the programmatic positions of these two blocs. The results thus begin to shed light on some of the limitations of bloc articulation efforts in Peru. I explore these disarticulations in greater depth below.

Part B. Platform Analyses

The congruence analyses developed in the previous section provide a broad overview of the programmatic and ideological alignments in the Bolivian and Peruvian party systems. As such, they shed light on articulation dynamics that are highly pertinent for the programmatic appeals dimension of the articulation framework. However, they also leave undesirable gaps. First, because of data constraints, these analyses do not provide information on all of the relevant programmatic dimensions that I found to be meaningfully differentiated along ethnic lines at the voter level. As such, they offer a limited view of political parties' efforts at articulating voters programmatic and ideological preferences. Second, the congruence analyses also speak only to political parties' appeals along the programmatic dimension of the articulation framework. While this is a useful starting point for evaluating articulation efforts, it alone cannot shed light on the more complex elements of the articulation process. Thus, I now turn to the platform analyses to examine how sectoral, programmatic, and identity appeals are weaved together (or not) to define the likelihood of articulation.

To analyze bloc articulation efforts through platform analysis, I focused on the political platforms of the three political parties that obtained the most votes in the 2005, 2009, and 2015 elections in Bolivia and the 2006 and 2011 election in Peru. In each of the platforms, I looked for appeals (as well as attacks and gaps) associated with the sectoral, identity, programmatic, and ideological properties of both ethnic blocs, focusing, in particular, on the ethnic bloc that supported that party most in the general election.

Because the survey data employed for the congruence analysis focuses on the 2009-2015 Bolivian Congress and the 2011-2016 Peruvian Congress, I only present the results for the platform analyses of the 2009 and 2011 presidential campaigns in Bolivia and Peru, respectively. However, the platform analyses for the other election cycles were consistent with the results presented here.

In this section, I first describe the cleavage-level articulation outcomes of the platform analyses for Bolivia and Peru, respectively. After that, I discuss three in-depth case studies—reflecting instances of successful (MAS in Bolivia), partial (GP in Peru), and failed (PPB-CN in Bolivia) bloc articulation—to illustrate the various bloc articulation outcomes.

1. The Partial Articulation of the Ethnic Cleavage in Bolivia

The platform analyses reveal that Bolivia's salient ethnic cleavage is only partially articulated in the party system. While the MAS has successfully articulated the indigenous bloc of this cleavage, the non-indigenous bloc remains disarticulated and politically fluid. The two main parties that sought to articulate the non-indigenous population in the 2009 election, PPB-CN and UN, systematically failed in their articulation efforts.

The MAS offered a structuralist development model that targeted ethnic inequalities from multiple angles and sought to drastically transform the political, social, and economic systems in Bolivia to make them more representative and inclusive of the indigenous majorities. The party embraced an indigenous discourse and ideology—the ideology of the *Vivir Bien*—to frame its political agenda, while its platform effectively drew associations between indigenousness, on the one hand, and poverty, rural and peri-urban development, the informal economy, and the defense of the interests of coca producers, on the other (MAS-IPSP 2009). This brought to the fore the linkages between the indigenous bloc and particular *sectoral interests*, a recognition that also provided the foundation for the programmatic proposals that the party put forth. In line with this, the party's *ideological and programmatic articulation appeals* included, amongst other things, proposals that sought to (1) expand the role of the state in strategic industries and service provision, (2) advance a model of public goods distribution that prioritized the poor in rural and peri-urban

areas[84], and (3) implement cash transfer programs aimed at the most disadvantaged (and mostly indigenous) sectors.[85]

In contrast to the MAS, PPB-CN and UN, significantly downplayed and even criticized the politicization of ethnicity. The critique of the politicization of the ethnic cleavage was most evident in the UN platform, which stated:

> Bolivia, then, is culturally diverse, and that diversity should be valued—for example, in productive technology and for marketing purposes—always focused on advancing Bolivians' wellbeing. But, *getting stuck only on the diverse* runs the risk of each group being seen as possessing irreducible and historically unchanging cultural particularities, when *culture*—understood as an *intercultural space*—has been and continues to be *relational*; both before and now, articulations and de-articulations [of this diversity] have been in permanent movement…In Bolivia, we are certainly multiple and that rich diversity is valued adequately. However, it is also recognized that Bolivians are connected by thousands of other articulations. Today, democratic coexistence in a permanently globalizing world requires emphasis on those articulations and relations, with the risk that the absence of this layer could create isolated cultural, socioeconomic, and political *guettos* (UN, 2009: 6-7).

In seeking not only to de-politicize the ethnic cleavage, but also to trivialize diversity and associate it with notions of cultural *ghettos* (in a context where indigenous populations were demanding increased political recognition and participation), the UN platform was de-legitimizing indigenous political claims in less than subtle ways. The party's proposed alternative, as well as that of PPB-CN, sought instead to frame the structural debate as one about poverty, as opposed to race or ethnicity. Their approach was in tune with the strategies of traditional parties in Bolivia's former party system: they recognized that the indigenous were poorer than the non-indigenous whilst also denying the socio-structural roots of these inequalities and advancing a paternalistic model that, instead of emphasizing political empowerment—as the MAS platform did—presented UN and PPB-CN as willing and able to take care of those in greatest need. This strategy was accompanied

[84] This model was rather holistic and included policies such as the nationalization of the telecommunications industry intended to make communication accessible for the poorest.

[85] Despite employing extensive indigenous appeals, the MAS' party platform did not explicitly pit the indigenous against the non-indigenous. Instead, the enemy was structural: it was the economic model, the legacies of colonialism, the lack of sovereignty, and the old political elites, all structures that the MAS argued had historically placed indigenous populations at a disadvantage. Of course, underlying this framework was an implicit attack on the non-indigenous hegemony that the party argued had prevailed before 2005, but the MAS did not have to articulate this fracture explicitly.

by an emphasis on the role of merit, competition, and legal certainty as central strategies for shaping the distribution of income and reducing inequalities in these societies.

The PPB-CN (2009) and the UN (2009) platforms, then, did not make explicit ethnic-based appeals to non-indigenous populations.[86] *Identity* appeals were instead expressed in implicit ways—primarily through value-based assumptions and the de-legitimization of indigenous demands—but these did not add up to a *coherent* political identity. Most of the strength of these platforms' articulation appeals stemmed instead from the *programmatic* dimension and, to a lesser degree, the *sectoral* one. Both platforms favored a market-led economy, rejected the expansion of the state into additional strategic industries, advanced visions of public goods provision that, while state-led, nonetheless followed a market logic, and strongly rejected nationalistic views. All of these positions were proximate to those of the non-indigenous bloc and, whether intentionally or unintentionally, benefited the sectoral interests of this bloc directly.

Thus, whether implicitly or explicitly, the ethnic cleavage was central to all party platforms in Bolivia. For the indigenous bloc, the connections were clear. The MAS advanced a platform that articulated the structural, programmatic, and identity components of the indigenous identity into a coherent political indigenous ideology. For the non-indigenous, the appeals were present but were not complete and lacked the holistic coherence that characterized the articulation of the rival bloc. Instead, the articulation offers of the non-indigenous bloc came mainly in the form of economic models, policy proposals, and diluted sectoral appeals that were ethnicized at the voter level and therefore provided parties with alternative cues for mobilizing non-indigenous populations. Collectively, the analyses reveal a party system in which the indigenous bloc has been fully articulated even as the non-indigenous one remains in flux.

[86] This is more difficult to do given power differentials and historical legacies. However, it is not impossible due to the existence of a *camba* identity that is commonly used in the eastern lowlands and that serves as a proxy for the non-indigenous white identity.

2. The Failed Articulation of the Ethnic Cleavage in Peru

The analyses of the party platforms of the three main parties that competed in Peru's 2011 election—GP, FP, and AGC—evidence the failed articulation of the country's ethnic cleavage. While the GP platform suggests a partial articulation—with some *identity* and *sectoral* appeals as well as significant *programmatic* alignments—its offer is far from complete and is particularly lacking along the coherence dimension. For their part, the FP and AGC platforms, although to varying degrees, push against the politicization of the ethnic cleavage and instead focus their articulation appeals to the non-indigenous bloc on the *programmatic* and *sectoral* dimensions. However, even these articulation appeals are relatively limited. Like the GP platform, the FP and AGC platforms also lack a coherent political identity that effectively weaves together the different dimensions of the ethnic cleavage.

Ethnic identity appeals only featured explicitly in the GP platform and concentrated, primarily, in the party's diagnosis of the social and economic problems of the country. For instance, the platform states:

> The economic extroversion, the patrimonial state, the dislocation of work, the exploitation of the indigenous labor force, the exacerbated inequalities, the lack of understanding of the indigenous world, and racism constitute the legacies of the colonial period. The diverse attempts at reverting this history have failed. The indigenous resistance, the national indigenous movements, the creole movements and independence itself did not cancel the structural traits instilled by the colonial era. Moreover, capitalism in its various forms—raw material exports, import substitution, and neoliberalism—has produced significant changes in the production systems, class structures, culture, and the state but, instead of interrupting the colonial heritage, has continued to develop within this frame. (GP 2010: 25)

In contrast, the other political platforms tended to ignore or resist ethnic-based identity appeals. The AGC platform, for instance, brought up ethnicity but only to make the case for Peru as a *mestizo* nation, stating: "[we foment] awareness of a Peruvian identity and of *mestizaje*, a reality that all Peruvians should feel proud of" (AGC 2011: 3). With this statement, the platform shifts attention away from ethnic differences, rejects the use of divisive ethnic-based political appeals, and advances a vision of the single (i.e. homogenous) Peruvian *mestizo* nation.

All three platforms were more effective at articulating the ethnic blocs along the programmatic dimension, yet, as the congruence analyses show, they nonetheless tended to pull the programmatic debate to the ideological Right. This was particularly the case with the AGC platform, which early on stated: "[we foment] private investment as the engine of the economy" (AGC 2011: 3). Both the AGC and FP agendas are very clear in their economic postures. They favor a non-interventionist state and the expansion of the market economy, and avidly reject nationalist positions. GP, for its part, advanced the opposite framework. It called for a state-led economy (though not one that replaced the markets entirely), rejected free trade agreements, and advanced nationalistic views that focused, in particular, on critiques of the United States and multinational corporations. Thus, the programmatic appeals advanced by the three parties articulated relatively well—if not fully—the programmatic content of the ethnic cleavage. These appeals were at times combined with references to the *structural* dimension. However, only GP concentrated its *programmatic* and *sectoral* appeals on the indigenous bloc. The other parties, in contrast, tended to dilute their articulation efforts in order to appeal more directly to the poorest sectors of Peruvian society.

This dilution, however, must be placed in context. Given the hegemony of the non-indigenous bloc in Peruvian society, FP and AGC's support for the continuity of economic, social, and political models that are structurally advantageous to non-indigenous populations serves, in a fairly clear way, as a representation signal to non-indigenous populations. Coupled with the programmatic alignments and the de-politicization of the indigenous identity, these cues can be effective at mobilizing the non-indigenous bloc, even if they ultimately fail to articulate it.

Collectively, the platforms portray a party system in which the indigenous bloc is somewhat closer to articulation than the non-indigenous one given that appeals to that bloc tap, if with significant limitations, into a collective identity, sectoral interests, and programmatic demands.

Yet, ultimately, both blocs remain in flux, as articulation efforts fall short of giving expression to the multiple dimensions that make up the ethnic cleavage in Peruvian society.

3. Variation in Bloc Articulation: Case Studies

In this section, I aim to deepen the analysis of articulation patterns by presenting case studies of instances of successful (MAS-IPSP), partial (GP), and failed (PPB-CN) *bloc-level* articulations. The analyses shed light on the approach towards measuring articulation and on the variation in articulation strategies and capacity across the different political parties.

i. Successful Bloc Articulation: The Case of the MAS in Bolivia

The MAS 2009 platform, titled "Bolivia, Leader Country", identifies the political representation of indigenous populations as *the* party's central purpose. The MAS sees itself as the channel through which the unique philosophies and wisdoms of the indigenous cultures can be incorporated into a state development model. The party platform states:

> Across the world, indigenous peoples continue to be treated as foreigners in their own land. Their rights are not recognized nor respected. Their vision and message are considered remnants from the past and their identity and culture are reduced to folklore. The future of Bolivia and the world depends on changing this vision and attitude. In the Indigenous Peoples lays the moral reserves, the ethical vision of nature and the commitment to cultural diversity and consensual democracy that can enable us to save the planet and life (MAS-IPSP 2009: 147).

The MAS uses this ethnicized framework as the foundation for its political platform and organizes it into an ideology that it calls the *Vivir Bien* model. This combines a socialist economic agenda with indigenous principles of life.[87] This *Vivir Bien* concept means 'to live well' and is set against the notion of 'living for more' used to describe the philosophy underlying the market

[87] In the 2015 platform, the *Vivir Bien* model is referred to, instead, as Communitarian Socialism for *Vivir Bien*.

economy. The platform attributes many of the socioeconomic ills and sectoral conditions of Bolivia's indigenous populations to the market economy model:

> The application of development models that favored the governing elites, forgetting the indigenous majorities, has been identified as the central reason why the majority of the rural and indigenous populations find themselves in a condition of extreme poverty. The application of liberal and neoliberal models in the country has generated inequality, marginalization, and discrimination, condemning the majority of Bolivians to live in undignified conditions (MAS-IPSP 2009: 120).

As an alternative, MAS proposes this *Vivir Bien* model and, through it, brings together the central dimensions of the ethnic cleavage into a coherent ideology. Its *sectoral* articulation focuses on processes of de-colonization that include economic policies targeted at dismantling the legacies of colonialism and social policies that foment the inclusion of indigenous populations and the incorporation of their knowledge and experiences into the state. Its *programmatic* articulation focuses on a rejection of neoliberalism and the defense of a fervent nationalism. As an economic model, the platform proposes a state-led socialist communitarian and plural economy "oriented fundamentally towards eliminating poverty, social and economic exclusion, and achieving 'Vivir Bien' in its multiple dimensions" (MAS-IPSP 2009: 60). This economic model injects the state development agenda—which supports the nationalization of a wide range of industries[88]—with "[indigenous] forms of economic organization regarding principles of complementarity, reciprocity, solidarity, redistribution, equality, sustainability, equilibrium, justice, and transparency" (MAS-IPSP 2009: 60). Through this, the MAS successfully fuses programmatic and identity articulations. Its emphasis on increasing Bolivia's independence from foreign influence, be it from the United States, international institutions, or transnational companies further strengthens these alignments.

[88] Zooming into the programmatic and ideological articulation, the MAS presents itself as a party that is significantly to the Left and strongly supportive of state intervention in key industries and in the provision of services. The platform highlights numerous industry nationalization initiatives—for instance, the nationalization of the hydrocarbon, communications, and electricity industries—carried out during the party's first term in office.

The following quote captures how the MAS party weaves together the various elements that define the indigenous bloc in Bolivia into a single coherent platform. Describing the accomplishments of the first three and a half years of the MAS in government, the platform states:

> Change arrived with President Evo Morales, who called for a Constituent Assembly, nationalized hydrocarbons, implemented social policies to end exclusion and proposed the National Development Plan that is making the construction of a Dignified, Sovereign, Productive Bolivia for the "Vivir Bien" possible. These measures were implemented within the framework of the Democratic and Cultural Revolution, led by President Evo Morales, and which is dismantling the neoliberal and colonial model to generate a new Plurinational State that is productive and solidary, that controls the economic surplus and applies a new development strategy that has allowed the country to begin healing its many historical injustices. In four years, Bolivia got rid of illiteracy, the poorest sectors obtained free health care, [and] the coverage of basic services was expanded (MAS-IPSP 2009: 15).

The quote integrates indigenousness with its various sectoral and programmatic components. It taps into the ethnic cleavage through references to, for instance, the new Plurinational Constitution, historical exclusions and injustices, colonialism, and *Vivir Bien*. It also highlights the party's prioritization of the sectoral interests of indigenous populations by discussing the eradication of illiteracy and policies targeted at "the poorest sectors." And it signals its ideological and programmatic alignments with indigenous populations by referencing its anti-neoliberalism, the nationalization of hydrocarbons, "social policies to end exclusion," and coverage of basic services.

Altogether, the MAS platform reveals a successful articulation of the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage in Bolivia. The platform merges identity-based appeals with the programmatic representation of indigenous populations' preferences, and the strategic formulation of policies that seek to structurally advantage indigenous population in the various social and economic spaces that they occupy. In so doing, the MAS is able to capture the complexity and multi-dimensionality of indigenous identities in Bolivian society and to articulate these coherently into a political platform and party vision.

ii. Partial Bloc Articulation: The Case of GP in Peru

The *Gana Perú* (GP) platform, titled "The Great Transformation", targets the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage with its proposed agenda. The party calls for the re-foundation of the Peruvian nation with indigenous cultures as the main actors and benefactors of its proposed nationalistic project. The platform states that it aims to dismantle the historical disadvantages that were created by colonial structures and then sustained by the export-oriented neoliberal economy:

> We will develop a national identity that respects ethnic and cultural diversity, and we will foment inter-culturality and plurality […] Let's not fool ourselves: the current national dispute in Peru is not between democrats and the forces of change that are being labeled as anti-systemic. It is between those that utilize democracy to defend the interests of large national and transnational capital and those of us who believe in a democratic republic in which the economic, social, and political development benefits all Peruvians. It is a dispute between those who defend an embarrassing past and those who are fighting for the birth of a new nation with a political community of free and equal citizens and an independent and sovereign state that is respectful of human rights (GP 2010: 7-8).

Beyond these identity appeals to the indigenous bloc, the GP platform also targets these populations through *sectoral* proposals aimed, in particular, at rural populations. The party proposes land redistribution projects, an end to large landholdings, greater access to public services, and an increased focus on agricultural development as key dimensions of its nationalistic project. It also targets its appeals to popular peri-urban sectors, focusing on the need to support the informal sector and expand public services to city outskirts.[89]

The GP platform also produces a fairly strong articulation of the *programmatic* dimension of the ethnic cleavage, focusing its appeals on the indigenous bloc. GP presents itself as leftist, strongly nationalistic, and supportive of limited state intervention in the provision of social services. However, where the party seems somewhat de-aligned with indigenous populations'

[89] For instance, on the informal sector, the GP platform states: "We should not consider small informal enterprises evaders […] Instead, we should understand that the main reason these informal businesses fail to meet their obligations is because they are unable to finance the costs of formalization with their current levels of productivity. The challenge, then, is to delineate strategies that allow them to generate the necessary conditions to cover these expenses" (152).

programmatic preferences is in its approach towards state intervention in strategic industries as well as on the liberal values dimension. On the former, the GP platform does not come across as particularly statist, despite its nationalistic discourse. Instead, it advances a model that it calls the *National Economy of the Market* model, which afford the state something like a stronger supervisory role in the economy.[90]

Altogether, the GP platform provides a partial articulation of the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage. GP combines identity-based appeals with a nationalistic economic model that engages with those sectors of the economy where indigenous populations predominate. It is also aligned with the indigenous along several of the dimensions that define the ethnic cleavage programmatically. And yet, its articulation is limited in crucial ways. For instance, although the GP platform criticizes the neoliberal economic model, it does not actively challenge its underlying structures. Instead, the party advocates for an economy that is "nationalistic" because it promotes the development of national markets, not because it advocates for the state intervention in re-structuration of the Peruvian economy. Moreover, the articulation offer developed by GP ultimately lacks significant coherence. GP does not develop a political identity linked with indigenous populations; nor does it weave together the various programmatic, sectoral, and identity components of the indigenous bloc in effective ways. Instead, while recognizing the value in representing indigenous interests, the platform comes across as fractured and fails to capture the complexity of this identity and to embed it in its rationalization of the agenda. This, I argue, significantly undermines GP's articulation efforts. In so doing, the GP platform provides a fairly

[90] The following quote is telling of the line GP seems to walk: "We must nationalize our economy. This means centering the country's development on the expansion of existing internal markets and the creation of new ones; that is, we must develop a national market economy. This does not mean autarchy or statism. It means basing the gains of our competitiveness on increased [national] productivity and not in natural and absolute advantages or on the cheap *cholo* [cheap indigenous labor]" (60).

strong but nonetheless flawed—and, as such, unsuccessful—representational offer for indigenous populations.

iii. Failed Bloc Articulation: The Case of PPB-CN in Bolivia

The PPB-CN 2009 platform, titled "First Bolivia and its Citizens" targets non-indigenous populations through its programmatic articulations. Nonetheless, the platform fails to articulate the non-indigenous identity because of its rejection of group-based identity frames, its dilution of sectoral appeals, and the overall lack of coherence of its articulation offer as it pertains the non-indigenous identity.

In its platform, PPB-CN proposes a "paradigm shift" for Bolivia, a push away from the state and towards the individual citizen that can be read as a rejection of group-based mobilization frameworks. The platform states: "we need to understand that our country will be better, not only due to what governments do for their people, but also, and fundamentally, through what we the citizens do for ourselves, for our society, and for the country" (PPB-CN 2009: 4). This ideology sees the individual and markets as the key to progress; state intervention is only necessary to the extent that it can help both operate better. For the individual, this means investing in capacity and opportunities, whereas for the markets, it means legal certainty and expansion. Towards this end, the platform states, "the State will promote, through development diplomacy, the opening of external markets to guarantee demand of national products of sufficient quality in the international markets" (PPB-CN 2009: 10). In its embrace of the individual, PPB-CN pushes back against cleavage politics.

Given this, the platform seems to be, whether intentionally or unintentionally, constructing a framework that, at least at the surface level, aims to be post-cleavage. While the party recognizes that some individuals need more help than others—and it makes this case for rural households—it

negates the collective and systemic elements of this dynamic and, in so doing, attempts to place itself above and beyond the cleavage.

PPB-CN nonetheless fails to escape these divisions in two critical ways. First, through various policies and statements, the party signals its alignments with the programmatic and ideological preferences of the non-indigenous populations. Although some social policies, particularly in the area of education, do seem to target issues that primarily affect indigenous sectors—and thus suggest this post-cleavage position—the party's policies towards areas of the economy that concentrate indigenous populations are scarce and even antagonistic. For instance, when writing about the informal sector of the economy—which is heavily populated by the indigenous—the party states that it will formalize "all informal activity that has been a constant for our country, practice that is prohibited but indulged by all governments because of strictly personal goals" (PPB-CN 2009: 10). In adopting this threatening tone towards the informal sector, PPB-CN signals not only a lack of willingness to work with these populations to identify non-antagonistic solutions. Similarly, despite the indigenous population's concentration in small agrarian production, the platform does not introduce any programs aimed at supporting rural producers. These platform gaps and policy statements collectively paint a picture of a party that is acutely aware of its alignments but that is looking to present itself as more inclusive than it actually is.

Beyond this, the second way in which the PPB-CN platform fails to escape the ethnic cleavage is through its programmatic proximity to the preferences of non-indigenous populations. By positioning itself in ways that are consistent with the most significant programmatic dimensions of the ethnic cleavage, the PPB-CN signals its alignment with the non-indigenous as well as its de-alignment with the indigenous, even as it denies these alignments in its discursive treatment of the

cleavage.[91] This comes across most clearly in the party's economy model, which calls for "a state that incentivizes, promotes, and protects private initiatives until these have the maturity necessary to be competitive in the market through quality and efficiency." PPB-CN strives for a market economy characterized by "as much state as necessary, as much market as possible" (PPB-CN 2009: 10).

These patterns suggest a relatively successful programmatic articulation of the non-indigenous bloc, but an overall articulation failure. The platform's focus on the individual, as opposed to the collective, serves as a rhetorical denial of the ethnic cleavage. By pushing against the use of a cleavage lens in the analysis of Bolivian society, the party rejects at least a discursive representation of its non-indigenous bases. This articulation failure is compounded by the use of soft appeals to the indigenous through the party's paternalistic approach to rural development, which dilutes appeals to the non-indigenous bloc. Although the party signals its alignment with non-indigenous populations through its programmatic agenda and sectoral appeals, its articulation efforts do not coherently merge these programmatic and sectoral interests with a differentiated collective identity. These limitations produce an articulation failure.

Part C. Articulation And Bloc Volatility

Now that we have measured and established articulation dynamics across ethnic blocs in Bolivia and Peru, we can return to the proposed hypotheses to determine the association between these articulation patterns, volatility outcomes, and party survival dynamics. To do this, I consider the levels of bloc electoral volatility. Based on the framework advanced in this chapter, I expect

[91] The PPB-CN platform is rather imprecise about how its vision translates into policy proposals (the document is only 18 pages). Instead, the platform offers a broad programmatic vision and a list of thematic priorities that give a sense of where the party stands but leaves out the party's plans to implement this vision. Given this, the interpretation of programmatic alignments has to be derived from fewer statements and is therefore more limited.

successful bloc articulations to become associated with decreased levels of bloc volatility and both partial and failed bloc articulation to remain linked with elevated levels of bloc volatility.

Although the articulation analyses present only a snapshot of a particular electoral cycle, they are nonetheless suggestive of broader trends. Given the articulation patterns identified in Bolivia and Peru, I expect bloc volatility levels to increase with the collapse of these countries' party systems and to decrease substantially—and consistently—only in those instances where full bloc articulation has been achieved (thus, only in the case of the indigenous bloc in Bolivia). Given that the non-indigenous bloc in Bolivia and the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs in Peru remain disarticulated, I expect these blocs to be associated with elevated levels of volatility in the period after collapse (since 1990 in Peru and 2002-2005 in Bolivia).

To analyze bloc volatility, I use the Pedersen Index (Pedersen 1979) for calculating aggregate electoral volatility as a starting point but adapt this index to the bloc level. The bloc volatility measure follows the following formula:

$$BV = \frac{|P(iV + jV + kV)|}{2}$$

where P(iV + jV + kV) represents the absolute value of the difference in votes for each of the parties associated with a particular bloc across electoral cycles. The measure ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values reflecting higher electoral bloc volatility. To provide a point of comparison, volatility levels in Western European societies tend to average around 10.

The proposed bloc volatility measure is akin to Bartolini and Mair's (1990: Chapter 1) Within-Bloc volatility measure but differs from it in one key way: I classify parties along ethnic blocs in each election using the results of the ecological inference analyses and without making prior assumptions about their bloc attachments. That is, in my measure, a party can be in the indigenous bloc in one election and not in another if, according to the results of the ecological inference analyses, it obtained the indigenous vote in the first election, but not in the second

election.[92] This approach is better adapted to highly volatile contexts in which we cannot assume, *a priori*, parties' bloc appeals.

As noted, to classify parties according to ethnic blocs, I used the results of the ecological inference analyses presented in Chapter 3. Those parties that received votes predominantly from indigenous populations are classified as belonging to the indigenous bloc, whereas those that obtained the vote from non-indigenous populations are classified as non-indigenous. Parties that obtained similar vote shares from both indigenous and non-indigenous populations—for instance, *Cambio 90* in the 1990 election—are excluded from the ethnic bloc categories.[93]

Figure 5.6 presents the results of the bloc volatility analyses for Bolivia and Peru between 1980 and 2016. The dots included represent the volatility calculated between a given election year and the previous election.[94] So, for instance, the value for 1993 in Bolivia represents the volatility calculated for that ethnic bloc between the 1989 and 1993 elections.

[92] This happens with more frequency than we would expect. For instance, the UCS in Bolivia began as a party that mobilized the indigenous vote. When it changed leaders—from a *cholo* with Quechua heritage from the highlands to a white businessman from the eastern lowlands—the party became more closely aligned with the non-indigenous vote.
[93] In the analyses, I include parties that obtained less than 5 percentage points in an "other" category, for which I also examined voting trends. If, in a given year, electoral support for the "other" category was associated with a particular ethnic bloc (or with neither), I included each of the parties in that "other" category in the volatility analyses for that particular bloc. That is with the exception of those parties that obtained more than five percentage points in a different election and for which I had found a strong association with a particular ethnic bloc. When those parties fell in the "other" category, they were nonetheless classified based on previous behavior, regardless of the behavior of the "other" category. This was the case, for example, for Peru's APRA, which obtained less than 5 percentage points in several elections but has been strongly non-indigenous in other electoral cycles.
[94] Given the lack of district-level data for the 1995 Peruvian election, I implemented the analyses at the provincial-level to get an approximation of bloc alignments. However, these represent rough and imprecise results and should therefore be interpreted with caution.

Figure 5.6 Ethnic Bloc Volatility in Bolivia and Peru (1985-2016)



The bloc volatility analyses present patterns that are relatively consistent with the proposed hypotheses. In Bolivia, we observe an indigenous bloc that has become decreasingly volatile since the collapse of the party system and the emergence of the MAS in the 2002-2005 period. For this bloc, volatility levels prior to 2005 averaged 18.6 but have decreased to average 9 in the years since. This is clear evidence of the effects of a successful bloc articulation, which resulted from the rise of the MAS. The MAS became a nationally relevant political actor in 2002 and grew significantly between then and 2009 (from 22 percent in 2002 to 64 percent in 2009). Its successful articulation efforts were strongly associated with a decrease in levels of volatility. Indeed, we can attribute the limited volatility that the indigenous bloc has experienced since 2002 mostly to the growth of the MAS (that is, shifts in votes from other parties to the MAS), as opposed to voter movement away from it.

The indigenous bloc's remarkable stability contrasts tremendously with the elevated levels of bloc volatility experienced by the non-indigenous bloc during this same period. Since party system collapse, volatility levels for the non-indigenous bloc in Bolivia have averaged 40.8, a figure that is not only four times greater than the indigenous bloc's volatility levels in this same

period, but that is also almost double the size of the volatility levels experienced by the non-indigenous bloc before systemic collapse (which averaged 21.7). The striking difference in volatility levels between the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs in Bolivia is consistent with the expectations of the articulation framework. Articulation failures by parties like PPB-CN and UN in the 2009 election have left non-indigenous voters politically unanchored. Lacking anchoring, voters shift across political parties from one election cycle to the next in search of representational offers that are more clearly aligned with their identities, programmatic preferences, and sectoral interests. Since parties continue to fail in their articulation efforts, voters continue to reject parties.

The figure presents a somewhat different picture of bloc volatility dynamics in Peru. Since the party system collapsed in 1990, bloc volatility levels for both the indigenous and the non-indigenous bloc have remained elevated.[95] If in 1985, bloc electoral volatility levels for the indigenous bloc were at 18.9, after 2000—when the indigenous bloc was again associated not only with votes against particular parties but also with votes *for* specific political organizations—these levels have averaged 24.7. This figure increases to 30.8 if we exclude 2011 from the analyses, a year where volatility levels dipped for the indigenous bloc. This volatility dip reflects a temporary alignment between GP and indigenous populations between 2006 and 2011. The alignment, however, was short lived. In 2016, Peru's indigenous bloc again experienced a rise in bloc volatility, likely the result of GP's ultimate articulation failure. The party's rise to power in 2011 brought to the surface some of the limitations of GP's representational offer, leaving voters unanchored and ready to shift parties in the next electoral cycle.

[95] I exclude 1995 from the analyses. Although this year presents low volatility levels for the indigenous bloc, these low levels should be seen as artificial, since, according to the ecological inference analyses, voter behavior in the 1995 election did not respond to ethnicity. Thus, the low volatility for the indigenous bloc in this election, rather than reflecting alignment, reflects the irrelevance of ethnicity in that particular cycle. This also explains why the "Neither" category is so elevated in that same electoral cycle.

The bloc electoral volatility patterns for the non-indigenous bloc are, interestingly, somewhat more erratic. Before the collapse of the party system in 1990, volatility levels for the non-indigenous bloc were at 14.1. In 1990, they increased to 37.6 and, since 2000—when the non-indigenous bloc again became associated with particular political organizations—they have averaged 34.1. This is consistent with the theoretical expectations: given the lack of articulation of the non-indigenous bloc, we should expect this bloc to experience elevated levels of bloc volatility. Yet, despite the overall consistency of volatility patterns for this bloc, the dynamics for the period for which articulation patterns were analyzed are somewhat less consistent with the proposed framework. In contrast to the expectation that articulation failures of FP and AGP would trigger a movement from voters away from these political alternatives, this did not occur in the 2016 election cycle. Instead, both parties remained stable. Although this stability is likely short-lived[96]—and might respond to shifts in party articulation efforts since 2011—when looked at in combination with the 2006 volatility dip for the non-indigenous bloc and the 2011 dip for the indigenous one, it nonetheless suggests a more cyclical dynamic in the Peruvian party system: over the last several election cycles, voters seem to have hung on to parties for two electoral periods, and the movement away from these parties has often occurred when such parties have entered government. This happened with PP after 2001 (with the indigenous bloc), APRA after 2006 (with the non-indigenous bloc), GP after 2011 (with the indigenous bloc), and will likely happen with AGC and FP after 2016. Thus, although articulation failures may keep non-indigenous voters unanchored, it may be the lack of articulation of their interests once a party reaches government what is giving voters the final push to continue searching elsewhere for representation.

[96] On March 21st, 2018, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski renounced the presidency after the release of videos that featured Kenji Fujimori bribing members of Congress to get them to vote against vacating Kuczynski. Fuerza Popular, for its part, has been experiencing a significant decline in support and internal fissures that put into the question the party's long-term prospects for survival.

Despite these caveats, the bloc volatility analyses provide important evidence in support of the proposed framework. Blocs lacking articulation experience significantly more elevated levels of electoral volatility than those that have undergone articulation. When articulation efforts succeed, bloc volatility levels experience a significant decline.

VI. Conclusion

This chapter has presented a theory of cleavage articulation that introduces and develops the concept of cleavage articulation. In contrast to what the scholarship expects, I have argued that this process of cleavage articulation mediates not only the expression of social cleavages in the party system but also their effects on party system outcomes. Cleavage articulation processes are much more prone to failure than the literature recognizes. And these failures—which occur at the level of cleavage blocs and can produce either partial or failed social cleavage articulations—have crucial consequences for patterns of bloc electoral volatility and for the general viability of the political system. If salient social cleavages are associated with the most stable party systems across Western Europe, they are associated with some of the most fragile democracies in Latin America. Cleavage articulation, as opposed to cleavage salience, explains this variation in outcomes.

The proposed approach to measuring cleavage articulation treats cleavages as multi-dimensional social phenomena defined not only by socio-structural features but also by a well-defined programmatic and ideological content, and an identity component that is more complex than the scholarship has tended to recognize. Articulation involves weaving these dimensions of the cleavage together into a political discourse and platform.

As the analyses have demonstrated, this is an elusive process for nascent political parties. Collectively, the analyses begin to provide important insights into the differences between Bolivia and Peru regarding their recent experiences with party system reconstruction. Bolivia evidences a

clear instance of *partial cleavage articulati*on, a context where one bloc has achieved articulation while the other one remains in flux. The imbalance across cleavage blocs affects patterns of political stability. Bolivia now has a political party, MAS, providing consistent and stable representation to the interests of indigenous populations. As a result, the MAS has also achieved consolidation and maintained its electoral support across three electoral cycles, something unprecedented in Bolivia's political history. In sharp contrast, the non-indigenous bloc remains disarticulated in the party system. This places non-indigenous populations at a significant representational disadvantage in the political arena. To the extent that political parties offer this bloc representation, it is flawed and de-aligned. This leaves voters unanchored and uncommitted.

Peru's party system looks much different from Bolivia's and embodies an instance of failed cleavage articulation. This failed articulation has triggered elevated levels of bloc volatility for both indigenous and non-indigenous populations and tremendous political instability. Such instances of failed cleavage articulation are perhaps most threatening for democratic stability because they represent the failure of party politics to serve as an institutionalized channel for the most salient fractures in society. In the long term, this can push cleavage politics to the extra institutional arena and trigger an increase in social conflict. In failing to serve as social megaphones, parties push cleavage blocs to turn elsewhere for political expression.

In the next chapter, I turn to examine in greater detail why articulation failures occur. For this, I focus on the structures of social networks associated with the various ethnic blocs.

CHAPTER 6

FROM SOCIAL NETWORK STRUCTURES TO Pparty SYSTEMS

> The Indians are missing national linkages. Their protests have always been regional. This has contributed, in large part, to their abasement. A people of four million men, conscious of its numbers, do not ever become despaired by the future. Yet, as long as those same four million men remain an inorganic mass, a dispersed crowd, they remain incapable of deciding their own historical fate.
>
> - José Carlos Mariátegui, in *El problema del indio* (1928)

How do we explain variation in articulation outcomes? In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that cleavage articulation is a challenging process, replete with potential stumbling blocks that significantly limit the likelihood that a social cleavage will stabilize the party system. Yet, despite such difficulties, some political parties are able to navigate this process successfully while others are not. This chapter explores this variation with particular focus on the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage in both Bolivia and Peru. The chapter asks: Why did the MAS succeed in articulating this indigenous bloc while numerous other parties in both Bolivia and Peru have failed in their endeavors?

In this chapter, I argue that social network structures condition the articulation of social cleavages in the party system. Social network structures regulate the exchange of information between voters and parties, constrain or enhance nascent parties' mobilizational capacity, and condition the linkages that ensue between political parties and their bases. The role of social networks for cleavage bloc articulation is particularly salient in contexts of party system reconstruction, where the partisan networks that had previously allowed for political mobilization have disappeared. In such instances, social networks provide the channels through which nascent

political organizations seek to establish themselves, expand their reach, and construct representation for particular sectors of the population.

Yet, social networks vary significantly in their capacity to transmit information, mobilize populations, and facilitate the formation of linkages in society. This chapter introduces a typology to understand variation in social networks' articulation capacity. The typology focuses on variation along two structural dimensions of social networks—*breadth* and *depth*—that, together, seek to capture the social network landscape within which nascent political parties must necessarily operate as they seek to articulate collective identities and become anchored in the party system. While the *breadth* dimension considers networks' geographical spread (whether they have local, regional or national presence), the *depth* dimension refers to networks' degree of community embeddedness. The interaction between the two dimensions produces four ideal network types—robust, superficial, fragmented, and atomized—that condition political parties' articulation capacity in distinct ways.

This chapter argues that *nascent political parties generally emerge from within one of these social network structures and that this starting point places important constraints on parties' articulation capacity going forward, regardless of their expansion strategy.* As I will demonstrate through an analysis of network structures and party building efforts in Bolivia and Peru, the challenges that arise from social networks' original structures markedly condition the likelihood that a political party will successfully expand through these social networks, establish effective inter-organizational alliances, and succeed in its articulation of a cleavage-bloc identity. Political parties have one of two possible paths as they look to expand into the national arena. The first and least common strategy is to build their social networks from scratch, organizing individual voters in communities, linking these local networks at the national level, and using programmatic,

ideological, personalistic, and/or clientelistic mechanisms to create network cohesion.[97] More often than not, however, nascent parties opt for the second route, which is to grow within their original network structures, whether these are social organizations (Van Cott 2005; Samuels and Zucco 2015b, 2015a), military groups (Loxton 2015, 2016), guerrilla insurgencies (Holland 2016), regional associations (Eaton 2016), community organizations, or other types of social networks. Once they reach the physical boundaries of these networks, they then turn to inter-organizational alliances as a strategy to compensate for structural weaknesses, continue expansion, and increase the likelihood of political success.

New and significant challenges arise, however, when parties begin to seek expansion through inter-organizational alliances. Because parties' expansion strategy can no longer rely on within-network ties—which are the strongest—parties instead resort to building weaker and more contingent inter-organizational alliances with social organizations outside of their original network. Alliances with external networks, however, are not only weak, but are also more dependent on conditional exchanges than within-network ties. At the most superficial (and common) level, parties offer positions on their lists, control of ministries, programmatic concessions, or clientelistic goods in exchange for, or rather in the hopes of, obtaining a social network's political support. These linkages tend to be conjunctural (and, as such, fleeting) and their effectiveness is difficult to estimate *a priori*.

Beyond this, once political networks aim to grow beyond their original structures—whether upward to the national level, sideways to other regions, or downward to the community level—they

[97] An example of this is the party of Cesar Acuña, Alliance for Progress (APP), in Peru. Acuña began building private university empire in northern Peru in the 1990s. He established universities first in Trujillo and then progressively expanded his network across different Peruvian cities. Since the early 2000s year, Acuña has begun turning this university empire into a political organization, with his universities serving not only as sites for recruiting political support, but also as points of origin for his campaigns and his expansion into surrounding communities (Barrenechea 2014). Party-building efforts like that of Acuña, however, are rare. While plausible, such party building strategies are unlikely precisely because they demand virtually insurmountable financial and time resources that are traditionally scarce when political parties are seeking to establish themselves and grow. That being said, the framework introduced here can be applied to such instances as well.

will, more often than not, encounter significant resistance and competition from those political projects that are either established within such networks or looking to expand through them. This competition, I argue, impedes nascent parties from expanding into those spaces and significantly constrains their chances of constructing a successful articulation and anchoring themselves in the party system.

In sum, nascent parties' original networks provide the greatest opportunities for growth and articulation. When these original networks are structurally diverse and provide significant within-network interconnectivity to the national arena, nascent parties can expand through these networks and benefit from their strong linkages. However, when original structures are limited, parties have to instead resort to external alliances to compensate for their structural weakness. These external alliances, however, place crucial constraints on parties' capacity for articulation; linkages become weaker, more conditional, and less reliable. Competition from alternative political projects also becomes more likely. Collectively, these dynamics place almost insurmountable constraints on nascent parties' capacity for articulation and growth.

This chapter examines variation in indigenous articulation outcomes in Bolivia and Peru through this networked cleavage articulation theory. I use original interview data as well as primary and secondary resources to explore the structures of the various networks associated with indigenous populations and evaluate their structural capacity to serve as useful foundations for party building efforts. The next section examines why the MAS was successful at articulating the indigenous bloc and anchoring itself in the party system whereas other similar political projects—in particular, the MIP and ASP—failed in similar endeavors. I find that although these three political organizations emerged within *regional* social networks with tremendous *depth*, the MIP and ASP nonetheless shared the same single route for political expansion. This constrained their expansion strategy and capacity for cleavage bloc articulation.

The MAS' network structure, on the other hand, provided the nascent party with multiple paths for growth despite also originating from a regional and deeply embedded network. While the MAS shared an important network path with the MIP and ASP (through the CSUTCB and COB)—which allowed the MAS to challenge and undermine other parties' control of these social spaces—it also had other channels through which it could continue growing without the threat of political competition (mainly, CSCB and its inter-organizational linkages). Thus, I demonstrate that differences in network structures, rather than variation in leadership style and political rhetoric, enabled the MAS to succeed in its articulation efforts and hindered the expansion of the MIP and ASP political projects.

The chapter then turns to evaluate the lack of indigenous articulation in Peru. I demonstrate that while Peru's indigenous bloc is characterized by a vast organizational landscape, it is nonetheless deeply fragmented. The social networks within which political projects have emerged in this country have been either *regional* or *atomized* and have lacked feasible network channels for further expansion. Concretely, this has resulted in the formation of numerous regional political projects that have sought to articulate the indigenous identity but have been constrained by their network structures. These projects' lack of embeddedness in larger network structures, and the competition that they have encountered when they have sought to expand their reach, has not only hindered the successful articulation of ethnic cleavages in the party system, but has also incentivized representational dynamics that are highly problematic for processes of party system stabilization. Peru's network structures have produced a deeply fragmented and unstable political arena and thwarted the articulation of Peru's indigenous bloc in the party system.

Altogether, the chapter demonstrates that Peru's continued political instability in the context of a salient ethnic cleavage is not due to the absence of indigenous identities or the lack of an indigenous movement, but to the structures of the underlying social networks that do exist.

While both Bolivia and Peru have been characterized by extensive network presence, the network structures associated with the indigenous bloc in these societies have produced drastically different articulation outcomes in the party system. Whereas Bolivia's network structures—characterized by significant breadth and depth—have enabled the successful articulation of the indigenous bloc in the party system, those in Peru—characterized by significant depth but a lack of breadth—have instead driven the formation of a deeply fractured political landscape. The rest of the chapter examines the Bolivia and Peru articulation dynamics in greater depth, with particular attention to the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage in these societies.

I. Social Network Structures, Articulation, and Party System Reconstruction in the Andes

1. Indigenous Articulation in Bolivia

The 1990s and early 2000s were a period of heightened social mobilization in Bolivian society. Beginning with the historic 1990 indigenous March for Territory and Dignity, and until 2005, Bolivia experienced a dramatic upsurge in social mobilization, with indigenous populations placing themselves at the forefront of the most significant cycle of protests since the country's return to democracy. This period of heightened mobilization displayed the indigenous populations' remarkable organizational landscape, shed light on the central elements of their politics, and triggered their forceful push into the political arena.

Three political projects emerged from this protest cycle that aimed to channel both the grievances and political momentum of these indigenous mobilizations. These were the *Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (ASP), the *Movimiento Al Socialismo-Instrumento por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (MAS-IPSP), and the *Movimiento Indigena Pachakuti* (MIP). All three of these political projects were created within the indigenous peasantry and led by three of the

leading figures of these indigenous mobilizations: Alejo Veliz (ASP), Evo Morales (MAS-IPSP), and Felipe Quispe (MIP). Despite their strong roots in the indigenous peasant movement, only the MAS-IPSP project was able to grow into a national political force, capturing the vote of indigenous sectors through its articulation, and become stabilized amidst a context of political crisis that many thought would spiral into outright social conflict.

Existing explanations for this variation point to the differences in leadership styles and political appeals between these leaders, focusing primarily on the figures of Quispe and Morales. This scholarship understands Morales' political success as the product of an ethnopopulist and inclusionary political discourse that was uniquely effective at mobilizing indigenous populations together with other sectors of Bolivian society (mainly, the middle classes and *mestizos*) (Madrid, 2016: 306). Morales' inclusionary appeals are contrasted with Quispe's exclusionary ones, which emphasized the construction of a Qullasuyu indigenous nation and are said to have driven voters away from the MIP and towards the MAS. Morales' selection of a *mestizo* Leftist intellectual as his running mate for the 2005 campaign (the '*poncho* and tie' political binomial, (*La Prensa*, 8/17/2005) his alliance with a Leftist urban party (the *Movimiento Sin Miedo*, MSM), and his avoidance of a separatist discourse are taken as indicators of his greater inclusiveness and increased appeal vis-à-vis Quispe (e.g. Madrid, 2016: 319).[98]

[98] Madrid's argument relies on LAPOP data that asks for ethnic self-identification and includes white, *mestizo*, and indigenous, as three of the possible categories. He concludes that "self-identified whites and mestizos represented almost 70 percent of the MAS's total vote in the 2005 presidential elections, according to the 2006 LAPOP survey" (Madrid 2016: 320). However, in a parenthesis, he also recognizes that "most of these self-identified *mestizos*, however, came from indigenous backgrounds and spoke indigenous languages" (320). This parenthesis is telling of the problematic measure employed to reach this conclusion. As I have argued in earlier chapters, measures that pit indigenous against *mestizo* as self-identification categories are problematic not only due to the tremendous historical baggage of particular identities but also because of the tendency of indigenous populations to reject the indigenous category (seen as a product of colonialism) in favor of Quechua or Aymara classifiers that are rarely included in these survey questions. The use of language and background categories, instead of self-identification ones, for these same analyses challenges the notion that Morales won by obtaining the *mestizo* and white vote and support the argument that it was the Quechua-Aymara articulation what instead enabled the success and consolidation of the MAS-IPSP as an indigenous party.

Yet, a few dynamics point to the limitations of this leader-centric framework. First, although Morales was indeed more tactful than Quispe with his political appeals, it is less certain that Quispe was *not* trying to appeal to the same *mestizo* and middle classes. Quispe's definition of indigenousness was a broad one and incorporated urban populations and working classes. This was evidenced in his 2005 political platform, which stated: "For the dignity and liberation of the originary, Andean, and Amazonian nations (workers, merchants, professionals, students, and all of the exploited and oppressed) to pursue the [*Vivir Bien*] mode of life" (MIP, 2005: 2). Like Morales, Quispe also sought political alliances with representatives from the *mestizo* Left, apparently inviting García Linera—who ended up on the Morales ticket—to be his vice-presidential candidate (La Voz, 8/6/2005) as well as holding discussions towards this same end with Jaime Solares, the Executive Secretary of Bolivia's largest labor confederation, the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB)[99] and a fairly close collaborator of Quispe's.[100] Further, while Quispe did have a more radical (or perhaps angrier) discourse than Morales, Veliz' discourse was actually in the more moderate end of the spectrum. Thus, existing work that points to the differences between Morales and Quispe to explain the success of the former's political project, cannot account for why Morales' more inclusionary appeals succeeded while Veliz' failed.

Second, Morales' MAS-IPSP was actually the least likely case of success of the three political projects. The MAS-IPSP was born from the most heavily stigmatized sector of Bolivian society, the *cocalero* movement. This group was not only widely portrayed as being a front for the illegal production and trafficking of cocaine, but was also criticized for its protest tactics, forms of democratic engagement, and within-group accountability practices. Although the sector was respected amongst the indigenous peasantry, it was feared and despised across many urban spaces.

[99] Bolivian Workers' Confederation
[100] Quispe eventually opted to exclude Solares from his ticket because he "did not want *caudillos*" (ANF, 9/5/2005)

The degree of alarm that the thought of a MAS-IPSP presidency raised was such that less than a week before the 2002 election, the United States ambassador threatened with ending assistance to Bolivia if Morales won the general elections.[101]

Beyond this, the MAS-IPSP case was also unlikely because it represented, by far, the smallest social sector of the three political projects. This was expressed bluntly by Abel Mamani, the leader of FEJUVE-El Alto, the organization at the forefront of the mobilizations that ended in the resignation of two presidents (in 2003 and 2005):

> Evo Morales, to me, he represented the *cocaleros* and that was it. He has never represented the peasants here in La Paz or the peasants in Santa Cruz, or the manufacturers, or the miners. He represented the *cocaleros* of Cochabamba […] We're talking about someone who represented 100 thousand people at most, but more like 70, maybe 80 thousand; 100 is an exaggeration. So let's say, he had 70 thousand people under his command. I, on the other hand, was the leader of the city of El Alto, a city of a million people. (Interview with Abel Mamani).

Morales' natural bases were actually even smaller and were estimated at around 45,000 (Control Social n.d.), a number that contrasted markedly with Felipe Quispe's and Alejo Veliz' *Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (CSUTCB)[102], which incorporates approximately 4 million indigenous peasants (García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005: 132). Given that Quispe had been democratically elected to lead the most important and powerful indigenous organization, his leap into the political arena seemed to hold more promise than that of Morales' MAS-IPSP. Why, then, did the MAS-IPSP political project succeed to establish itself whereas the MIP and ASP projects failed?

To understand the differences between these three party-building efforts, it is necessary to consider the structures of the social networks from which these political projects originated and the organizational landscape within which these networks were embedded. I posit that these political projects' organizational origins shaped their paths to growth and articulation capacity going

[101] "I want to remind everyone that if you elect into office those who want Bolivia to become a cocaine exporter again, you will risk losing aid from the United States into the future" (*Los Tiempos,* 6/27/2002).
[102] Unified Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia

forward. Whereas the MAS-IPSP' social network structure enabled the party to expand into the national arena and successfully articulate the indigenous bloc of Bolivia's ethnic cleavage, those of the MIP and ASP significantly constrained their paths into the national arena and hindered their articulation efforts.

ASP, MAS-IPSP, and MIP all emerged from regional indigenous peasant organizations with tremendous mobilizational strength. Alejo Véliz' ASP traced its organizational origins to the peasant federation from the department of Cochabamba, the *Federacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Cochabamba* (FSUTCC).[103] Morales' MAS-IPSP was founded in January 1999 (Romero-Ballivián 2003), created by the *Coordinadora de las 6 Federaciones del Trópico*[104] (which I will refer to as the *Coordinadora*), the coca growers' organization based in the Chapare region of Cochabamba. Quipe's MIP, for its part, was founded in November 2000 and traced its origins to the powerful peasant federation of the department of La Paz: the *Federación Departamental Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz "Tupac Katari"*[105] (FDUTC-LP "TK").[106] Table 6.1 summarizes these political parties' organizational origins.

[103] Although originally founded in 1995 to serve as the political instrument of the three largest indigenous peasant confederations in the country—the CSCB, CSUTCB, and CIDOB—ASP underwent a split after 1997 due to leadership struggles between Véliz and Morales. Véliz kept control of the political organization's name—though it was no longer recognized as the party of the indigenous movements—and sought to organize a new political project around his leadership, using the Cochabamba peasant confederation as its starting point.
[104] Coordinator of the Six Federations of the Tropics
[105] Unified Departmental Federation of La Paz Peasant Workers - Tupac Katari
[106] Quispe actually founded MIP during his tenure as Executive Secretary of the national peasants' confederation, the CSUTCB. However, as I will explain later on, he did so within a context of a deeply fractured CSUTCB that had divided into two camps and left Quispe with control of his original base, the La Paz federation as well as some other sectors of the country. Thus, effectively, the MIP was a political organization emerging not from the national CSUTCB but from the regional La Paz federation.

Table 6.1 Indigenous Political Projects in Bolivia

Political Party	Leader	Organizational Origin	Year Founded
ASP	Alejo Véliz	Cochabamba Peasants' Federation (FSUTCC)	1995
MAS-IPSP	Evo Morales	Coordinator of the Six Coca Growers Federations (*Coordinadora*)	1999
MIP	Felipe Quispe	La Paz Peasants' Federation (FDUTC-LP "TK")	2000

These three social networks—FSUTCC, *Coordinadora*, FDUTC-LP "TK"—are all characterized by a remarkable degree of community embeddedness. Their network depth is reflected in their broad responsibilities within their communities, efficient accountability structures, and mobilizational capacity. They are, essentially, their communities' collective voice when engaging with government authorities; they manage land titling and land purchases, coordinate health and education services, and monitor infrastructure projects. As stated by García Linera et al. (2005), "the local peasant unions manage all of the necessary elements for the common good of these families. Little by little, this has led to the establishment of a series of collective responsibilities and rights which have entrenched a different type of communitarianism in these spaces" (395). All three organizations have well-established institutions for engaging the different communities and levels of the organization. Meetings occur with regularity—with participation often being required—and decisions are made and communicated through an institutionalized multi-level structure. Once decisions are made, all three organizations have mechanisms for holding their families accountable through fines and social pressure. Those that do not "comply with the organizational statutes can be threatened with losing their land" (García Linera et al., 2005: 426-7).

Yet, their impressive degree of community embeddedness is limited, on the other hand, by their regional reach. FSUTCC, the *Coordinadora*, and FDUTC-LP "TK" are, fundamentally, regional organizations that, although connected to the national levels cannot, on their own, exercise authority beyond their regions of influence. For FSUTCC and the *Coordinadora*, this region of influence is Cochabamba; for FDUTC-LP "TK", it is the capital city of La Paz. This is, therefore, where the strength of ASP, MAS-IPSP, and MIP is concentrated and from which it was generated. Their zones of influence were reflected in these parties' electoral performance. Table 6.2 reflects the percentage of the national vote obtained by each of these parties in their respective departments. It reflects the degree of concentration of each party in their zones of origins. This is somewhat less the case for the MAS-IPSP, a dynamic that this framework will account for.

Table 6.2 Percentage of national vote obtained by ASP, MAS-IPSP, and MIP in their Department of Origin (%)

Party	Region	1995 - M	1997 - G	1999 - M	2002 - G	2004 - G
ASP[107]	Cochabamba	58.1	73.0	80.0		
MAS-IPSP	Cochabamba			38.9	31.3	33.0
MIP	La Paz				92.2	62.0

Notes: '**M'** refers to municipal elections, while '**G'** refers to general ones. Evo Morales (MAS-IPSP) was part of the ASP political project in the 1995 municipal election and the 1997 presidential one. Table created with data from the *Atlas Electoral* (Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) 2010, 2012)

Given these structural foundations, it can be argued that the ASP, MAS-IPSP, and MIP were all grounded in fragmented social network structures and that their central challenge was expanding their regional strength to the national level.

[107] ASP ran as IU in the 1995 municipal election (as well as in the 1997 presidential one) and as PCB in 1999.

As fragmented networks look to grow into national political projects, they generally turn, first, to the social network structures within which they are embedded and, second, to the inter-organizational alliances. Whereas the network landscapes within which social networks are embedded increase the likelihood of strong and stable linkages, the latter alliances tend to result in more conditional and contingent linkages.

ASP, MAS-IPSP, and MIP all shared one potential and crucial path to growth: the CSUTCB. The CSUTCB is the most important indigenous peasant organization in Bolivian society. It operates at the national level, with departmental and provincial federations as well as community associations (called *centrales*, *sub-centrales*, and *sindicatos*) established across most of the country (though it has greater strength in the highland region).

CSUTCB, in many ways, represented the ideal social network structure for the emergence of an indigenous political party. First, the organization gathers a majority of indigenous peasant communities spread across Bolivia and is estimated to have approximately four million affiliates (in a country of ten million). Second, CSUTCB is also deeply embedded at the community level through its departmental and provincial structures. Garcia Linera et al.'s description of how community control is enforced during CSUTCB mobilizations is telling of the organization's structural depth:

> Community control during social mobilizations is strict. On the one hand, it establishes a type of moral obligation to comply with the pressure measures previously decided on by everyone (through assembly consensus). On the other, there are specific punishments implemented against those families that do not comply with that which was agreed by everyone. These punishments range from fines to public moral sanctions, and are largely defined based on the traditions of each community (García Linera et al. 2005: 166).

The capacity for mobilization of the CSUTCB was displayed during the protests of the 1990s and early 2000s, protests in which the organization was a consistent and leading actor. That said, its embeddedness has limitations and varies across regions:

> Neither CSUTCB nor its departmental affiliates has the capacity to promote collective actions on their own. Instead, they depend on the decisions that are made at the provincial, central, sub-central, and community levels. Thus, it is common for mobilizations to initiate at the provincial or departmental level and later, due to the strength of the issues, for other provinces and departments to join them, forcing the national leadership to assume the direction of the mobilization. This is precisely what happened with the mobilizations of September and October 2000 (García Linera et al. 2005: 136).

The regions that have displayed the greatest strength within the CSUTCB national structure have historically been La Paz and Cochabamba.

Beyond its national presence, membership size, and structural depth, the CSUTCB was also embedded within the *Central Obrera Bolivia* (COB), the Bolivian Workers' Confederation, an organization that gathered most unionized sectors of Bolivian society. For the emerging political parties, this meant that they had at their disposal within-network channels that could potentially allow them to grow from the regional level into the national arena through the CSUTCB and into urban spaces through the COB.

Yet, because the three political projects all shared this path to the national arena, the CSUTCB, rather than providing easy access to its national network for these projects, instead became intensely fractured. Divisions, it is important to note, have been a constant within the CSUTCB. These have stemmed from two dynamics. First, internally, the organization has been historically fractured by ideological positions, pitting *indianistas* against *kataristas*,[108] and both of these groups against the more traditionally leftist circles that have emphasized the role of class at the expense of ethnic recognition. The second set of divisions, which have at times mapped onto ideological ones, have been regional ones. Importantly, the strength of CSUTCB lays more in its regions than in its national interconnectivity. Decisions within this organizational structure generally move up from the regional level to the national one, rather than down from the national

[108] As explained in Chapter 2, whereas *indianistas* generally emphasized ethnicity as the single identity and social structure explaining social reality, the *kataristas* tended to combine ethnicity and class into their analyses and were more open to collaborations with the labor sector and the traditional organizations of the Left.

leadership to the regional one. This makes for vulnerable national ties, which can unravel when the conflicts between regions for control of the organization become salient. This is exactly what happened as ASP, MAS-IPSP, and MIP sought to move up from their regions of influence through the CSUTCB network.

The first fracture to appear within the CSUTCB came from the split between Alejo Veliz and Evo Morales and the collapse of the original ASP political project, which had been formed through an alliance between the three main indigenous peasant organizations, the CSUTCB, CSCB, and CONAMAQ. With the failure of this political project, two new parties, both based out of Cochabamba ensued. Véliz kept the ASP party name while Morales founded the MAS-IPSP political instrument. This split created an intense division within the CSUTCB as the two new political projects sought to assert their influence at the national level. The fracture between the two camps boiled to the surface in the 1998 CSUTCB Congress, when the blocs engaged in physical confrontations (García Linera et al., 2005: 121; Webber, 2011; Zuazo, 2009). The COB intervened as a mediator in this conflict, calling for a Unity Congress later that year. In that Congress, Felipe Quispe was elected to lead the national CSUTCB as the compromise or consensus candidate between the two factions. Quispe, however, while not siding with Véliz' political project, nonetheless actively challenged Morales. This laid the seeds for the second split within the CSUTCB:

> Quispe will look to distance the CSUTCB from the MAS-IPSP led by Morales, which will lead to growing conflict amongst the members of the CSUTCB associated with the political instrument project. The refusal of the CSUTCB executive to attend the organizational proclamations of the MAS, in contrast to what other leaders had done in the past, will lead the Consejo de *Federaciones Campesinas de los Yungas* [to] deny recognition of Felipe Quispe as the maximum leader of the CSUTCB. In the end, at the *ampliado* of March 1, 2000, Román Loayza—the second in command in the CSUTCB—will be expulsed, consummating an organizational and ideological division (García Linera et al. 2005: 121-22).

This second fracture led to the formation of a parallel CSUTCB organizational structure in early 2000. One bloc brought Quispe and Véliz together in a very delicate alliance. The other was controlled by Morales. Thus, by the time Quispe founded the MIP in November 2000, he was no longer the leader of a nationally strong CSUTCB. Instead, he led one of two CSUTCB's that would continue operating separately in the years that followed. The two CSUTCB's reflected these leaders' regions of influence. Morales' CSUTCB bloc included the regional federations of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Tarija, Pando, Potosi, and parts of Cochabamba and Oruro. Quispe, for his part, had control over the La Paz (the most important regional peasant federation) and Beni federations, as well as parts of the Cochabamba and Oruro ones, as well as several provincial federations (García Linera et al. 2005: 124).

That fracture put a cap on these political projects' capacity for growth, at least within the CSUTCB. Their shared networked path to growth limited their access to the national arena and their capacity to assert themselves as the legitimate representatives of the indigenous bloc. Lacking the strength to outdo each other within the CSUTCB, each party rose to the national arena without making significant headway outside of their regions of origin. In theory, their inability to outdo each other should have sent all three projects back to their regional spaces and devolved into personalistic conflict and fragmentation. As I will show later on, this is exactly what happened in neighboring Peru. However, while this 'end of the road' dynamic defined the fate of ASP and MIP, it did not lead to the same outcome for the MAS-IPSP.

In contrast to ASP and MIP—whose only path into the national arena was the CSUTCB—the MAS-IPSP had an alternate within-network path upward. This was due to the *Coordinadora's* organizational structure—within which the MAS originated—which was embedded in more diverse network structures than both Véliz' FSUTCC and Quispe's FDUTC-LP "TK". The *Coordinadora's* diverse network structures included not only an alternate within-network channel

into the national arena—through the *Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia* (CSCB)[109]—but also more stable inter-organizational alliances with other nationally (and regionally) relevant organizations such as the *Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu* (CONAMAQ)[110], which organized traditional indigenous communities from the highlands, and the *Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB)[111], which organized indigenous populations primarily in the eastern lowlands. These alternate paths enabled the MAS to grow into a national organization despite its limited capacity for expansion within the CSUTCB channels. Eventually, and because of these social networks, the MAS was able to overpower both ASP and MIP and succeed in its organizational and ideological articulation of the indigenous bloc.

Much of the diversity of the *Coordinadora's* social network landscape, ironically, is owed to its messy and deeply fractured organizational beginnings. The *cocalero* movement, which the *Coordinadora* represents, traces its roots to the late 1970s, a period during which the Chapare region of Cochabamba experienced tremendous population growth. Migration to the Chapare resulted partly from the spike in the price of coca leaves in 1980—which attracted immigrants from Potosí, La Paz, and Oruro—and partly from the mass migration of former miners triggered by the privatization of the mining industry in 1985 (Flores and Blanes 1984; García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005; Spedding 2005).

Many of those who established themselves in the region became coca producers and, as the region grew, communities organized into unions to coordinate land titling processes and other local issues, and connecting these unions through local federations. In 1968, the first coca producers' federation— *Federación Especial de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba*

[109] Syndical Confederation of Bolivian Colonizers
[110] National Council of Ayllus and Markas of the Qullasuyu
[111] Indigenous Peoples' Federation of Eastern Bolivia

(FETCTC)[112]—was founded. But, internal struggles, coupled with the population growth that ensued in the years after FETCTC was established, sent the organizational structure of the *cocaleros* into a downward spiral. In 1971, a sector split from FETCTC and created the *Federación de Colonizadores de Chimore* (FECCH)[113] (Control Social, n.d.; García Linera et al., 2005: 390; Spedding, 2005). In 1983, FECCH also divided and that fracture led to the foundation of the *Federación de Colonizadores de Carrasco Tropical* (FCCT)[114]. In 1986, FETCTC experienced another internal fracture, which led to the formation of the *Federación Unica de Centrales Unidas* (FUCU)[115], and FUCU then underwent its own split in 1988, resulting in the creation of the *Federación Especial Yungas del Chapare* (FEYCH)[116]. By the end of the 1980s, the *cocaleros* had established five different coca federations. Finally, in 1994, the *Federación Sindical Agropecuaria de Mamore- Bulo Bulo* (FSAMBB)[117] was created as a result of a new municipality law (Control Social, n.d.: 51). Figure 6.1 charts these fractures.

[112] Special Federation of Peasant Workers of the Cochabamba Tropic
[113] Colonizers' Federation of Chimoré
[114] Carrasco Tropical Colonizers' Federation
[115] Unitary Federation of United Centrals
[116] Yungas del Chapare's Special Federation
[117] Mamoré-Bulo Bulo Agropecuarian Syndicate Federation

Figure 6.1 Social Network Splits in the Cocalero Movement of Cochabamba



Throughout the 1980s, these coca federations operated in isolation from each other. Crucially, this meant that each federation had independence when choosing their affiliations to other regional and national organizations. As a result, they inserted themselves in different network structures at the departmental and national levels. FETCTC—the largest and most powerful of the six federations—and FUCU became affiliated with the Cochabamba peasants' federation, the FSUTCC, which in turn inserted them into the CSUTCB structure. FECCH, FCCT, FEYCH, and FSAMBB, for their part, affiliated with the *Federacion Sindical Colonizadores de Cochabamba* (FSCC)[118], which embedded them in the national structure of the CSCB, the national confederation of *colonizadores*. Thus, two of the six federations became associated with the Cochabamba peasants' federation and four attached themselves to the same department's colonizers' federation.

[118] Colonizers' Syndicate Federation of Cochabamba

The *Coordinadora* emerged within this fractured context in 1991, as a strategy for unifying these federations (five of them at the time of its foundation) and facilitating their coordination in the fight against the increasingly militaristic coca eradication policies being implemented by the government, with the support of the US military. Importantly, however, despite their new affiliation to the *Coordinadora*, the *federaciones'* connections to the various departmental and national networks did not change. The insertion of the *Coordinadora*—now the representative of the six federations—within this network landscape meant that the organization now had the unusual structural position of being formally embedded in both the FSUTCC and the FSCC at the departmental level as well as in the CSUTCB and CSCB at the national one. Both of these national networks, moreover, also connected the *Coordinadora* with the COB.

In addition to this structure, each of the *federaciones* in the Chapare also had a parallel *cocalero* women's federation. These six women federations were themselves affiliated, at the departmental level, with the Cochabamba' women's peasant federation (*Federación Departamental de Mujeres Campesinas Originarias de Cochabamba – Bartolina Sisa, FDMCOC – B.S.)*[119] and at the national level with the *Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas y Originarias de Bolivia – Bartolina Sisa* (CNMCIOB – B.S.)[120] and the CSUTCB (Control Social: 50-6; García Linera et al. 2005: 390-1; Spedding 2005).

The structural landscape of the coca producers' federations and the *Coordinadora* are represented in Figure 2. The figure on the left captures the network landscape prior to the formation of the *Coordinadora* and the one on the right reflects how the formation of the *Coordinadora* altered this landscape.

[119] Originary Peasant Women's Departmental Federation of Cochabamba - Bartolina Sisa
[120] Originary Peasant Women's National Conederation of Bolivia - Bartolina Sisa

Figure 6.2 The Cocalero Movement's Network Structure Pre- and Post-the Coordinadora de las Seis Federaciones del Trópico (Coordinadora)



Morales, who was the elected Executive Secretary of the *Coordinadora* upon its foundation found this organizational structure problematic. In an interview with García Linera et al, he said: "Because of its very problematic organic structure, these organizations are affiliated to two different national core organizations […] Both of these national confederations are also represented in the COB" (García Linera et al. 2005: 391). But rather, it was precisely this diverse network landscape that enabled the MAS-IPSP political project to expand into a national political organization, even as it encountered resistance in some of the social networks within which it was embedded.

When MAS-IPSP was created from the *Coordinadora* structure, it had two independent paths to expansion into the departmental and national arenas from the sub-departmental level within which it operated. These were FSUTCC and FCC. As the party moved into FSUTCC, at first it did not encounter significant resistance. At that time, Morales and Alejo Véliz shared a political instrument that was founded through an alliance between CSUTCB, CSCB, and CIDOB.

ASP was able to establish itself as the party of the Cochabamba peasants' federation and by 1996 had also obtained the top position—executive secretary—within the CSUTCB. However, as I already noted, soon after its foundation, the ASP project collapsed, splitting the organizational space that Veliz and Morales had previously occupied together into two camps. This organizational fracture became reflected both within the FSUTCC and the CSUTCB.

But the MAS also had an alternative path, the CSCB. The CSCB network structure offered the MAS two things that the party lacked from the CSUTCB path: a strong within-network channel where it could grow into the national political arena without significant competition from any sectors within it and a set of strong and stable inter-organizational linkages which the CSUTCB lacked.

The CSCB was founded in 1970 as a structure dedicated to organizing the '*colonizadores'* throughout Bolivia, which was the term used to describe peasants who had migrated and occupied new lands whether by their own doing or as part of government-led land distribution projects. Structurally, CSCB is well organized. Meetings occur regularly; all affiliates are expected to attend; decisions are made in consensus; and there are internal mechanisms for ensuring compliance with these decisions.

Yet, CSCB, much like CSUTCB, does not have structural depth of its own. Its presence at the community level is filtered through its regional and local affiliates. The organization has departmental affiliates in four departments—La Paz, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Cochabamba—and local affiliates in Chuquisaca and Tarija. Historically, the primary source of structural depth of the CSCB has come from the *Coordinadora*, with other regional affiliates either lacking similar depth and organization at the community level or having depth in some spaces and not others. Interestingly, however, the *Coordinadora* actually operates rather autonomously from the CSCB (García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005). Although it is integrated to this network

and participates actively within it, the *Coordinadora* makes its own decisions when it comes to social mobilizations and political postures. The Executive Secretary of CSCB described this: "In Cochabamba, we do not have [control over the affiliates] because Evo manages the six federations through the *Coordinadora de las Seis Federaciones del Trópico*. Of the six, four are regional affiliates of ours" (Interview with Sergio Loayza in García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005: 280).

As such, CSCB's main strength is that it provides a crucial space for its affiliates to come together, agree on common social and political agendas, and develop strategies for advancing these aims collectively. In other words, what CSCB offers is a crucial platform for national connectivity. And because of the differentiated levels of community embeddedness across the sectors that integrate it, it is less prone than the CSUTCB to devolve into power struggles between its departmental affiliates. "With the exception of the *cocaleros* of Chapare, who generally act autonomously, there are no other strong personal leaderships capable of putting all of their organizational capital at play by mobilizing unilaterally from the top positions, as it has happened in CSUTCB" (García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005: 284-5) .

Beyond this, CSCB has also been particularly apt at establishing stable inter-organizational linkages with other national and regional organizations. Along with the CSUTCB, it joined forces with CIDOB in 1995 to construct a political instrument, though the alliance eventually failed. When CONAMAQ was founded (officially in 1997 but had multiple Congresses prior to this foundation date), it established a close collaboration with this organization, which it was able to sustain over the years. And it has also worked consistently with regional organizations such as

Coordinadora de Pueblos Etnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC),[121] which originally formed part of CIDOB but broke from that structure in 2002.

CSCB's inter-organizational ties are further enhanced by those established by the *Coordinadora* itself, outside of the CSCB structure. In fact, "as it pertains to collective action with other social movements in the country, the *cocalero* movement has been one of the organizations that has sought the most alliances throughout its history. To do this, it has been necessary to permanently integrate the vindication aims of the *cocalero* federations with those of other sectors and, in more recent times and with more energy, demands of a national nature, which are the ones that are mobilizing many sectors throughout the country" (García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005: 434-5).

Through the *Coordinadora*, the *cocaleros* of the Chapare have engaged in a wide range of social protests that go much beyond their own policy demands. Examples of this include the *cocalero's* participation in the 2000 Cochabamba Water Wars, during which it developed a strong and durable inter-organizational alliance with the *Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y la Vida de Cochabamba* (CDAVCH)[122] and the *Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Regantes* (FEDECOR)[123]—the "main mobilizational force of the Cochabamba valley region"—as well as other popular urban sectors (García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005). Ties with the working-class sectors were established through alliances between the *cocaleros* and the *Centrales Obreras Departamentales* (CODES)[124], six departmental federations within the COB structure that broke with the COB national leadership structure, which had sided with Quispe in the conflict between the two parties (Opinión 1/20/2003; L. Voz 1/18/2003).

[121] Coordinator of the Ethnic Communities of Santa Cruz
[122] Cochabamba Coordinator for the Defense of Water - Acronym applied to facilitate discussion here but is not official.
[123] Irrigators' federation of Cochabamba
[124] Workers' Departmental Centrals

Stable inter-organizational alliances were also established with the *cocaleros* from the Yungas of La Paz, organized in the *Consejo de Federaciones Campesinas de los Yungas* (COFECAY).[125] Both sectors mobilized together on multiple occasions in opposition to coca eradication policies. In 2001, Morales' CDAVCH also integrated the *Coordinadora de Movilizacion Unica Nacional* (COMUNAL)[126], which was an alliance originally established with other sectors of Cochabamba such as the FSCC, the *Coordinadora del Agua*, the irrigators' federation, and artisan and manufacturer sectors, amongst others. This organization eventually became the *Estado Mayor* ("General State") and was also joined, sporadically, by the COB and the CSUTCB. The *Estado Mayor* had Morales and his *cocalero* movement at its helm and, although it varied significantly in its capacity to bring these sectors together over the years, it nonetheless provided an arena for the formation of strong and other weak inter-organizational linkages. Figure 6.3 visualizes the *Coordinadora's* social network landscape, including both strong within-network linkages and inter-organizational stable (though weaker) linkages.

Between 2003 and 2005, the *Coordinadora* also joined protests organized by the FDUTC-LP "TK" (La Paz peasants' federation), the CSUTCB, *Federación de Juntas Vecinales de El Alto* (FEJUVE-El Alto)[127], *Central Obrera Regional de El Alto* (COR-El Alto),[128] Huanuni miners, and the *Coordinadora de Defensa del Gas y los Hidrocarburos,*[129] providing crucial mobilizational and organizational support to these communities during their struggles. Because of the tremendous mobilizational capacity of the *Coordinadora*, their participation in social protests enabled social movements—most often based out of La Paz—to gain national interconnectivity, increase the level of threat, and gain greater legitimacy.

[125] Council of Yungas' Peasant Federation
[126] Unitary National Coordinator of Mobilizations
[127] Federation of Neighborhood Councils of El Alto
[128] Regional Workers' Central of El Alto
[129] Coordinator for the Defense of Gas and Hydrocarbons

Figure 6.3 Social Network Landscape of the Coordinadora



The *Coordinadora* and CSCB's approach towards inter-organizational alliances contrasts somewhat with that of the CSUTCB, which has been less effective and interested in these endeavors. This is not to say that the CSUTCB has not participated in alliances with other indigenous organizations. But the tendency of the CSUTCB has been to establish conjunctural alliances with other organizations supporting its efforts, rather than going out of its way to build stable linkages with them. Such was the case, for instance, in 2001, when Quispe's CSUTCB launched a series of protests and the *Coordinadora* and the CDAVCH joined it in support. Similarly, in 2003, Quispe went on a hunger strike that eventually evolved into the Gas Wars as other social organizations—such as FEJUVE-El Alto, COR-El Alto, *Coordinadora*, COB, amongst numerous others—joined it in support. Thus, the organization has tended to seek support from other organizations at critical junctures and it is within this context that strategic but weak linkages

have been established. Overall, however, CSUTCB has been much less effective than either the *Coordinadora* or CSCB at generating linkages outside of its within-network landscape.[130]

Thus, MAS had at its disposal a vast social network landscape with multiple paths into the national arena as well as inter-organizational linkages that could facilitate its expansion into other social sectors. And this is precisely how the party grew. As it fought for power within a fractured CSUTCB structure—within which it encountered competition first from ASP and then from MIP supporters—it moved almost effortlessly into the national space through the CSCB structure, developing strong linkages along the way.

The MAS-IPSP then used the CSCB's inter-organizational linkages, as well as those that had been established by the *Coordinadora*, to establish itself in other important social networks. Its departmental inter-organizational alliances enabled the MAS-IPSP political project to enter into the working class sectors of Cochabamba (through the CDAVCH and the FDCHOR, as well as other smaller sectors), the rural areas of La Paz (through COFECAY), the indigenous communities of Santa Cruz (through CPESC), the working classes of La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Potosí, and Tarija (through the CODES), and, to a lesser extent, the city of El Alto (through FEJUVE-El Alto). Its national inter-organizational alliances, for their part, allowed it to penetrate peasant indigenous communities affiliated with CONAMAQ in La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí. Collectively, these inter-organizational linkages, although weaker than the ones facilitated through within-network expansion, enabled the MAS-IPSP to expand across the national landscape and insert itself in sectors outside of the party's own network structures.

This combination of within-network linkages and stable inter-organizational alliances gave the MAS a privileged position in the national political landscape. This, in turn, increased its

[130] As García Linera notes, the "CSUTCB confronts limits […] in its capacity to articulate durable and effective alliances with social sectors in other departments as well as with urban populations" (García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005: 211).

competitiveness within the networks spaces that were being contested with other political forces. Figure 6.4 maps the core network structure that each of the three political parties had as well as how they moved up these spaces. The left presents the distribution of political presence in the pre-Quispe years, during which ASP and MAS-IPSP were contesting control of the CSUTCB. The figure on the right maps this distribution after the formation of the MIP in November 2000. The figure shows how the advantaged position of the MAS-IPSP given the network structure within which its original organization, the *Coordinadora*, was embedded allowed it to become a national political organization. As such, it also visualizes why the MAS-IPSP was able to overpower its political rivals and hinder their expansion.

Figure 6.4 Political Presence of ASP, MAS-IPSP, and MIP in Social Network Structures



The MAS-IPSP' path to the national arena through its regional and national affiliates significantly impacted its capacity for articulation. As the political project grew, so did the political

discourse that the party put forth. Both the MAS-IPSP and its *cocalero* movement went from making sector-specific claims in the 1990s to leading many of the most important fights for the national political agenda in the early 2000s.

While remaining firm in their commitment to sectoral interests, the MAS-IPSP and the *cocaleros* also became incorporated in numerous struggles against the privatization of natural resources, becoming central actors in both the Water and Gas wars of 2000 and 2003, respectively. By 2003, these two groups were also calling for the implementation of a Constitutional Assembly, defending clear positions on issues of regional autonomy, calling for greater Bolivian sovereignty, and advocating for national referendums on key decisions. In a short span of time, the MAS-IPSP had become one of the primary advocates for the re-foundation of Bolivia as a plurinational state and the transformation of power, social, and economic structures in Bolivian society. As Morales put it: "To have more influence and to be heard—because, if you are a minority they do not listen to you—you have to search for ways to have an impact […] You cannot only discuss the themes that concern you but also other important themes at the departmental and national levels" (García Linera, Chávez León, and Costas Monje 2005: 435).

By the 2005 election, the MAS-IPSP represented an articulation of the indigenous bloc both in terms of its organizational structures and the ideological and programmatic preferences that defined it. What had been a rather fractured though vast organizational landscape of indigenous social networks became interconnected through a single political organization—the MAS-IPSP—that effectively articulated these various sectors, their organizational structures, and their political preferences into a single political project and agenda.

The MAS-IPSP had developed as strong of an organizational foundation as any nascent political party could wish for. This put the party in a privileged position going into the 2005 elections, one that has been largely missed in existing work on party building in Bolivia. Whereas

most nascent parties have to necessarily resort to conditional external alliances at times of election, the MAS-IPSP had a full organizational structure that it could kick into gear. This is not to say that the party did not turn to external alliances. It certainly did and, when this happened, the linkages were inevitably weaker. Such was the case, for instance, with the *invitados*, which were individual figures that were invited to join the party lists in order to appeal primarily to urban and intellectual sectors where the MAS-IPSP had less presence. It also happened, to a lesser degree with organizations such as FEJUVE-El Alto and COR-El Alto, which received either positions on party lists or the directorship of key ministries in exchange for electoral support. Yet, unlike other nascent parties, the MAS-IPSP' position, in combination with its alliance strategy, enabled it to eventually grow these into more sustained and stronger ties. It did so by going beyond party list concessions and incorporating more substantial proposals into the political platform. This meant that what started off as conditional and highly contingent ties—and, as such, provisional and weak linkages—at times evolved into stronger linkages. Such was the case with the COB, which maintained a safe distance from the MAS-IPSP political project until after the 2009 election, even though the Morales government made numerous efforts to articulate the working classes into its platform. A COB leader explained how the organization eventually allowed the MAS-IPSP in:

> After so many years of struggles, finally, we saw the rise of a government that represents the large majorities of this country, which are our *compañeros*, the peasants, and many of those in the lower classes. So, we held a meeting and, in that meeting, we did an in-depth analysis of what was going to be the role of the COB in this process. And we reached a single resolution—which was unanimous across all of the more than fifty sectors within the COB—that we should support this process of social change to transform the country, and that we have to make sure that all of these great benefits reach workers directly. So, in that context, we made an official declaration as COB leaders, called the Santa Cruz declaration (on November 21, 2013) and, in that declaration, we identified those social, political, production apparatus, and mining themes [that concern us]; and said that now is the opportunity for us workers to enter into the political arena and make a reality that for which we have been fighting for in the streets, through marches and protests, for years. We want to see laws that favor the workers. And so we agreed with this government that this is a change that we have to continue deepening in favor of the workers and the large majorities […] we agreed that we need to have our own representatives [through the MAS-IPSP] and that's what we are working on now (Interview with Juan José Guzmán, COB)

Such an approach to sectoral alliances has allowed the MAS-IPSP to expand well beyond its within-network structure since the 2005 election campaign period. In a sense, this has driven the transformation of the organizational landscape, from one that is deeply embedded but fractured, to one that is robust, though perhaps now overly embedded in the political arena. While the Morales' leadership style has certainly played a role in this process of alliance formation, it is unlikely that the party's growth would have been possible had it not been for its original network foundations. Instead, it was the diverse and strong network landscape within which the MAS-IPSP was embedded (through the *Coordinadora*) that enabled the party to grow into a national political force and, adapting its discourse and positions along the way, eventually succeeding in its articulation of the indigenous bloc.

2. Indigenous Disarticulation in Peru

In contrast to Bolivia, Peru has thus far failed to produce a successful articulation of the indigenous bloc of the ethnic cleavage. As a result, the political arena remains fraught with political instability. In Peru, the political arena is deeply fragmented. Over the last decade, "national" parties have retreated to Lima and ceded control of regions to a breadth of provincial and regional political movements (De Gramont 2010; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016). This has been associated with the disintegration of the political landscape: in 2014, "national" parties captured only six of twenty-five regional governments (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016: 415). Most departmental and provincial governments were instead fought over by regional and province-level political projects that have thus far been unable to grow into national political organizations. Further, most if not all of the political projects that have ensued in Peru since the collapse of the party system—whether at the national, regional, or provincial level—have proven ephemeral, disappearing after their first or second appearance on the ballot.

The rapid growth and disappearance of parties has generated a large mass of independent politicians that have limited loyalties to the political organizations with which they run and, scholars argue, rely primarily on their image to win elections and gain positions as new political projects arise. The figures are rather staggering. Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016) found that

> […]Of the fifty winners and runner-ups in [the 2014] regional election, thirty-five [candidates for governor] had belonged to two or more parties, eighteen had belonged to three or more parties, and eight had belonged to four or more parties. Likewise, of the 195 provincial mayors elected in 2014, 168 (86 percent) had belonged to two or more parties, 101 (52 percent) had belonged to three or more parties during their career, and forty-eight (25 percent) had belonged to four or more parties" (419).

Existing research suggests that Peru, in contrast to Bolivia, lacks the social cleavages necessary to trigger the formation of a party system structured along programmatic lines. According to Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016), the combination of two factors, the absence of a polarizing conflict and the collapse of a party system, has driven the rise of "coalitions of independents" that operate as party substitutes. The authors write: "after parties collapsed, politicians developed alternative strategies (such as party-switching and the deployment of party substitutes) that enabled them to win elections without parties. By facilitating politicians' efforts to 'go it alone,' the diffusion of these alternative strategies further weakened incentives for party building. Moreover, electoral competition appears to select for politicians who make effective use of these nonparty strategies and technologies" (413). In this context, politicians tend to rely primarily on personalistic linkages to mobilize political support and political projects become devoid of programmatic or ideological content.

As previous chapters have demonstrated, however, the underlying premise of this explanation—that no polarizing conflict or social cleavage exists that can effectively organize the population into rival social blocs and enable mobilization along programmatic and ideological lines—is problematic. Both Peru and Bolivia are characterized by salient ethnic cleavages that have been consistently associated with differentiated patterns of political behavior. The remarkable

levels of political instability in Peru have persisted *despite* the presence of a salient ethnic cleavage. Given this, the question that this section attempts to answer is: why are political parties failing to articulate the existing salient ethnic identities in Peru?

An analysis of the social network structures within which political projects in Peru are originating in and the organizational landscapes that these networks are embedded in sheds light on the differences in articulation outcomes between Bolivia and Peru. I posit that political projects in Peru are originating within a vast but fragmented social network landscape that, although oftentimes deeply embedded at the community or provincial level, lacks the within-network and inter-organizational paths necessary to effectively grow into the regional and national arenas. Lacking these alternative paths, nascent parties have had to rely almost exclusively on contingent external alliances to expand their reach into the regional and national terrain. These alliances, however, have rested on the weakest and most unstable form of linkages and, as such, have been highly contingent, appearing and disappearing across election cycles. Such reliance on external alliances has made nascent parties remarkably vulnerable to the competition encountered as they have attempted to grow beyond their social networks of origin.

The weakness of nascent parties in Peru, however, cannot be confounded with an absence of ideological or programmatic content. Rather, efforts to articulate the indigenous bloc in this society abound with indigenous projects having made significant appearances in numerous regional elections. Most of these political projects, moreover, have tended to agree on the central themes: ethnic identity, land and territorial claims, environmental protections, and resistance and/or balance against a rapidly expanding extractive industry. Yet, internal fractures and weak linkages have driven most of these articulation efforts to failure. In that sense, Peru's indigenous parties tend to resemble Bolivia's MIP and ASP: they have a base and an agenda but lack the network structures necessary to succeed.

I explore this argument through an analysis of social network structures and party building projects in Peru, with particular attention to the cases of Puno and Cusco, two departments in the highland region that concentrate the majority of indigenous populations.

Peru's Social Network Landscape

Peru continues to have a dense and vast social organizational landscape in spite of the erosion experienced by many of the labor and peasant organizations that shaped politics during the 1980s. Back then, as now, the *comunidades campesinas* (peasant communities)—previously recognized as *comunidades de indígenas* (indigenous communities)—provided the primary structure for organizing in Peru's indigenous rural areas. There are approximately 6,200 *comunidades campesinas* distributed across Peru, with 90 percent of these being concentrated in the highland region (where Quechua and Aymara populations predominate) (Sistema de información sobre comunidades campesinas del Perú 2016: 4-6). These represent "the most important institution" in Peru's rural areas (Diez Hurtado 2007: 119). Figure 6.5 visualizes the distribution of peasant communities across Peru.

The vast landscape of *comunidades campesinas* is complemented by—and provides the foundation for—other types of social network structures that operate either at the community or provincial levels. These network structures include *rondas campesinas (*peasant safety rounds)—which replace *comunidades campesinas* in some contexts—*tenientes gobernadores*, peasant associations, peasant leagues, defense fronts, producer associations, women's organizations, and neighborhood associations, amongst others (Grupo Allpa 2010). Collectively, these organizational structures have significant influence in patterns of organizing and mobilizing amongst indigenous populations in Peruvian society.

Figure 6.5 Indigenous Peasant Communities in Peru



Source: Sistema de información sobre comunidades campesinas del Perú 2016

The community-level network structures provide the main sites for organizing collective action in Peru's rural areas. They constitute the most basic unit in the organizational structures of Peru's peasant federation and have historically played a fundamental role in agrarian and social movements in Peru's rural areas. The continued significance of the *comunidades campesinas* for contemporary movements has been highlighted in recent research (see, for example, Diez Hurtado 2012). For instance, a recent study found that 71 out of the 131 social conflicts identified in Peruvian departments in January 2011 involved *comunidades campesinas*, *comunidades nativas* (native communities), or *rondas campesinas*. Figure 6.6 visualizes the distribution of social

conflicts between 2009 and 2015 and similarly suggests this association between indigenous peasant communities and social conflict events, with Puno, Cusco, Ayacucho, Apurimac, Ancash, Piura, Cajamarca, and Loreto reflecting the highest levels of social conflict.

The prominent role of *comunidades campesinas* for social organizing came across in the interviews implemented in Cusco and Puno, where leaders explained the impossibility of organizing without engaging the leaders of the *comunidades campesinas*: "there are some areas, for example, that you have to go to the *tenientes gobernadores* and you have to explain the logic of the protest to them to get strong support for your strike. If you don't support this position well…if you don't, for example, provide a lot of information, then, there will be no strike. So, the social structure will respond to a demand that they think will affect them but you still have to reach out to the leaders because, without their support, you fail; we've failed on multiple occasions" (interview with Hugo Llano, *Comité de Lucha de la Zona Sur*[131]). Thus, the significance of *comunidades campesinas* for the coordination and emergence of social and political processes can hardly be overstated.

[131] Mobilization Committee for the Zona Sur

Figure 6.6 Social Conflict Events by Department in Peru (2009-2015)



Note: Data from Defensoría del Pueblo (2017: 40)

The conflicts that have emerged from these communities have been first and foremost associated with mining and water issues. According to one report by the *Defensoría del Pueblo*, over 50 percent of the social conflicts that took place between 2009 and 2014 were associated with environmental conflicts (Defensoría del Pueblo 2017).[132] Crucially, the primary social actors involved in these conflicts were community based organizations ranging from *comunidades campesinas* and *rondas campesinas* to *frentes de defensa*—which are community level alliances

[132] The increased focus on water and the environment was explained to me by Tomás Quispe of the *Federación Departamental de Campesinos del Cusco*, FDCC, explains this: "since 2000, our struggles have been focused more than anything on the defense of our right to water. This is because the Water Law was passed and, according to that law, our waters were going to be privatized. But this is an important, fundamental resource. Without water, there is no life. So we have had to carve at that law […] and we have organized committees for the defense of water" (Interview with Tomás Quispe, FDCC).

that bring together many of the community organizations—peasant federations and irrigation federations.

Water and environmental issues have thus become central to patterns of community organizing and mobilizing at the most local level of society in the Peruvian indigenous highlands. As a result of this, two important dynamics have ensued. First, environmental demands have become closely intertwined with an indigenous rhetoric that is regularly employed by both movement and party leaders to frame their agendas. In fighting against either the presence or the unfair treatment of mining projects, indigenous populations claim to be fighting for the protection of the Pachamama (Mother Earth) and the defense of natural resources, as well as making claims to their rights to prior consultation and territorial autonomy as indigenous communities. In this same vein, their agricultural and development projects, and their rejection of the neoliberal economic model have all become articulated through this ethnic lens.

The significance of this indigenous discourse and ideological framework was reflected in my interviews with political leaders across Puno and Cusco. For instance, in an interview with Hugo Llano, who ran for president of the Puno region in 2014, he explained: "we are in the process of putting together an Andean ideology […and] we blindly and honestly believe that Mother Earth is fundamental for our existence and we use that as our starting point, and spirituality as a fundamental element, to create positive energy and continue the struggle" (Hugo Llano, *Comité de Lucha de la Zona Sur*). Similarly, in Cusco, one of the leaders of the Autogobierno Ayllu political project explained:

> For us, the main bastion or practice is this theme of the three principles of the Tahuantinsuyo, which are Ama Sua, don't be a thief; Ama Quella, don't be greedy; and Ama Llulla, don't be a liar. Those were the underlying principles of the Tahuantinsuyo so this is what we are trying to rescue and revalue. We are an originary people then, if you can say that. We also maintain as our primary language of communitcation the quechua. Our meetings are done in Quechua, very rarely do we use Spanish. And we practice in our political action the theme of being in direct contact and slignment with the Pachamama. We make payments to mother earth and, in all of our daily practices and economic activity—that is, in all of our activities—our indigenous culture is involved.

This fusion of environmental claims and an indigenous ideology or, at least, political rhetoric, has been central to the political platforms of some of the most important regional movements in Puno and Cusco. In Puno, it manifested itself in the political platforms of the elected regional presidents of 2002, 2006, and 2010, all of which came from different regional movements yet nonetheless combined an ethnic discourse with some environmental demands (Vilca 2014a). Yet, by far, the most intense expression of this environmentalist indigenous political ideology to date in Puno was in the 2014 regional election. In this election, Walter Aduviri, an Aymara leader who led the *Aymarazo* uprising that paralyzed Puno in 2011 in rejection of a mining mega-project, advanced a radical anti-mining environmentalist campaign that was strongly ethnicized. Aduviri came in second place despite a massive media campaign and legal processes against him.

The second important dynamic to emerge from the concentration of environmental protests in indigenous communities is that these *comunidades campesinas*—and the organizational landscapes embedded in these local spaces—have become, once again, the organizational starting point for those political projects that have sought to articulate the indigenous bloc.[133] This has been particularly the case in those *comunidades*, *rondas*, peasant federations, and *frentes de defensa* that have been involved in social protests against the mining industry. In many of these instances, these network structures have served as springboards for social leaders to transition to political candidacies and, in some instances, attempt to form their own regional political movements with limited success.

[133] This is not to say that other social networks have not been important. Significant political projects have emerged from regional university networks, the organizational remnants of the liberation theology secular network, business and professional associations, as well as mining cooperatives, to name just a few. I focus here on *comunidades campesinas* because these provide the most consistent expression to the environmental-indigenous agenda. However, much of the argument about the structural foundations of these indigenous environmental political projects applies to the other types of networks that exist in Puno and Peru. They are, in general, networks with no viable channels for expansion beyond their structures of origin precisely because the organizational landscape in this region is so localized and remains fragmented beyond the provincial level.

This set of community-level organizations provides an interesting starting point for political projects seeking to articulate the indigenous bloc. *Comunidades campesinas*, *rondas campesinas,* and peasant federations are generally characterized by a stable organizational structure, defined by specific leadership selection processes and protocols, established meeting schedules, and appropriate channels for problem-solving, and collective action decisions. Moreover, these organizations also tend to be characterized by significant depth or community embeddedness (though this certainly varies). Their degree of embeddedness is most clearly reflected in the high levels of participation in community activities (Diez Hurtado 2007), the active involvement of the communities in decision-making processes, and the accountability mechanisms that become activated at moments of social protest. For instance, the communal assembly is the highest authority for making decisions about communal involvement in particular issues: "what is decided in an assembly gets done. It operates through consensus more than through obligation. Through consensus, we participate and participate, defend and defend, and it is based on the internal organization of each community" (Interview with Milton Cariapasa of the *Unión de Comunidades Aimaras* (UNCA)[134]). Much like in Bolivia, these community structures also provide the lowest level of the organizational pyramid of peasant federations, and all decisions have to be agreed upon and transmitted to and from that level (Interview with Tomás Quispe, FDCC). During the Aymarazo protest, for example, "all of the [Aymara] communities became mobilized in shifts; in shifts, one week a community from the lake, another week a community from the center, another week and so on and so forth. It was a very clear organizational structure" (Interview with Milton Cariapasa of the *Unión de Comunidades Aimaras* (UNCA)). This degree of compliance was also articulated—though through a negative lens—by Víctor Hugo Gutiérrez, a former member of the UNCA:

[134] Union of Aymara Communities

> If an agreement had been reached [with the mining company], that would've been excellent. But no agreement was reached and so what happened was that they forced the communities to participate through the *tenientes gobernadores* and the [community] presidents. If a community didn't go, they would invade them and loot them. Because of fear too, that's how they worked. It wasn't really based on the will of the people as in "I give everything"; it was under pressure. Basically, they leaders, pressuring the communities so that they get scared and feel forced to participate, and they did for about a month.

Thus, the embeddedness that characterizes these networks can serve as an important and useful building bloc for political parties seeking to articulate these communities, their demands, and identities.

Yet, that said, the embeddedness landscape nonetheless varies in important ways. In some communities, *tenientes* are the most important authorities, whereas, in others, it can be the *presidentes*, the *rondas campesinas*, or the peasant federation leaders (Interview with Victor Hugo Gutierrez, UNCA). In many contexts, these organizations tend to be seamlessly intertwined with each other. This can, on the one hand, allow for a dense organizational landscape at the community level, with various social networks within the community regularly coordinating and mobilizing together as they work towards specific shared goals. But, on the other, this can also complicate the process of inter-community coordination because of the disparate structures across communities. For instance, Hugo Llano explained that, when organizing social protests, "you have to figure out what the predominant organization structure is in that community. There are areas like, for example, Zepita-Kelluyo, where the president of the community is the main leader; but at other times, it can be the *mancomunidades*, so you have to go into the mancomunidad. And, in that way, each geographical space has its representation and we have to coordinate with each of those."

The most significant challenge of the community-based network structures, however, is that their presence is very localized and does not aggregate beyond the district or provincial levels in most instances. The organizational structures of *comunidades campesinas* do not go part the district level, which is below the departmental and provincial levels. The same goes for the *tenientes gobernadores* who, despite meeting on a weekly basis at the district level, have no mechanisms of

coordination beyond at the provincial level. The *rondas campesinas* and *frentes de defensa*, for their part, tend to aggregate only to the provincial level, bringing together community- and district-level leaders. While recent efforts have attempted to integrate *rondas* at the departmental and inter-departmental levels, these have thus far remained inconsistent and un-institutionalized.

There is one important exception to the otherwise generalized lack of upward connectivity that defines social network structures in Peru: the peasant federations, which are supposed to aggregate from the community to the district, provincial, departmental, and national levels (Interview with Tomás Quispe (FDCC) and Efraín Mamani (*Autogobierno Ayllu*)). However, these network structures are severely limited for a number of reasons. First, the strength of these federations does not lay in the departmental federations, but in the provincial ones, which makes the aggregation process more challenging than in neighboring Bolivia. Second, their linkages between the various levels—but, especially, at the community one—have become greatly eroded over the past three decades as a result of shifts in the economic model and, most importantly, significant repression and persecution from the state and insurgent movements during the conflict with the Shining Path. Third, there are already strong fractures in the peasant movement as a result of the existence of two rival peasant federations—with the *Confederación Campesina del Perú* (CCP)[135] and the *Confederación Nacional Agraria* (CAN)[136]—in each department. This old rivalry—which traces its roots to the Velasco Alvarado regime—has tended to undermine the legitimacy of these organizations as representatives of the indigenous peasantry and created much inter-network conflict. Further, it has divided the indigenous peasantry within each department in two. Thus, despite being the only path towards upward expansion currently active in the social

[135] Peasant Confederation of Peru
[136] National Agrarian Confederation

network landscape of the indigenous highlands of Peru, the peasant federations represent deeply flawed and ineffective vehicles for movement growth and expansion.

Finally, in addition to these fragmented community-level organizational structures, the Puno and Cusco regions have also had several inter-organizational alliances that have emerged to coordinate inter-regional fights against both formal and informal mining projects. Examples of this include the *Frente de Defensa de la Cuenca Ramis* in Cusco and the *Comité de Lucha de la Zona Sur* in Puno. Although these inter-organizational have tended to facilitate not only engagement by different social sectors, but also inter-connectivity within and across provinces and even departments, they have nonetheless been characterized by weak linkages of temporary duration. In general, these alliances have demonstrated a strong reliance in community structures and have had difficulties triggering collective action through independent authorities.

Political projects have generally used these types of community-based organizational structures as their starting point. Walter Aduviri's regional movement has the Aymara peasant communities as its roots. Despite his popularity and his significant electoral success, he currently lacks both the within-network path for expansion as well as the inter-organizational alliances that can enable him to grow outside of the Aymara region.

Parties such as PDR and *Autogobierno Ayllu*, for their part, have emerged from the peasant federations of Puno and Cusco, respectively. Because of these federations' interconnectivity across different organizational levels, these parties can establish a certain presence in their respective regions and become somewhat more stabilized. Paloma Bellatin (2014b, 2014a) has argued that the *Autogobierno Ayllu* might represent the single case of actual party building in the Cusco region. However, the weakness of the linkages that hold these peasant federations together, coupled with their much debilitated community presence and the legitimacy challenges that they face from the opposing peasant federation, make the growth of these political projects even into the department-

level, and their sustainability at the community level, highly unlikely. Opposition to the *Autogobierno Ayllu*, for instance, has emerged within the ranks of the Cusco peasants' federation (Interview with Tomás Quispe, FDCC). And the political project has also already encountered resistance from the rival peasant organization, the *Federación Agraria Revolucionaria Túpac Amaru de Cusco* (FARTAC).[137] On this latter point, one of the *Autogobierno Ayllu* leaders admitted: "our friends in FARTAC are always trying to bother us, annoy us, and discredit us" (interview with Efraín Mamani, *Autogobierno Ayllu*).

Beyond this, social movement leaders have sought, without much success, to build political projects and campaigns rooted in inter-organizational alliances. An example of this is the *Sentimiento y Unidad por el Mundo Andino* (SUMA)[138] project, which was a project involving indigenous leaders of the *Comité de Lucha de la Zona Sur* and the UNCA, an atomized network structure, that failed before it could get off the ground, not in small part because of the weak linkages that characterized it. One of its organizers explained to me his analysis of the party building failure: "the previous election has taught us. Each leader ended up going his own way, with another party. But in the moments we get together we say, 'you see! Why is this happening?' and we tell each other and we all agree [that] if we stuck together and had our own political instrument, we would go with clear proposals, and win" (Interview with Milton Cariapasa, UNCA). His frustration is telling, on the one hand, of the general desire to build stable and ideologically consistent political organizations and, on the other, the weakness of the linkages that are bringing these political projects together and also triggering their rapid collapse.

Thus, in the highland region, political projects have either emerged from social networks that lack embeddedness—as was the case for SUMA—or have embeddedness and perhaps even

[137] Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Agrarian Federation of Cusco
[138] Sentiment and Unity for the Andean World

inter-organizational foundations, but are very localized—as was the case with Aduviri in Puno and Oscar Mollehuanca in Cusco—or have a within-network path to growth to the regional level but this path is nonetheless fraught with weak linkages—as was the case for the *Autogobierno Ayllu* in Cusco and the PDR in Puno. Lacking a reliable within-network path to expansion, these political projects must necessarily turn to external alliances to expand. But they seek to do this in a landscape replete with competition from other similar political efforts arising from different—and similarly weak—social network structures. This is where personalism becomes a tool for success or, rather, a weapon for battle.

However, underlying many (or at least some) of these personalistic struggles are important debates about what it means to vindicate indigenous communities. Political projects like the PDR, for instance, remain grounded in a modernization agenda that aims to represent indigenous populations through agrarian projects, increased access to power, and the recognition of diversity and cultural values. It rests less on an indigenous ideology and more on a modified traditionally leftist agenda. Other political projects such as Mauricio Rodriguez' *Aymaras y Quechuas Unidos e Integrados* (AQUI)[139] and SUMA, go further and advance an indigenous ideology that blends environmental and cultural claims but is nonetheless moderate in its transformational goals. And yet others are significantly more radical either due to their firm opposition to mining projects and defense of indigenous populations' territorial claims—as is the case with Aduviri—or because of their embrace of old indigenous principles and ways of life as guiding principles for their agendas, as has been the case with the *Autogobierno Ayllu*. These all represent competing articulation efforts aimed at the same bloc of society. But their limited reach and their weak network structures significantly hinder their expression and consolidation.

[139] Aymaras y Quechuas United and Integrated

Given the absence of significant network structures and thus the impossibility of scaling up through societal networks, many of these nascent political parties have come to rely on political alliances with other regional movements and political parties inscribed at the national level to attempt expansion. Cariapasa describes his personal experience with these negotiations:

> They told me that I was a potential candidate for representing the Aymaras. So I said, perfect, no problem if its that way. But I gave them two conditions: first, that I will participate in that party as long as, and only if, the political platform incorporates the theme of the Constitutional Assembly and the political constitution. They didn't like that. Second, I asked that the government platform consider in the majority of areas the issue of interculturality [in its various expressions]. They didn't like these conditions so they basically kicked me out and basically said 'we can't do that, there are no conditions, you are here as a guest'. But, other leaders did fall for that no condition position. (Interview with Milton Cariapasa, UNCA)

These types of political alliances, however, represent the weakest forms of linkage. As political projects transition from within-network growth to expansion through inter-organizational to external alliances (whether within or outside of the political realm), the linkages become weaker and more contingent and accountability mechanisms erode. Party building becomes nearly impossible in such a context, not because of the lack of interest in party building or the generalized enthusiasm for party substitutes, but because of the structure of the organizational landscape and the linkage dynamics that it produces.

Peru's social network landscape—characterized by social structures with significant community embeddedness yet no pathways to national expansion—has hindered the articulation of the indigenous bloc and created the conditions for the emergence of a deeply fragmented and highly volatile political arena. Mariátegui's statement—"the Indians are missing national linkages"—remains, for Peru, as valid today as it was in the 1920s. Network linkages—their strength, absence, and weakness—have been central drivers of the political climate that has characterized Peru since party system collapse. These linkages help account for why, despite the existence of salient ethnic cleavage structures and localized efforts at indigenous articulation, party building remains an elusive goal.

II. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that social network structures condition the articulation of social cleavages in the party system. Focusing on party building efforts for the indigenous bloc in Bolivia and Peru, the chapter has demonstrated that political parties' foundational network structures in many ways constrain or enhance their capacity for growth. These structures embed parties in network landscapes with distinct pathways to regional and national expansion that are difficult to break away from or overcome. When the networks allow for internal expansion and inter-organizational alliances are stable, nascent political parties will rest on strong linkages and, more often than not, have the capacity to outdo the political projects that will inevitably emerge in challenge. Network structures and the linkages that they facilitate provide crucial constraints for articulation. And they help explain why indigenous articulation efforts have so frequently failed.

Ultimately, the MAS' was born within a broad and diverse social network landscape that connected it—whether formally or through close inter-organizational ties—with the most significant social organizations in Bolivian society. These structures provided crucial channels for the MAS to grow into the national arena and establish strong within-network ties to the various social sectors within the network along the way. ASP and MIP, by contrast, lacked similarly diverse network landscapes. Although their networks of origin provided highly desirable starting points, structurally, they proved inflexible and deeply constraining as these parties sought to expand into national actors and effectively articulate the indigenous bloc.

Peru presents a somewhat different network landscape, one that is deeply embedded but lacking in national interconnectivity. These structures have driven parties to rely on weak linkages that are weak, highly contingent, and, as such, conducive to political instability.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation began with the question: why, despite facing similar systemic shocks, has Bolivia successfully embarked on a new process of partial party system reconstruction while Peru has thus far failed in this endeavor? I have developed and assessed a theory that highlights the role of social cleavage articulation processes and social network structures in shaping party system reconstruction outcomes.

Social cleavages have long been recognized as important foundations for the formation of stable party system. With the works of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Bartolini and Mair (1990), cleavages were brought to the foreground and provided some of the primary explanations for understanding why stable party systems existed in Western European society and why they remained more fluid elsewhere (Dix 1989).

This framework provided the starting point for the analysis of party system reconstruction processes after the collapse of party systems across much of the Latin American region. From this perspective, Bolivia's relative success and Peru's remarkable failure at party system reconstruction since the collapse of their former party systems has been attributed to a variation in these countries' cleavage structures. The prevalent argument in the literature can be summarized roughly as follows: while both Bolivia and Peru were previously characterized by *relatively* salient class cleavages that provided the underlying structures for their former party systems, with the erosion of these cleavages, party systems collapsed; since then, the consolidation of a newly salient ethnic cleavage has enabled party system reconstruction in Bolivia, while, in Peru the absence of a similarly salient cleavage has hindered party system reconstruction efforts and driven the rise of a

political class largely reliant on individualistic and personalistic appeals (see, for example, Van Cott 2005; Faguet 2017; Rice 2012; Yashar 2005).

My dissertation has sought to challenge this dominant narrative—and its underlying mirror-image assumption—by advancing a framework for evaluating social cleavages independent of party system outcomes. The idea here is that because social cleavages represent the most important social fractures in society, the possibility exists that, if salient, they can result in heightened social conflict rather than party system stabilization. By problematizing the mirror-image assumption, my dissertation therefore turns the relationship between social cleavages and their expression in the party systems into an empirical question and shifts the focus away from issues of cleavage salience and towards the process of cleavage articulation.

The proposed theory of networked cleavage articulation aimed to understand how salient social cleavages become articulated in the party system and to decipher why this process is so prone to failure. The first part of the dissertation—Chapters 3 and 4—set out to understand what defines social cleavages in Bolivia and Peru.

Chapter 3 demonstrated that ethnic cleavages have been historically consequential in both societies, shaping citizens' access to the state, patterns of social conflict, and inequality structures across the countries' various historical phases. The chapter also considered the extent to which ethnicity has influenced patterns of political behavior since democratization and what the relationship has been between the ethnic and class cleavages throughout the various stages of party system stability, collapse, and reconstruction.

I find that, in both Bolivia and Peru, the relationship between salient ethnic cleavage structures and patterns of voter behavior has been remarkably consistent despite the enormous transformations that have occurred in the representational arena. That is, ethnic cleavages were reflected in patterns of voter behavior in both Bolivia and Peru during the three party system

phases examined in this study—stability, collapse, and reconstruction—and even as the political parties in these societies remained in constant flux. Further, the chapter also finds that, although the class cleavage seems to explain less variation in political behavior than the ethnic one, its salience did not diminish in significant ways with the collapse of these countries' former party systems. That finding points to the extent to which class cleavages in both Bolivia and Peru are inter-webbed with ethnic ones.

Chapter 4 then considered the programmatic and ideological content of ethnic cleavage-based identities. In this chapter, I paused to consider whether there is anything inherently different between ethnic cleavages and other types of social cleavages such as class. This represents the dominant view in the literature on ethnic politics, which generally expects ethnic cleavages to become associated with patronage-based (and often more unstable) party systems while it sees class cleavages (as well as other types of social cleavages) as providing the underlying foundations for programmatic party system formation. The logic here is twofold. First, scholars argue that ethnicity, in contrast to class or rural-urban fractures, for example, is not associated with differentiated economic and/or social positions that can inform programmatic differentiation. In the absence of such differences, ethnic competition revolves around access to power and control of resources: whichever group has control of the state is expected to benefit their own ethnic groups at the expense of others. Second, ethnic cleavages are also considered easier to mobilize because co-ethnicity serves as a sufficiently strong cue to signal ethnic favoritism. This makes it less necessary for politicians to develop programmatic platforms to mobilize support, an advantage that class-based parties do not enjoy (Chandra 2004, 2007; Gunther and Diamond 2003; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). These two dynamics have driven the literature to treat ethnic cleavages as an exception to the otherwise dominant relationship between social cleavages and programmatic party system formation.

In Chapter 4, however, I challenged these predominant positions of the literature on ethnic politics and argued that there is nothing inherently different about ethnicity that makes it conducive to patronage and antithetical to programmatic party system formation. Rather, at least in contexts where ethnicity has provided the underlying foundations for state formation and the development of economic and social relations, ethnic cleavages can be closely associated with differentiated programmatic and ideological preferences. Such historical experiences afford ethnic cleavages with their programmatic content and define the ways in which ethnic groups become socially, economically, and politically differentiated. Crucial to this argument is that there is nothing inherently polarizing about ethnicity *per se* and thus that the salience and content of ethnicity will vary across societies based on the place of ethnic cleavages in social relations and historical experiences.

Using this framework as a starting point, Chapter 4 examined the extent to which ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru are associated not just with voter behavior but also with differentiated programmatic preferences and can, in turn, provide the foundations for the reconstruction of programmatic party systems. The chapter employs survey data and considers the relationship between ethnic cleavages and programmatic preferences along six different dimensions: ideology, support for state intervention in strategic industries and the provision of services, nationalism, social values, and populist and democratic tendencies. I find that ethnicity is associated with differentiated preferences along most of these dimensions and that this difference holds despite the lack of stable top-down activation in Peru. These findings push against common understandings of ethnic cleavages and suggest that the challenges of party building in these societies do not stem either from the salience or the nature of their cleavage structures.

With the salience and programmatic content of ethnic cleavages established, the remainder of the dissertation turned to consider how the content of these salient ethnic cleavages becomes

articulated in the party system. Chapter 5 looked into the process of cleavage articulation and its consequences for party system stability outcomes. The chapter argued that cleavage articulation processes occur first and foremost at the level of cleavage blocs—which are the opposing sides within the social cleavage—and, as such, can produce three different articulation outcomes: *full articulation* (when both sides of the social cleavage become articulated), *partial articulation* (when there is an asymmetric articulation and only one of the cleavage blocs becomes articulated), and *failed articulation* (when both blocs within the social cleavage remain disarticulated). Each of these outcomes, I argued, is associated with divergent patterns of bloc electoral volatility. The chapter introduces a measure of cleavage articulation, applies it to the ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru, and then considers the implications of these articulation outcomes for party system stability. The analyses suggest that whereas Bolivia's current party systems represents an instance of partial cleavage articulation—with the indigenous bloc having achieved articulation while the non-indigenous one remains disarticulated—and is characterized by differentiated levels of bloc volatility across these two ethnic blocs, Peru's current political arena serves as an example of failed cleavage articulation, characterized by elevated levels of bloc electoral volatility. Thus, despite the salience of ethnic cleavages in both societies, only the indigenous bloc in Bolivia has become articulated in the party system; in contrast, Bolivia's non-indigenous bloc and both the indigenous and non-indigenous blocs in Peru remain disarticulated.

In the final empirical chapter, Chapter 6, I then turned to consider why articulation failures are so common. In line with recent research on party building, I argued that social organizations play a prominent role in the party-building process and that this is particularly the case in contexts of party system collapse where the political networks and elites have disappeared and politicians therefore have to turn to the extra-institutional arena to develop political parties. Yet, the dissertation also sought to go beyond current understandings of the importance of social

organizations for party building. Whereas existing scholarship has traditionally focused on the question of *whether* social networks matter for party building processes, my dissertation turns to ask *how*.

In Chapter 6, I developed and tested a framework that highlighted the importance of social network *structures* in enabling and constraining nascent political parties' capacity for expansion and articulation. This framework focuses on nascent parties' networks of origin and the social network landscapes within which these networks are embedded in. I focused on two structural dimensions—breadth and depth—that in many ways outline the challenges of expansion of nascent parties. Thus, whereas networks with significant depth have to focus on growing into the national arena and expanding their reach across regions, those with significant breadth but limited depth have to focus on strengthening along the latter dimension. The networks within which these original structures are embedded in, however, define nascent parties' paths to expansion. When network landscapes have diverse within-network paths to expansion that connect them to organizations (or organizational levels) with national and/or regional strength, nascent parties are able to grow through strong linkages. But, when the network landscape does not provide internal or within-network paths to growth, nascent parties must instead turn to external alliances to expand into the national arena. Such constraints matter: external alliances, especially when they are conjunctural rather than stable, tend to be more conditional and significantly less effective at transmitting the information, resources, and mobilization capacity that nascent parties need to produce strong articulation offers. These weak linkages make nascent parties more vulnerable to competition and ineffective articulators. Thus, the chapter argued, political parties that can overcome their structural challenges through within-network linkages are significantly more likely to stabilize than those nascent parties that must resort to external alliances for expansion into the national arena.

Chapter 6 evaluated this argument through a comparison, first, of indigenous party building efforts in Bolivia and second, through an analysis of the variation in social network landscapes between Bolivia and Peru. The chapter demonstrated that, of the three indigenous parties that were constructed in Bolivia to articulate the indigenous identity, the MAS-IPSP was the *least likely* to succeed in its party building efforts given the small size of its original bases of support and yet, the *most likely* to succeed in its articulation efforts due to the diverse network landscape within which it emerged. The other indigenous parties, ASP and MIP, were born from important social network structures yet the network landscapes within which they were embedded constrained their capacity for articulation and expansion. Ultimately, ASP and MIP failed. MAS-IPSP, on the other hand, succeeded in articulating the indigenous bloc and stabilizing the electoral arena.

Chapter 6 then turned to examine why the ethnic cleavage in Peru remains disarticulated and demonstrated that Peru's articulation failures stem from the social network structures within which political parties are emerging. Although Peru, like Bolivia, is characterized by a vast social network landscape that is providing the foundations for the emergence of indigenous parties, the network structures within which these parties are emerging tend to lack within-network access to the national level. As a result, most nascent parties have resorted to external and highly contingent alliances to expand beyond their networks of origin. Yet, the competition from similar political offers, and the weak commitment that comes from such contingent alliances, have significantly limited parties' articulation capacity and driven most of them to failure. Collectively, the findings of this chapter show that social organizations, even when associated with salient social cleavages, are not only insufficient for party building, but can actually enable or hinder cleavage articulation efforts. Structures matter because they define nascent parties' paths to expansion and, with that, these parties' capacity for articulation.

The remainder of this conclusion highlights the implications of this study for scholarship on social cleavages, political behavior, party politics, and ethnic politics. I will then consider the strengths and limitations of this framework, its generalizability, and future directions for research.

I. Social cleavages and political behavior

This research project makes several contributions to the social cleavages literature. First, my study shows that social cleavages operate independently from party systems. I introduce a new measure of social cleavage salience that enables the analysis of cleavages in isolation from party system dynamics and demonstrate that cleavages can provide remarkable stability to voter behavior even in contexts where party systems remains in disarray.

My analyses evidence that a similarly salient social cleavage, grounded in similar historical experiences can be similarly associated with stable patterns of political behavior and yet result in party system stabilization in one instance and increased party system instability in the other. This is an important, if not counterintuitive, insight. From a theoretical standpoint, the finding that social cleavages can be associated with variation in party system outcomes refreshes debates about the contemporary relevance of social cleavages, which scholars have deemed increasingly irrelevant for understanding party system outcomes (see, for example, Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Franklin 1992). It also allows us to overcome the mirror image assumption that underlies much of this research to reconsider the extent to which cleavages are eroding or, alternatively, becoming disarticulated in party systems. From an empirical standpoint, the contribution expands the relevance of cleavage analysis to societies with either unstable or unrepresentative party systems. This is of particular relevance for the region of Latin America, where social cleavage analysis has largely been deemed inadequate for understanding party system outcomes (Dix 1989), yet where most of the arguments that have reached this conclusion have relied on the mirror image

assumption to argue for cleavage weaknesses by looking at party system dynamics (see, for example, Torcal and Mainwaring 2003).

Second, and relatedly, this dissertation also contributes to the social cleavages literature by shifting the focus away from questions about cleavage salience and onto the process of cleavage articulation. The study introduces a framework for exploring cleavage articulation processes that reaches into the social cleavage to understand how each of the blocs within it are associated with distinct patterns of political behavior and independent experiences with articulation.

The measure introduced in this study incorporates the structural, identity, and programmatic content of social cleavages and evaluates the extent to which these are appealed to, given expression, and interwoven together in a coherent political platform and discourse. This approach aims to reflect the complexity of the social cleavage articulation process and, as such, can provide interesting insights into why articulation offers associated with similar social cleavages can vary in content, focus, and degrees of success over time. This is important because it highlights that there is no single way to articulate a cleavage-based identity. Political parties have significant leeway in engaging with the different structural, identity, and programmatic components of social cleavages and constructing articulation offers. The variation in articulation offers, however, does not necessarily signify a transformation *within* the cleavage. Rather, it reflects the challenges of articulation and helps shed light on why many articulation offers ultimately fail. This is something that existing literature tends to take for granted but that matters for how we examine representation dynamics.

Additionally, the articulation framework also speaks to the importance of examining social cleavages first and foremost at the level of their blocs. It is political parties (not party systems) that articulate cleavage-based identities and that either succeed or fail in becoming anchored in social cleavages. Thus, the process of articulation can occur asymmetrically for the various blocs within

the cleavage, with notable consequences for party system outcomes. This insight matters mainly because it provides a lens through which to understand uneven patterns of representation in the party system less as a consequence of particular tendencies amongst social groups (for instance, that they are inherently more populist), and more as the result of variation in articulation offers, successes, and failures at the party system level (Carreras, Morgenstern, and Su 2015).

Third, the dissertation contributes to ongoing debates about the drivers of *political behavior* and, specifically, the extent to which political organizations are primarily articulators or architects of social cleavages, political identities, and programmatic preferences in society. The findings challenge predominant top-down explanations that portray voters as malleable followers and political elites as all too informed and influential actors (Achen 1975; Converse 2006; de Leon, Desai, and Tugal 2015; Posner 2004; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). In contrast to what this literature expects, my work shows that social cleavages can structure voter behavior and programmatic preferences even in the absence of stable political representation and despite tremendous levels of electoral volatility. Further, I show that political elites, at least in contexts of party system reconstruction, lack the information and consensus necessary to influence political behavior in significant ways, and that the effective articulation of voter preferences and identities decreases levels of electoral volatility. These dynamics suggest that political parties have a more representative function than the top-down approaches to the study of social cleavages and political behavior tend to suggest.

My findings provide significant evidence in support of sociologically rooted approaches that emphasize the representative and articulatory function of political organizations particularly during the process of party system formation (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Although I demonstrate that this articulatory function is not always fulfilled, my findings point to the significance of articulation failures rather than volatility in voter behavior as the source of

significant instability in contexts of party system collapse. This argument is consistent with theories that point to de-alignments (Roberts 2014), the erosion of party brands (Lupu 2016), and other representation failures (Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012; Slater and Simmons 2013) as the sources of party system breakdown. However, it does not make a claim about representation patterns in contexts of stable party systems. In such contexts, the emergence of partisanship may well transform the process of preference formation and the degree of influence of political parties over these preferences.

II. Social Organizations and Party Politics

This research also contributes to the literature on party politics. In line with recent work (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016), my dissertation highlights the significance of social organizations for party building processes. Organizations constitute the lifeblood of political parties. They provide important resources, from mobilization channels and boots on the ground (Samuels 2006; Samuels and Zucco 2015a, 2015b) to financial resources (Madrid 2016), information, and a 'cadre' cushion for moments of crisis (Van Dyck 2016), to name just a few. Because of their critical functions in the party building process, social networks—whether they emerge from business sectors, social movements, interest groups, labor unions, or religious organizations—are thought to significantly aid in the process of party growth and consolidation (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Van Cott 2005; Holland 2016; Kalyvas 1996; Keck 1992; LeBas 2011; Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016; Loxton 2015, 2016; Samuels and Zucco 2015a).

Yet, my research looks to deepen these insights to consider how social networks matter. My dissertation bridges insights from the literature on social network structures and social movements (see, for example, Diani 1995; Diani and McAdam 2003) to shed light on the important ways in which social networks' capacity for facilitating the exchange of resources, support, and

mobilization can vary based on their structures and the organizational landscapes within which they are embedded. Not all social networks are made alike. My research focuses on the question of variation in structures and emphasizes the significant variation in party building outcomes that ensue. Whereas some social network structures can provide ideal sites for the emergence and expansion of nascent political parties, others may actively hinder the process of party building and contribute to increased levels of party system instability. My dissertation sheds light on why this occurs: because different network structures condition nascent political parties' capacity for expansion and cleavage articulation by regulating access to information, resources, mobilizational capacity, and new bases of support.

Beyond this, this study also presents an important challenge to leader-focused theories of party building success and suggests the need for re-embedding political figures in their social network landscapes. Although appeals certainly matter, my research suggests that, in many ways, political parties' capacity to build successful articulations is regulated by their social network foundations. Social networks inform agendas, generate incentives for adapting platforms to be more inclusive, and provide politicians with bases of support that allow for such appeals to resonate. Disconnecting political elites from their organizational foundations obscures important mechanisms that condition political success. By contrast, re-embedding politicians in their context can perhaps elucidate the underlying logic behind political parties' strategic 'choices': reliance on mass media access, construction of party substitutes, adoption of personalistic appeals can all be at least partially explained by the types of linkages that nascent political parties have at their disposal and, in many instances, these political projects' lack of paths for within-network expansion into the national arena (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016).

III. Ethnic politics and Programmatic party systems

Finally, my dissertation also challenges a central assumption of much work on ethnic politics in developing societies. In contrast to this literature's expectations (see, e.g., Chandra 2004, 2007; Gunther and Diamond 2003; Kitschelt 2000), my study finds that ethnic cleavages are not necessarily antithetical to programmatic agendas nor are they inevitably conducive to clientelistic linkages. Instead, at least in contexts in which ethnic cleavages have provided the historical foundations for state development—and continue to structure state-society relations—they can be associated not just with differentiated patterns of voting behavior but also with ideological and programmatic preferences. This finding goes against much of the research on ethnic politics, particularly in Africa and India (though it is more compatible with the work on race politics in the United States), and pushes against the suggestion that there is something about ethnicity *per se* that makes it incompatible with programmatic party systems. Ultimately, my results suggest that ethnic cleavages are not entirely unlike other social cleavages; much like class cleavages, ethnic cleavages can structure voter behavior and become associated with differentiated ideological and programmatic preferences.

Beyond this, my work also raises questions about the capacity of large-N studies that remain dis-embedded from historical context to serve as a starting point for the study of ethnic politics. I find that the content of ethnic cleavages varies even across very similar societies. This suggests the need to zoom into cases and incorporate historical experiences and state-society relations to most effectively capture the ideological and programmatic content of ethnic identities and their evolution over time.

IV. Generalizing Beyond Bolivia and Peru

The findings of this study can be generalized at various levels. First, although my work focuses on ethnic cleavages in the context of Bolivia and Peru, many of the insights can be applied to all social cleavages, class-based, region-based, or ethnic-based, weak or strong, in varying contexts. One of the main strengths of this project is that it challenges the existing barriers between ethnic cleavages and other types of social cleavages and demonstrates that these can behave in similar ways, shaping patterns of political behavior regardless of representation dynamics. The measure of social cleavage salience introduced in this dissertation reflects this view. It was developed with the idea that it can be employed to analyze cleavage dynamics across most democratic contexts and cleavage types, and enable the field of cleavage studies to reach well beyond its traditional geographical strongholds. Thus, while a natural next "frontier" for this research project lies in the cases of Ecuador or Guatemala—similarly defined by salient ethnic cleavages—the cleavage framework can also be employed to discern patterns of political behavior particularly in societies that are structured along sociological lines.

That said, the theoretical focus of this dissertation—that social network structures condition cleavage articulation and party system reconstruction efforts—is more limited in terms of its generalizability. This framework has two central scope conditions: it applies to contexts that are characterized by both party system collapse and salient social cleavages. I do not claim that salient social cleavages exist and are consistently shaping political behavior everywhere. On the contrary, my dissertation posits that this is an empirical question worth exploring and introduces a tool to evaluate this with care. Nor is my argument that the association between salient social cleavages, social networks, and party system stability dynamics holds in contexts where party systems already have shape. My intuition is that different mechanisms come into play once party systems take form, partisans emerge, and party brands come into focus. In such contexts, social networks are also

likely to lose their prominence as political parties define their social foundations and solidify their own linkages.

Instead, then, what my dissertation looks to elucidate is the process through which salient social cleavages become articulated into stable party systems. I suspect that by separating cleavages from their political expression and sharpening our strategy for measuring articulation, we will be able to identify more instances of salient social cleavages without representation. This should also help increase the precision of this framework's generalizability. But, as a starting point, I believe that this framework can provide a useful lens through which to consider the recent political experiences in countries such as Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela, where party systems have recently collapsed and political dynamics, to varying degrees, point to the existence of varying social cleavages.

V. Future Research Directions

Looking towards the future, there are multiple paths not only for strengthening this research agenda further but also expanding its insights into new terrains. On the former, one of the most important extensions of this dissertation concerns a more in-depth analysis of the variation in articulation efforts in the case of Peru and the application of the networked articulation framework to the experiences of non-indigenous cleavage blocs in the two countries. Demonstrating that social networks and articulation dynamics apply in similar ways to opposing blocs within a social cleavage—and that numerous instances of party building can be explored through a networked articulation lens—can help strengthen the validity of this framework and reveal crucial insights regarding the interplay between cleavage blocs.

I also see as an important next step the evaluation of this framework outside of the Bolivian and Peruvian contexts focusing both on Latin American cases as well as comparing across regions.

Such extensions should allow me to gather new data to better understand the generalizability as well as the limits of the proposed framework. They should also enable me to better discern the ways in which social network structures and landscapes vary and condition articulation efforts across varying social cleavages and political contexts.

Looking towards long-term extensions of this research agenda, my dissertation introduces a number of important questions that merit further exploration regarding both social networks and collective identities. On the former, some of the questions that arise are the following: where do social network structures come from? To what extent are social network structures malleable? Is social mobilization or social conflict necessary for the configuration of network landscapes that are conducive to successful party building or can networks take shape and formulate strong linkages in the absence of conflict? How and why do network structures change? And why do some remain outside of the party building process? These questions provide useful entry points to deepen our understanding of the place of social network structures in the party system reconstruction process. They also offer new spaces for bridging literature on social movements and party politics.

My work provides some basic insights into some of these issues. For instance, the findings suggest that well-established organizational structures provide much stronger foundations for party building efforts than social movements built on weaker and more conjunctural ties. Future work could shed greater light, for instance, on the sources of shifts in the strength of social network structures and the consequences of these shifts for political outcomes. Relatedly, although this project focuses on instances of party system reconstruction in the context of party system collapse, it nonetheless raises questions about what happens when political parties become consolidated. The case of the MAS in Bolivia suggests that, at least those within-networks structures within which political parties originate can be swallowed into the party with its political success. What remains

unclear, however, is how inevitable such an outcome is and what the implications of this are for the social network structures themselves going forward.

Beyond the more obvious extension to the social networks component of my research agenda, I also see potential extensions of this project in the realm of race and ethnic politics. In general, the political science literature has not been exempt from normative biases against ethnic politics and identities. This, I believe, has driven the literature to insist, first, on the increasing irrelevance of ethnic identities for modern politics and, second, on the inadequateness of ethnic cleavages as productive foundations for democratic politics.

My research suggests the need to take ethnicity and race seriously in Latin American politics and to push against existing biases that have significantly hindered how we analyze collective identities and ethnic politics in the region. Recognizing that ethnic identities are historically-grounded but constantly evolving, that they do not reflect a 'modernization problem' (and that cultural convergence is not an inevitable outcome of modernity), and that they are not incompatible with 'modern' programmatic politics can open the doors for a more nuanced examination of the role of ethnicity and race in democratic behavior and representation outcomes. For instance, considering how ethnic identities are expressed beyond political discourse, 'cheap' ethnic symbolism, and co-ethnicity can shed light on the subtle cues that voters rely on to determine cultural and ideological proximity to political parties. Similarly, systematically examining both the implicit and explicit expression of discriminatory and linked-fate attitudes and behavior—and the varying degrees of affinity between individuals and groups—can produce much needed insights into the multi-dimensional nature of collective identities and their various manifestations in political behavior.

In the case of Latin America, a more nuanced approach to the study of race and ethnic politics would also allow us to push beyond excessively rough—and widely used—identity

measures such as self-identification and language spoken, and decrease our reliance on simplistic frameworks for evaluating the content of ethnic and racial political appeals. Significant advances have been made towards this end in the study of racial identities in Brazil, for instance, but have yet to become a standard in the field or to influence the ways in which we study regional politics in meaningful ways.

Although this dissertation does not provide solutions towards this end, it nonetheless highlights the potential of more nuanced approaches. By shedding light on the historical roots and evolving nature of ethnic cleavages, their expression in political behavior, their multi-dimensional content, and the challenges of their articulation, the project reveals the robustness and complexity of ethnic identities in Bolivian and Peruvian societies. As such, it can provide a starting point for a more nuanced examination of identity politics in the region going forward.

Going beyond the Latin America region, a more nuanced approach towards the ethnic politics also has implications for the study of ethnic identities and politics particularly in African and South Asian politics. Thus, by challenging core assumptions in the literature, I hope to freshen discussion not only about the programmatic or ideological content of ethnic identities and their expression in patterns of political behavior, but also about how we perceive diversity when studying democracy, what expressions of identity look like, and what our strategies are for measuring identities from a comparative perspective. Future research should continue sharpening our understandings of the role of ethnicity in democratic politics both theoretically and empirically.

APPENDIX A

QUALITATIVE DATA AND RESEARCH MATERIALS

I. List of Personal Interviews

1. Abugattás Majluf, Daniel. Partido Nacionalista - Gana Perú. Lima. 1 June 2016.
2. Acuña Peralta, Virgilio. Solidaridad Nacional. Lima. 28 April 2016.
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II. Interviews with Network Leaders[140]

First of all, I would like to you thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. I am interested in learning about your [social movement, business group, civic committee, community organization]'s purpose, structure, and composition. Your responses will be used to inform a research project on social networks in Bolivia and Peru in the last two decades. Feel free to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer or to request anonymity for any given response. The interview should last 45 minutes to an hour.

Basic features:

1. Why was this organization developed?
2. What are its current goals and objectives?
3. What policies has it defended in the past?
4. What policies does it defend or fight against nowadays?
5. What types of activities does the organization engage in to advocate for or challenge these policies?
6. Who does this organization seek to represent?

Patterns of interaction:

7. Where in the country is this organization active?
8. How many members does it have?
9. Where is it strongest in the country? And weakest?
10. Can you describe to me the organizational structure?
11. How often do the bottom tiers meet? And the middle tiers? And the upper tiers?
12. Who comes to these meetings? How many are usually present?
13. What happens in these meetings?
14. Are there established procedures for decision-making within the organization?
15. How are these decisions communicated to members? [Bottom-up or top-down; how is a message passed between tiers?]

Internal structures:

16. What is your current position in the organization? How long have you had this position? How did you reach it?
17. How are the leaders of the organization selected?
18. Does power rotate in the organization? If so, how?
19. How often do you interact with [network leaders in the different regions]?
20. What are these interactions like?
21. Do you collaborate in activities?
22. Can you give me an example of an instance in which you have collaborated?
23. How active are you at the community level? In what ways are you active?

[140] **Goals:** Understand networks' objectives and purpose, membership numbers, policy preferences, networks' regional presence, types of activities they engage in, patterns of interactions between nodes, regional and national network linkages, connections (if any) to political actors.

Interactions with other organizations:

24. Are there other organizations out there with similar agendas to yours? Which?
25. Where are these organizations most active?
26. Do you collaborate with these organizations? Or do you see them as rivals? Why?
    a. If collaboration, why are you separate organizations? What prevents you from formally joining forces?
    b. If rivals, where are your biggest disagreements with this organization?
27. How often do you meet with the leaders of these organizations?
28. Have you participated in activities with these other organizations in the past? Give examples.

Political affiliations:

29. Do politicians ever reach out to this organization asking for support? [How often? Why? How does it work?]
30. Did your organization formally support a political candidate in the last presidential elections? Is it supporting one in the coming elections? Has it supported politicians in the past? Who?
    a. If yes, in what capacity has the organization supported these campaigns?
    b. If no, has there been an unofficial support for politicians by the majority of the organizations' members? Who? Why?
31. Do your regional offices establish official or unofficial support for regional candidates? If so, can you give me a few examples?
32. Has this organization ever considered building a political party? Explain.
33. Do you think establishing a link with a politician helps the organization reach its goals? Why?
34. Have politicians ever reached out to this organization to participate in their campaigning efforts? What has this been like? Has it worked?

**Obtain the following documents: recent organizational resolutions, organization's regional offices, participation in meetings, minutes*

III. Semi-Structured Interviews with Politicians

First of all, I would like to you thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. I am interested in learning about your political background and hearing about your experiences campaigning for a political post in [Bolivia/Peru]. Your responses will be used to inform a research project on party building dynamics in Bolivia and Peru since the collapse of these countries' party systems. Feel free to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer or to request anonymity for any given response. The interview should last 45 minutes to an hour.

Background:

1. How many years have you been involved in politics?
2. Can you tell me about your political trajectory?
3. Which parties, if any, have you been affiliated with over time?

Political Campaign:

1. How and why did you decide to run for president?
2. What were the main points of your platform during your campaign?
3. Whose interests were you hoping to represent? How? Why?
4. How did you go about developing your campaign strategy? [Where did you campaign? How did you campaign?]
5. Who were you hoping to mobilize?
6. Were you able to mobilize your target population? Why yes/no?
7. What were the biggest challenges you encountered in the implementation of your campaign?
8. If you were to do this all over again, how would you do it differently?

Party Building:

1. Did you affiliate yourself with an existing political party for that election or did you build your own political instrument? Please explain this decision.

For those who built their own political instrument:

1. How did you go about constructing the political foundation for your campaign? [Who did you contact? Who did you mobilize? How?]
2. Where did you establish party offices?
3. Did you establish any affiliations with other political groups?
4. Who did you seek support from to help you run your campaign?
5. How did you go about making yourself and your political agenda known?
6. Were there any benefits to running as an independent/with a new political instrument? Which?
7. How did you fund your campaign?
8. What happened to the political instrument after the elections?

Political Values:

1. In your opinion, are there important differences between the traditional political parties and the new political actors participating in elections? What are these, if any?

2. In your opinion, has democracy improved in [Bolivia/Peru] since the collapse of the traditional parties? Why yes/no?
3. In your opinion, what makes a good politician? And a good political party?
4. In your opinion, what are the most important elements of a democracy?
5. How should a political agenda be developed and decided on?
6. How does a politician remain connected and in communication with his supporters?

Network Alliances:

1. Are you affiliated with any social movements? Civic committees? Business networks? Community organizations? Describe your relationship to these.
2. How often do you interact with these networks? In what capacity?
3. Did you use these affiliations during your campaigning period? How?
4. Were they helpful? Why?
5. In your experience, did these network affiliations present any limits to the success of your election? Which? How did you seek to overcome these?

Accountability Mechanisms:

1. How did you communicate with the population that you intended to represent?
2. How did you make sure that your political agenda was in line with the interests of these groups?
3. Did you ever put your agenda for evaluation amongst different communities? Why yes/no? How often did you do this? Where? What were the results?
4. Did you ever have to retract/adjust any policy proposals because of the pressure you experienced from within your group of supporters? What about from opposition members?
5. In your opinion, is reversing a position a sign of a politician's weakness or of his/her responsiveness?

IV. Survey Tool for Political Elites in Peru

I am asking you to participate in a survey of political elites and party building efforts in Peru. I will give you information about the study and answer any of your questions. This research aims to shed light on variation in party building processes in the Andean region. I will ask you to answer several questions about your political experience and knowledge. The survey should last between 25 and 35 minutes.

Risks and discomforts
I do not anticipate any risks from participating in this research.

Benefits
There are no direct benefits from participating in this project. However, this research will serve to increase understanding of party building dynamics in Peru.

Privacy/Confidentiality
If there is information or opinions that you would like to say off the record, please let me know. This information will not be quoted nor will it be linked to the source. The opinions given in this survey will not be shared with other respondents.

Taking part is voluntary
Participation in this survey is voluntary and you should feel free to skip questions that you do not feel prepared to answer. There is no penalty for choosing to end the interview early.

If you have questions
The main researcher conducting this study is Mariana Giusti-Rodriguez, a graduate student at Cornell University. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Mariana at marianagiustir@gmail.com. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Human Participants at 607-255-5138 or access their website at http://www.irb.cornell.edu. You may also report your concerns or complaints anonymously through Ethicspoint online at www.hotline.cornell.edu or by calling toll free at 1-866-293-3077. Ethicspoint is an independent organization that serves as a liaison between the University and the person bringing the complaint so that anonymity can be ensured.

Political Elites – Perú 2015

Q1. ¿With what party did you enter Congress?

- ❍ Fuerza 2011 (1)
- ❍ Gana Perú (2)
- ❍ Perú Posible (3)
- ❍ Partido Aprista Peruano (4)
- ❍ Partido Humanista Peruano (5)
- ❍ Partido Popular Cristiano (6)
- ❍ Restauración Nacional (7)
- ❍ Siempre Unidos (8)
- ❍ Solidaridad Nacional (9)
- ❍ Todos por el Perú (10)
- ❍ Unión por el Perú (11)
- ❍ Acción Popular (12)
- ❍ Partido Democrático Somos Perú (13)
- ❍ Alianza para el Progreso (14)
- ❍ Perú Patria Segura (anteriormente Cambio 90) (15)

Q2. What coalition bench did you join when you entered Congress?

- ❍ Nacionalista-Gana Perú (1)
- ❍ Fuerza Popular (2)
- ❍ Concertación Parlamentaria (3)
- ❍ Partido Popular Cristiano - Alianza Para el Progreso (4)
- ❍ Solidaridad Nacional (5)
- ❍ Alianza Parlamentaria (6)
- ❍ Otra (7)

Q3. And now, what coalition bench do you belong to?

- ❍ Nacionalista-Gana Perú (1)
- ❍ Fuerza Popular (2)
- ❍ Concertación Parlamentaria (3)
- ❍ Partido Popular Cristiano - Alianza Para el Progreso (4)
- ❍ Solidaridad Nacional (5)
- ❍ Perú Posible (6)
- ❍ Acción Popular - Frente Amplio (7)
- ❍ Dignidad y Democracia (8)
- ❍ Ninguna (9)

Q4. In what year did you join [party selected in Q1]?

Q5. And now, do you consider yourself a member of [**party selected in Q1**]?

- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Q6. Have you been a candidate for other political parties, regional movements, or local organizations in previous electoral cycles?

- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Q6. [***If Q6=1***] Please, provide a list of the political parties, regional movements, or local organizations for which you have been a candidate over the past 15 years and provide approximate dates for the elections in which you participated with each political organization.

Q7. And now, thinking of how political parties function in Peru, how would you classify the current level of militancy, that is, the current number of active members, in political parties in Peru?

- ❍ Very high (1)
- ❍ High (2)
- ❍ Medium (3)
- ❍ Low (4)
- ❍ Very low (5)

Q8. And, more concretely, how would you classify the level of militancy of [***party selected in Q1]?***

- ❍ Very high (1)
- ❍ High (2)
- ❍ Medium (3)
- ❍ Low (4)
- ❍ Very low (5)

Q9. Some people argue that democracies cannot function without political parties. How much do you agree with this statement?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q10. And thinking specifically about Peru, do you think political parties here actually (1) strengthen democracy, (2) neither strengthen or weaken democracy, or (3) weaken democracy?

- ❍ Strengthen democracy (1)
- ❍ Neither strengthen nor weaken democracy (2)
- ❍ Weaken democracy (3)

Q11. Hypothetically, if you were to design the ideal political party, which ***three*** characteristics from the following list would you prioritize?

- ❍ Public financing of political campaigns (1)
- ❍ A very coherent political ideology (2)
- ❍ Very coherent political proposals (3)
- ❍ A united executive party committee (4)
- ❍ Consolidated communication structures with the bases (5)
- ❍ Access to media (6)
- ❍ Greater private financing (7)
- ❍ Closer ties with other political parties or movements that defend similar ideas (8)
- ❍ Party structure with national reach (9)
- ❍ A very charismatic party leader (10)
- ❍ High levels of involvement by social organizations (11)

Q11a. **[If Q11 = 2]:** On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents no ideological coherence and 5 represents total ideological coherence, currently, how would you classify the level of ideological coherence of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q11b. **[If Q11 = 3]:** On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents no political proposal coherence and 5 represents high political proposal coherence, currently, how would you classify the level of coherence of political proposals of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q11c. **[If Q11 = 4]:** On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents total fragmentation of the executive party committee and 5 represents total unity of the executive party committee, currently, how would you classify the level of unity of the executive party committee of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q11d. **[If Q11 = 5]**: Thinking about the mechanisms of communication with the bases, in a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents inexistent communication mechanisms and 5 represents consolidated communication mechanisms, currently, how would you classify the level of consolidation of the communication mechanisms between [***party selected in Q1***] and its social bases?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q11e. **[If Q11 = 6]:** On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents no media access and 5 represents extensive media access, currently, how would you classify the level of media access of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q11f. **[If Q11 = 7]:** In the last general election, what percentage of the budget established as a target by **[*party selected in Q1*]** for the presidential campaign was the party able to reach?

- ❍ Less than 40% (1)
- ❍ 41% to 60% (2)
- ❍ 61% to 80% (3)
- ❍ 81% to 100% (4)
- ❍ 101% to 110% (5)
- ❍ More than 110% (6)
- ❍ I'm not familiar with the party's budget

Q11g. **[If Q11 = 7]:** And what about you, what percentage of the budget that you established as a target for your Congressional campaign were you able to reach?

- ❍ Less than 40% (1)
- ❍ 41% to 60% (2)
- ❍ 61% to 80% (3)
- ❍ 81% to 100% (4)
- ❍ 101% to 110% (5)
- ❍ More than 110% (6)

Q11h. **[If Q11 = 8]**: On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents very weak ties with other political parties or movements that defend similar ideas and 5 represents very strong ties with other political parties or movements that defend similar ideas, currently, how would you classify the strength of ties with other political parties or movements that defend similar ideas of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q11i. **[If Q11 = 9]:** On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents a party structure with limited regional reach and 5 represents a party structure with great national reach, currently, how would you classify the level of geographic reach of the party structure of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q11j. **[If Q11 = 10]:** On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents a highly uncharismatic party leader and 5 represents a highly charismatic party leader, currently, how would you classify the level of charisma of the party leader of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q11k. **[If Q11 = 11]:** On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents a very low level of involvement by social organizations and 5 represents a very high level of involvement by social organizations, currently, how would you classify the level of involvement of social organizations in [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q12. In Peruvian politics, it is fairly common for political representatives to defect and join the ranks of other political organizations from one electoral cycle to the next. In your opinion, what are the two main factors that explain this practice?

1.
2.

Q13. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents a political organization that gets activated only during electoral periods and 5 represents a political organization that remains highly active through non-electoral periods, currently, how would you classify the organization of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q14. In which Peruvian department does [***party selected in Q1***] have the most consolidated organizational structure?

- ❍ Amazonas (1)
- ❍ Ancash (2)
- ❍ Apurímac (3)
- ❍ Arequipa (4)
- ❍ Ayacucho (5)
- ❍ Cajamarca (6)
- ❍ Cusco (7)
- ❍ Huancavelica (8)
- ❍ Huánuco (9)
- ❍ Ica (10)
- ❍ Junín (11)
- ❍ La Libertad (12)
- ❍ Lambayeque (13)
- ❍ Lima (14)
- ❍ Loreto (15)
- ❍ Madre de Dios (16)
- ❍ Moquegua (17)
- ❍ Pasco (18)
- ❍ Piura (19)
- ❍ Provincia Constitucional del Callao (20)
- ❍ Puno (21)
- ❍ San Martín (22)
- ❍ Tacna (23)
- ❍ Tumbes (24)
- ❍ Ucayali (25)

Q15. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means an inexistent organizational structure and 5 means a totally consolidated organizational structure, currently, how would you classify the level of consolidation of the organizational structure of [***party selected in Q1***] in [***department selected in Q14***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q16. And, in which Peruvian department(s) does [***party selected in Q1***] have the least consolidated organizational structures?

- Amazonas (1)
- Ancash (2)
- Apurímac (3)
- Arequipa (4)
- Ayacucho (5)
- Cajamarca (6)
- Cusco (7)
- Huancavelica (8)
- Huánuco (9)
- Ica (10)
- Junín (11)
- La Libertad (12)
- Lambayeque (13)
- Lima (14)
- Loreto (15)
- Madre de Dios (16)
- Moquegua (17)
- Pasco (18)
- Piura (19)
- Provincia Constitucional del Callao (20)
- Puno (21)
- San Martín (22)
- Tacna (23)
- Tumbes (24)
- Ucayali (25)

Q17. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means an inexistent organizational structure and 5 means a totally consolidated organizational structure, currently, how would you classify the level of consolidation of the organizational structure of [***party selected in Q1***] in these weaker departments?

- 1 (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)

Q18. Using this same scale, how would you classify the level of consolidation of the party structure of [***party selected in Q1***] in the following regions?:

	1 (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 (5)
Región Amazonía (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Región Norte (2)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Región Sur (3)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Región Centro (4)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Ciudad Lima (5)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Lima Provincias (6)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Q19. From your perspective, what are the three most important factors that enable the development of a stable and strong organizational presence in a department and that, in their absence, limit the possibility of consolidating a party structure?

- ❍ Financial resources (1)
- ❍ Contact with social organizations in the region (2)
- ❍ Access to regional media (3)
- ❍ Access to national media (4)
- ❍ Important regional leaders (5)
- ❍ Regional political operators (6)
- ❍ Contact with national social organizations (7)
- ❍ Political proposals that respond to the regional reality (8)
- ❍ Committed militants in the region (9)
- ❍ A relationship with business sectors in the regions (10)
- ❍ A relationship with regional universities (11)
- ❍ A relationship with non-governmental organizations in the region (12)

Q20. And thinking about efforts to consolidate party structures for the long term, what level of interest—very high, high, medium, low, or very low—do you consider that the political class of Peru has in consolidating structures for their political parties?

- ❍ Very high (1)
- ❍ High (2)
- ❍ Medium (3)
- ❍ Low (4)
- ❍ Very low (5)

Q21. From your perspective, how well do you consider that the current political system represents the interests of the Peruvian population in general?

- ❍ Very well (1)
- ❍ Well (2)
- ❍ Regular (3)
- ❍ Bad (4)
- ❍ Very bad (5)

Q22. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means no ties and 5 means very strong ties, how would you classify the relationship between your party and the following groups and organizations?

	1 (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 (5)
Banker associations (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Business leaders from the agro-industry (2)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Mining companies (3)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Business leaders from the industry sector (4)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Union federations (5)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Miner unions (6)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Teacher unions (7)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Peasant organizations (8)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Student movements (9)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Neighborhood associations (10)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Catholic Church (11)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Evangelical Church (12)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Academic circles (13)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Indigenous organizations (14)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Women movements (15)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Gay rights movements (16)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Small and medium business-owner associations (17)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Q23. What is the most common method of communication used by [***party selected in Q1***] to communicate the different aspects of its political agenda to the population?

- ❍ Community meetings (1)
- ❍ Television media (2)
- ❍ Radio media (3)
- ❍ Newspapers and magazines (4)
- ❍ Social media (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram) (5)
- ❍ Meetings with leaders of social organizations and associations (6)

Q24. And second?

- ❍ Community meetings (1)
- ❍ Television (2)
- ❍ Radio (3)
- ❍ Newspapers and magazines (4)
- ❍ Online social networks (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram) (5)
- ❍ Meetings with leaders of social organizations and associations (6)

Q25. And thinking about your purpose as a representative in Congress, with which of the following phrases do you agree with most? In Congress, your main purpose is to represent:

- ❍ The programmatic platform of the party with which I was elected to Congress (1)
- ❍ The interests of voters from your department (2)
- ❍ The interests of your job sector in Peru (3)
- ❍ The interests of women in Peru (4)
- ❍ The interests of rural sectors in Peru (5)
- ❍ The interests of investors in Peru (6)
- ❍ The interests of Peruvians in general (7)
- ❍ The interests of small business owners in Peru (8)

Q26. What is the main mechanism you use to obtain information about [***Q25 selection]?***

- ❍ Social media (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, etc.) (1)
- ❍ TV, radio, or written press (2)
- ❍ Meetings with leaders from these sectors (3)
- ❍ Conversations with citizens (4)
- ❍ Survey analysis (5)
- ❍ Academic studies (6)
- ❍ Other. Please specify: (7) _____

EXPERIMENT 1 (LIST) – Consists of examining the true rate of gift giving to voters amongst politicians through a method that generally increases response rates to sensitive questions and improves the accuracy of responses.

Q27. How many of the activities in the following list did you engage in during your campaign? Only give the total number.

GROUP A	**GROUP B**
1 - House to house visits 2 - Phone calls to constituents 3 - Opinion surveys 4 - Meetings with business leaders 5 - Meetings with social organization leaders 6 - Meetings with non-governmental organizations 7 - Town hall meetings 8 - Fundraising events 9 – Pay the party leadership to be included in the Congressional list	1 - House to house visits 2 - Phone calls to constituents 3 - Opinion surveys 4 - Meetings with business leaders 5 - Meetings with social organization leaders 6 - Meetings with non-governmental organizations 7 - Town hall meetings 8 - Fundraising events

I will now present you with various opinions gathered through surveys and interviews. For each of the following, please tell me whether you would be willing to support the suggested policy or not:

EXPERIMENT 2 – This experiment tests the hold of politicians' ideology when faced with new information about voter preferences. This experiment includes three scenarios, each with a high, low, and neutral value version. Each politician will be randomly assigned to three scenarios, each one with a different value (high, low, and neutral).

EXPERIMENT 2. TREATMENT SET 1 (Low, Neutral, High)

Q28a. Approximately 18 percent of Peruvians favor greater direct involvement by the Peruvian state in the exploitation of mining resources. The remaining 82 percent either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that increases the direct involvement of the Peruvian government in the exploitation of mining resources in the country?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q29a. A proposal for a new government program is under development. This program would give state subsidies to private businesses so that these can offer training to less prepared workers. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that offers state subsidies to private

businesses so that these can train their workers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q30a. Approximately 73 percent of Peruvians think that free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers should be re-negotiated to reduce the impact on these sectors of the population. The remaining 27 percent of Peruvians either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that favors the renegotiation of those free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

EXPERIMENT 2. TREATMENT SET 2 (High, Neutral, Low)

Q28b. Approximately 82 percent of Peruvians favor greater direct involvement by the Peruvian state in the exploitation of mining resources. The remaining 18 percent either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that increases the direct involvement of the Peruvian government in the exploitation of mining resources in the country?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q29b. In has been suggested that there should be a government program that gives state subsidies to private businesses so that these can offer training to less prepared workers. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that offers state subsidies to private businesses so that these can train their workers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q30b. Approximately 27 percent of Peruvians think that free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers should be re-negotiated to reduce the impact on these sectors of the population. The remaining 73 percent of Peruvians either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that favors the renegotiation of those free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

EXPERIMENT 2. TREATMENT SET 3 (Neutral, High, Low)

Q28c. It has been suggested that there should be greater direct involvement by the Peruvian state in the exploitation of mining resources. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that increases the direct involvement of the Peruvian government in the exploitation of mining resources in the country?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q29c. Approximately 76 percent of Peruvians favor a government program that gives state subsidies to private businesses so that these can offer training to less prepared workers. The remaining 24 percent either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that offers state subsidies to private businesses so that these can train their workers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q30c. Approximately 27 percent of Peruvians think that free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers should be re-negotiated to reduce the impact on these sectors of the population. The remaining 73 percent of Peruvians either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that favors the renegotiation of those free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

EXPERIMENT 2. TREATMENT SET 4 (High, Low, Neutral)

Q28d. Approximately 82 percent of Peruvians favor greater direct involvement by the Peruvian state in the exploitation of mining resources. The remaining 18 percent either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that increases the direct involvement of the Peruvian government in the exploitation of mining resources in the country?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q29d. Approximately 24 percent of Peruvians favor a government program that gives state

subsidies to private businesses so that these can offer training to less prepared workers. The remaining 76 percent either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that offers state subsidies to private businesses so that these can train their workers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q30d. It has been suggested that free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers should be re-negotiated to reduce the impact on these sectors of the population. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that favors the renegotiation of those free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

EXPERIMENT 2. TREATMENT SET 5 (Low, High, Neutral)

Q28e. Approximately 18 percent of Peruvians favor greater direct involvement by the Peruvian state in the exploitation of mining resources. The remaining 82 percent either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that increases the direct involvement of the Peruvian government in the exploitation of mining resources in the country?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q29e. Approximately 73 percent of Peruvians favor a government program that gives state subsidies to private businesses so that these can offer training to less prepared workers. The remaining 27 percent either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that offers state subsidies to private businesses so that these can train their workers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
- ❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q30e. It has been suggested that free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers should be re-negotiated to reduce the impact on these sectors of the population. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that favors the renegotiation of those free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers?

- ❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)

❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

EXPERIMENT 2. TREATMENT SET 6 (Neutral, Low, High)

Q28f. It has been suggested that there should be greater direct involvement by the Peruvian state in the exploitation of mining resources. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that increases the direct involvement of the Peruvian government in the exploitation of mining resources in the country?

❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q29f. Approximately 24 percent of Peruvians favor a government program that gives state subsidies to private businesses so that these can offer training to less prepared workers. The remaining 76 percent either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that offers state subsidies to private businesses so that these can train their workers?

❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q30f. Approximately 73 percent of Peruvians think that free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers should be re-negotiated to reduce the impact on these sectors of the population. The remaining 27 percent of Peruvians either opposes this or does not have an opinion. Would you be willing or unwilling to support a proposal that favors the renegotiation of those free trade agreements that negatively impact the production and income of small farmers?

❍ Yes, I would be willing to support it (1)
❍ No, I would not be willing to support it (2)

Q31. And now, thinking about Peruvian voters, to what extent do you agree with the following statements about Peruvian voters in general?

	Strongly agree (1)	Agree (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Disagree (4)	Strongly disagree (5)
The Peruvian vote is consistent (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Peruvians care about the ideology of presidential candidates (3)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Peruvians only care about projects, and not about how these are implemented (4)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Peruvians do not care whether the state or private businesses manage the exploitation of natural resources (5)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In presidential elections, different generations vote for different political parties (6)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In presidential elections, the upper classes and the poorer sectors vote for different political parties (7)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In presidential elections, men and women vote for different political parties (8)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In presidential elections, employers and workers vote for different political parties (9)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In presidential elections, rural and urban zones vote for different political parties (10)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In presidential elections, indigenous and non-indigenous people vote for different political parties (11)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In presidential elections, the interior and the coast vote for different political parties (12)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In Peru, the image of the leader matters more than the political platform (13)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In Peru, the image of the leader matters more than the political discourse (14)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In Peru, it is better to have media access than a consolidated political organization (15)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Peruvian voters do not vote for a politician unless the politician offers them gifts (16)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

EXPERIMENT 3. Identity treatment: Presents politicians with two different fake scenarios. Each scenario will have one of three treatments: indigenous identity, non-indigenous identity, or neutral identity. Politicians will be randomly assigned to one of nine possible combinations of these scenarios.

TREATMENT SET 1

Q32a. In an interview, Mr. ***Nemesio Wamán Vilca*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33a. The ***Red Comunitaria Kallpachanchis*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

TREATMENT SET 2

Q32b. In an interview, Mr. ***Nemesio Wamán Vilca*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)

- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33b. The ***Asociación Regional de Exportadores de Espárragos*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

TREATMENT SET 3

Q32c. In an interview, Mr. ***Nemesio Wamán Vilca*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33c. An ***association*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

TREATMENT SET 4

Q32d. In an interview, Mr. ***Francisco García Miró*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33d. The ***Red Comunitaria Kallpachanchis*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

TREATMENT SET 5

Q32e. In an interview, Mr. ***Francisco García Miró*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33e. The ***Asociación Regional de Exportadores de Espárragos*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)

- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

TREATMENT SET 6

Q32f. In an interview, Mr. ***Francisco García Miró*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33f. An ***association*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

TREATMENT SET 7

Q32g. In an interview, an ***individual*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33g. The ***Red Comunitaria Kallpachanchis*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a

monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

TREATMENT SET 8

Q32h. In an interview, an ***individual*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33h. The ***Asociación Regional de Exportadores de Espárragos*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

TREATMENT SET 9

Q32i. In an interview, an ***individual*** argued that the government should develop a social program to increase the level of competitiveness and growth of micro-businesses in Peru through direct financial transfers. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of developing a government program that provides direct financial transfers to micro-businesses in Peru?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q33i. An ***association*** developed a proposal that aims to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for communities to evaluate regional projects, assess the performance of local governments, and promote better governance practices. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the idea of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the communities?

- ❍ Strongly Agree (1)
- ❍ Agree (2)
- ❍ Disagree (3)
- ❍ Strongly Disagree (4)

Q34. Traditionally, in politics we talk about left and right. How would you define the political positions that characterize the ideology of the Left?

Q35. And, how would you define the political positions that characterize the ideology of the Right?

Q36. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents the Left and 5 the Right, where would you place the ideological position of [***party selected in Q1***]?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q37. On this same scale, where would you place yourself?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q38. In your opinion, how important is political ideology in Peruvian politics nowadays?

- ❍ Very important (1)
- ❍ Somewhat important (2)
- ❍ Neutral (3)
- ❍ Slightly important (4)
- ❍ Not at all important (5)

Q39. And how important is to you your own ideological conviction?

- ❍ Very important (1)
- ❍ Somewhat important (2)
- ❍ Neutral (3)
- ❍ Slightly important (4)
- ❍ Not at all important (5)

Q40. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents total state control and 5 represents total market control, what management would you consider appropriate in the following areas?

	(1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	(5)
Exploitation of gas and petroleum (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Exploitation of other mineral resources (2)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Secondary education (3)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
University education (4)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Health services (5)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Water services (6)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Electricity services (7)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Retirement funds (8)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Investments in diversifying the economy (9)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Investments in industrializing the economy (10)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Media (11)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Q41. In your opinion, the Peruvian government (1) has the responsibility of providing economic assistance to sectors of the population with scarce resources, (2) does not have the responsibility to provide assistance to sectors of the population with scarce resources but should, or (3) does not have the responsibility to provide economic assistance to sectors of the population with scarce resources nor should it.

- ❍ Has the responsibility of providing economic assistance to sectors of the population with scarce resources (1)
- ❍ Does not have the responsibility to provide assistance to sectors of the population with scarce resources but should (2)
- ❍ Does not have the responsibility to provide economic assistance to sectors of the population with scarce resources nor should it (3)

Q42. And thinking about the current security problem, would you give greater importance to (1) a tough on crime and drug trafficking approach, (2) a social programs for prevention approach, or (3) a strengthening of the judicial institutions approach?

- ❍ Tough on crime and drug trafficking approach (1)
- ❍ Social programs for prevention approach (2)
- ❍ Strengthening of the judicial institutions approach (3)

Q43. Changing topic. In your opinion, do free trade agreements with the United States (1) favor the Peruvian economy and should be strengthened, or (2) hurt the Peruvian economy and should be eliminated?

- ❍ Favor the Peruvian economy and should be strengthened (1)
- ❍ Hurt the Peruvian economy and should be eliminated (2)

Q44. From your perspective, how much influence does the US government have on the Peruvian government?

- ❍ Much influence (1)
- ❍ Some influence (2)
- ❍ No influence (3)

Q45. [**If Q43 < 3**] And this influence that the US government has, is it positive, negative, or neutral?

- ❍ Positive (1)
- ❍ Negative (2)
- ❍ Neutral (3)

Q46. Thinking about the sources of income of the Peruvian state. Do you consider that taxes collected from foreign mining companies should (1) be reduced, (2) remain the same, or (3) be increased?

- ❍ Be reduced (1)
- ❍ Remain the same (2)
- ❍ Be increased (3)

Q47. And thinking about the environment, which of the following phrases do you agree with most?

- ❍ The government should allow all businesses to decide on their own how to protect the environment, even if this means that they don't always do the right thing (1)
- ❍ The government should approve laws to make businesses protect the environment, even if this interferes with the profits of these businesses (2)

Q48. In an economic crisis, would you favor (1) a set of policies that reduce government spending or (2) a set of policies that increases social investment?

- ❍ A set of policies that reduce government spending (1)
- ❍ A set of policies that increases social investment (2)

Q49. Changing topics. Indigenous people in Peru (1) have equal opportunities or (2) do not have equal opportunities?

- ❍ Have equal opportunities (1)
- ❍ Do not have equal opportunities (2)

Q50. According to census data, indigenous people in Peru, in general, are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?

- ❍ Indigenous people have low education levels (1)
- ❍ Indigenous people are discriminated by society (2)
- ❍ Their own culture limits the progress of indigenous people (3)
- ❍ Indigenous people are systematically excluded from government policies (4)
- ❍ Indigenous people are ignored by government institutions (5)

Q51. The indigenous peoples of the Peruvian sierra and Amazon regions are (1) better represented in Peruvian politics than non-indigenous populations, (2) equally represented in Peruvian politics as non-indigenous populations, or (3) less represented in Peruvian politics than non-indigenous populations?

- ❍ Better represented in Peruvian politics than non-indigenous populations (1)
- ❍ Equally represented in Peruvian politics as non-indigenous populations (2)
- ❍ Less represented in Peruvian politics than non-indigenous populations (3)

Q52. Positive discrimination policies provide preferential treatment to historically underrepresented sectors of the population in order to reduce inequalities. Some Peruvians argue that positive discrimination policies are necessary in this country. Others oppose the implementation of these types of policies. Would you favor or oppose a set of government policies that promote positive discrimination of indigenous populations?

- ❍ Favor (1)
- ❍ Oppose (2)

Q53. And thinking about religion, could you tell me whether you are more in favor of the presence of Christian values in politics or the principles of a secular state? Use the 1 to 5 scale, where 1 means a great inclination towards the presence of Christian values and 5 means a great inclination towards the presence of secular principles in politics.

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q54. On a 1 to 5 scale where 1 means totally against abortion under any circumstances and 5 represents entirely for the full legalization of abortion, what is your personal opinion about abortion?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q55. On a 1 to 5 scale where 1 means entirely against any form of union between same-sex partners and 5 means entirely in favor of equal rights for same-sex partners, what is your personal opinion about same-sex rights?

- ❍ 1 (1)
- ❍ 2 (2)
- ❍ 3 (3)
- ❍ 4 (4)
- ❍ 5 (5)

Q56. Thinking about the upcoming elections, will you be running for a position as an elected official?

- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)
- ❍ Don't know (3)

Q57. [**If Q56=2**] Do you expect to remain active in politics in any way in the next government?

- ❍ Yes (1)
- ❍ No (2)

Q58. What is your civil status?

- ❍ Single (1)
- ❍ Married (2)
- ❍ Divorced or separated (3)
- ❍ Widowed (4)
- ❍ Living with a partner (5)

Q59. What is the first language you learned to speak at home?

- ❍ Spanish (1)
- ❍ Quechua (2)
- ❍ Aymara (3)
- ❍ Other indigenous language (4)
- ❍ Other foreign language (5)

Q60. Officially, what is the highest level of study you have completed?

- ❍ None (1)
- ❍ Primary (2)
- ❍ Secondary (3)
- ❍ University (medium level) (4)
- ❍ University (superior level) (5)
- ❍ Post-graduate (6)

Q61. What was your main occupation before being elected to Congress? In other words, what did your job consist of?

Q62. And currently, are you only working as a politician or do you combine this work with other income generating activities?

- ❍ Only work as a politician (1)
- ❍ Combine political work with other activities (2)

Q63. [**If Q61=2**] And this income generating activity that you are working in; is it the same work you engaged in before entering Congress or is it different?

- ❍ Same (1)
- ❍ Other. Specify: _____ (2)

Q64. To wrap things up, could you tell me in which of these categories would you annual income fall under?

- ❍ Less or equal to $50,000 US dollars (1)
- ❍ Between $50,001 a $60,000 US dollars (2)
- ❍ Between $60,001 a $70,000 US dollars (3)
- ❍ Between $70,001 a $80,000 US dollars (4)
- ❍ Between $80,001 a $90,000 US dollars (5)
- ❍ Between $90,001 a $100,000 US dollars (6)
- ❍ More than $100,001 (7)

APPENDIX B

METHODS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES – CHAPTER 3

I. Measuring Cleavage Strength

Historically, our ability to study social cleavages through a long-term lens has been significantly hindered by methodological limitations and data availability challenges. As scholars often point out, shifts in cleavage strength likely occur at a glacial pace. This makes measurement difficult because of the range of variables that can intervene in such an extended time frame. There are also important data limitations, with strong and systematic survey data collection efforts only coming into wide use outside of the United States and Western Europe in recent decades (Mair 2014). In the absence of individual level data, it has been historically challenging to identify relationships between collective identities and party system configurations. Lacking these data across time periods, it has also been remarkably difficult to measure important shifts.

Recent methodological innovations in research methods, however, have created new possibilities for making headway on these important questions. Specifically, the introduction of advanced ecological inference methods (King 1997; Rosen et al. 2001)—which facilitate the study of individual-level patterns from aggregate-level data—and the development of new software to implement this method, provide a unique and critical tool for shedding light on the association between social structures and party systems.[141] Ecological inference enables the use

[141] In my analyses, I employ the Bayesian inference method proposed by (Rosen et al. 2001). This method employs Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling algorithms in a three-stage multinomial-Dirichlet hierarchical model. Results consist of an RxC contingency table with the empirical mean of each possible combination of political parties and cleavage blocs for each election year, along with the standard deviation, and the standard error of the mean. Packages used: (Collingwood 2017; Lau, Moore, and Kellermann 2007)

of census and electoral data to analyze the evolution of this relationship over extended periods of time, while also minimizing the risks of the ecological fallacy problem.

With few exceptions, ecological inference methods have been employed almost exclusively in the U.S. context, with most of the focus centering on patterns of ethnic and racial voting across U.S. elections. Despite the scarce application of this method outside of the U.S., it nonetheless holds great promise for the study of social cleavages in other scenarios. For instance, in a region such as Latin America, where party systems tend to be very weak conduits of collective identities and preferences, ecological inference allows us to separate voters from parties and analyze their political behavior independently from party system dynamics. We can consider whether cleavage patterns exist and structure political behavior at the voter level without having to consider political discourse or shifts in the political arena. This, in turn, can facilitate a more precise understanding of party systems' capacity and willingness to capture and express salient cleavages.

The method introduced here for measuring social cleavage strength utilizes as a starting point the results from ecological inference analyses. These analyses can be organized in various ways but, for the purpose of measuring cleavage strength, the focus is on the two most aggregated social blocs that define a given cleavage (i.e. workers and employers or indigenous and non-indigenous). Given this, the ecological inference analyses require three pieces of information: the proportion of each cleavage bloc in the populations, the proportion of vote for each political party, and the total number of valid votes. This produces an RxC table with estimates of the share of votes by each cleavage bloc for each political party in a given election. I then take this output---the distribution of group vote across parties---to measure cleavage strength.

I define cleavage strength as the total difference in voter behavior, *V*, that is explained by a given social cleavage, *CS.* Social cleavage, *CS,* is made up of two social blocs. Given the structure of the ecological inference output, each of these blocs has 100 percentage points that distributes across all *n,* political parties, in a given election. This is represented by the following equation where B_x is the cleavage bloc and is equal to the sum of V_{xp_i} (i.e. to the sum of the vote by bloc *x* for political party *i* across all political parties). As noted, B_x will always be equal 100 or 1 if we deal with proportions.

$$B_x = \sum_{i=1}^{n} V_{xp_i} = 1$$

Given this, I measure cleavage strength as the sum of the absolute value of the difference between cleavage blocs in their support for each political party. To calculate this, the following equation does two things. First, it calculates the difference between blocs in their support for each political party. This is represented in the following portion of the equation, $V_{ap_i} - V_{bp_i}$, where *a* and *b* are the cleavage blocs, p_i is each political party from *i* =1 through *n* (the total number of parties that competed in the election). Second, the equation adds then the absolute value of this difference between blocs across all political parties. Cleavage strength, CS_{ab}, is therefore represented as the aggregated difference in political behavior across blocs and for all political parties in a given election.

$$CS_{ab} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left| V_{ap_i} - V_{bp_i} \right|}{2}$$

Values in *CS* can range from 0 to 1, as each bloc, B_x, has 100 percentage points that it can allocate across political parties. A *CS* value of 0 results when two cleavage blocs vote exactly at the same rates for all political parties (for example, two political parties each receive 50 percent of the vote from each cleavage bloc) and 1 results when all of the votes from one cleavage bloc go to political parties that do not receive any support from the opposite bloc (i.e. 100 percent of voters from bloc *a* vote for Party 1 and 0 vote for Party 2, and 0 percent of voters in bloc *b* vote for Party 1 while 100 percent vote for Party 2). The greater the value of *CS*, the greater the variation in political behavior that can be attributed to the social cleavage and thus the greater the strength of the social cleavage.

This measurement approach to cleavage strength has three major strengths. First, it incorporates electoral behavior into the analysis of cleavage strength but does so in a way in which the social cleavage remains independent from specific political organizations. This overcomes a key challenge identified by (Bartolini and Mair 1990) in other approaches to measuring this variable, the tying of cleavages to the success of specific political parties. In the proposed measure, the decline or emergence of a single party is not associated with the weakening or strengthening of a social cleavage. Instead, the measure captures the extent to which voter behavior is structured by a given cleavage regardless of which parties exist at any given moment. The more variation that is explained by the cleavage, the stronger the cleavage is. Second, this measurement approach overcomes the challenge of measuring social cleavage strength over time. By employing census and electoral data, the approach makes it possible to analyze earlier periods and maintain consistency in data sources over longer time frames. This facilitates analyses of cleavage strength in highly volatile political contexts. Lastly, the approach

makes it possible to systematically compare cleavage strength between different types of social cleavages, a possibility that had thus far remained elusive.[142]

This measure of cleavage strength can also be employed to capture both within-bloc dynamics, and bloc articulation outcomes. To measure bloc cohesion, instead of using cleavage blocs in the original equation, the measure employs bloc sub-groups and calculates the differences in political behavior within the cleavage bloc. Running all other elements of the equation the same, the measure produces an index of bloc cohesion.

The bloc articulation measure, for its part, follow a similar logic but with key distinctions. Like in the cleavage strength equation, it focuses on differences in political behavior across cleavage blocs. Yet, unlike the cleavage strength measure, bloc articulation pre-classifies parties as outsiders or establishment and calculates the difference in cleavage bloc support for each of these party groups.

II. Dataset: Electoral and Census Data in Bolivia (1989-2009) and Peru (1980-2011)

For the ecological inference analyses, I use two original datasets that merge electoral and census data from Bolivia at the municipal level for the 1989-2009 period, and from Peru at the district level for the 1980-2011 period, respectively. The electoral data for Bolivia includes the vote share for every political party that competed in the seven national election cycles between 1989 and 2014 (Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) 2010). That for Peru includes the vote share

[142] Another important advantage of this approach is that it incorporates every cleavage bloc into the analyses. This stands in contrast to the work of (Bartolini and Mair 1990), who measured the strength of the class cleavage by focusing on the working class bloc and analyzing labor parties and union membership among workers but excluded rival social blocs.

of every political party that competed in elections between 1980 and 2011 (D. Sulmont and Bazán 2011), with the exception of 1995, when no data is available at the district level.

The Bolivia census data is derived from the 1992, 2001, and 2012 censuses (INE 1992, 2001; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2012) while that from Peru comes from the 1980, 1993, and 2007 censuses (INEI 1981, 1993, 2007). Both of the datasets match electoral results with the closest available census data. In each analysis of Bolivia, there are between 271 and 314 municipalities, depending on the number that existed at the time of elections. The Peru analyses include over 1700 districts.

Throughout the analyses, I operationalize the ethnic cleavage using individuals' native language.[143] I examine two cleavage blocs—indigenous and non-indigenous—and also consider two sub-blocs within the indigenous bloc, Quechuas and Aymaras, when analyzing cleavage configuration. The non-indigenous variable captures the proportion of the population with Spanish as their native language. The indigenous bloc captures the proportion of the population that has Quechua or Aymara as their native language.

The class cleavage in Bolivia is operationalized using data on poverty levels as classified in the census. I categorize as poor those individuals that are under the poverty line, while those that are above this line are categorized as not poor. In Peru, due to lack of data, I operationalize the class cleavage using informal sector versus workers. I plan to improve upon this measure in future iterations. The results of the ecological inference analyses are then combined and used to calculate cleavage strength for each of the social cleavages using the methodology outlined above.

[143] According to the 2001 census, approximately 44 percent of Bolivia's population speaks an indigenous language, with Quechuas and Aymaras making up 23 and 16 percent of the country's total population, respectively. The majority of the remaining 56 percent are native Spanish speakers.

APPENDIX C

METHODS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES – CHAPTER 4

Table C.1 Peru. Summary Statistics (2006-2014)

	N	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Indigenous	7, 485	0.14	0.35	0	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Class (assets)	7, 500	33.37	27.62	0	100	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rural	7, 500	0.24	0.43	0	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Education	7, 494	10.91	4.04	0	18	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ideology	6, 430	2.98	1.01	1	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Industry	5, 793	4.43	1.95	1	7		Y	Y	Y	Y
State Services	5, 810	5.27	1.40	1	7		Y	Y	Y	Y
Nationalism	1, 899	2.43	0.85	1	4				Y	Y
Democracy	7, 199	4.74	1.62	1	7	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Populism	6, 997	0.33	0.47	0	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Values	7, 275	4.27	2.86	1	10	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Table C.2 Bolivia. Summary Statistics (1998-2014)

	N	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Indigenous	27, 057	0.28	0.45	0	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Class (assets)	27, 696	25.54	21.04	0	100	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rural	27, 696	0.37	0.48	0	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Education	27, 659	9.96	4.85	0	18	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ideology	22, 265	3.08	1.06	1	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Industry	11, 547	4.46	1.83	1	7						Y	Y	Y	Y
State Services	11, 654	5.19	1.37	1	7						Y	Y	Y	Y
Nationalism	9, 964	0.62	0.36	0	1	Y			Y				Y	Y
Democracy	17, 275	5.00	1.45	1	7				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Populism	8, 073	0.16	0.37	0	1							Y	Y	Y
Values	16, 960	4.13	2.79	1	10				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Balance Statistics for Matching

Table C.3 Bolivia: Summary of balance for all data

	Means Treated	Means Control	SD Control	Mean Diff
Distance	0.4566	0.3008	0.1782	0.1557
Class	15.1003	29.0736	22.9756	-13.9733
Rural	0.5749	0.2927	0.4551	0.2822
Education	7.6472	10.8460	4.5379	-3.1988

Table C.4 Bolivia: Summary of balance for matched data

	Means Treated	Means Control	SD Control	Mean Diff
Distance	0.4566	0.4537	0.1667	0.0029
Class	15.1003	15.0304	14.1789	0.0699
Rural	0.5749	0.5749	0.4944	0.0000
Education	7.6472	7.7948	4.5483	-0.1476

Table C.5 Bolivia: Sample Size

	Control	Treated
All	3123	1729
Matched	3045	1729
Unmatched	78	0
Discarded	0	0

Table C.6 Peru: Summary of balance for all data

	Means Treated	Means Control	SD Control	Mean Diff
Distance	0.2007	0.1138	0.0910	0.0869
Class	19.6040	36.8826	27.9785	-17.2786
Rural	0.4805	0.1803	0.3845	0.3003
Education	9.3638	11.5087	3.7247	-2.1449

Table C.7 Peru: Summary of balance for matched data

	Means Treated	Means Control	SD Control	Mean Diff
Distance	0.2012	0.1992	0.1146	0.0020
Class	19.3709	19.4417	21.2524	-0.0707
Rural	0.4804	0.4804	0.4997	0.0000
Education	9.3765	9.4900	4.2270	-0.1134

Table C.8 Peru: Sample Size

	Control	Treated
All	5231	745
Matched	5140	741
Unmatched	91	4
Discarded	0	0

Robustness Checks

Table C.9 Ethnicity and Programmatic Preferences with Different Class Measure (Bolivia)

Dependent variable:							
	Left Ideology	Industry	Services	Nationalism	Populism	Liberal Values	Democracy
Indigenous	0.107***	0.100***	0.035**	0.117***	0.035	−0.056***	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Employer	0.047						
	(0.066)						
Home-worker	−0.028**			0.023		0.039	−0.079**
	(0.014)			(0.030)		(0.025)	(0.033)
Other worker	0.017	0.001	0.066	0.0005		0.025	−0.027
	(0.013)	(0.140)	(0.105)	(0.029)		(0.025)	(0.033)
Peasant	−0.0002	−0.030	0.002	−0.001		0.026	−0.015
	(0.018)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.040)		(0.027)	(0.028)
Self-employed	−0.009	0.031	0.006	0.054*	−0.459*	−0.016	−0.006
	(0.014)	(0.054)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.241)	(0.021)	(0.023)
White collar	0.013	0.064	0.003	0.081		−0.029	0.028
	(0.018)	(0.071)	(0.054)	(0.060)		(0.047)	(0.045)
Worker	−0.033	0.076	0.026	−0.026	−0.434*	0.018	0.005
	(0.025)	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.244)	(0.033)	(0.030)
Rural	0.003	0.049**	0.025*	0.063***	−0.089***	−0.030**	0.009
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education	0.002**	−0.002	0.003**	0.001	−0.005	0.007***	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
2000	−0.008 (0.013)						
2002	−0.040*** (0.014)						
2004	0.048***			0.034*			
	(0.013)			(0.019)			
2006	0.035**					0.061***	
	(0.015)					(0.017)	
2008	0.061***					0.054**	0.039**
	(0.019)					(0.023)	(0.020)
2010	0.075***	−0.100***	−0.087***			0.080***	0.028
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.027)			(0.025)	(0.022)
2012	0.045**	−0.065*	−0.023	−0.034	−0.003	0.130***	−0.048**
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.022)
2014	0.150***	−0.173***	−0.096***	0.031	−0.058	0.046*	−0.009
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Constant	0.441***	0.640***	0.703***	0.545***	0.756***	0.217***	0.674***
	(0.018)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.243)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Observations	4,845	984	987	1,817	659	2,221	1,478

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure C.1 Ethnicity and Programmatic Preferences (Post-Matching Analysis)



Table C.10 Interaction between Ethnicity and Class in Bolivia

Dependent variable:							
	Left Ideology	Industry	Services	Nationalism	Populism	Liberal Values	Democracy
Indigenous	0.124***	−0.024	−0.012	0.060**	−0.002	−0.050**	−0.005
	(0.013)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.069)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Class	−0.001***	−0.004***	−0.0001	−0.002***	−0.001	0.0004	0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Rural	−0.009	0.044*	0.030*	0.043**	−0.118***	−0.020	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.042)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education	0.004***	−0.002	0.002	0.0002	−0.009**	0.007***	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
2000	−0.007 (0.013)						
2002	−0.036*** (0.014)						
2004	0.048***			0.026			
	(0.013)			(0.019)			
2006	0.041***					0.072***	
	(0.015)					(0.016)	
2008	0.071***					0.059***	0.065***
	(0.019)					(0.021)	(0.018)
2010	0.069*** (0.019)	−0.076*** (0.029)	−0.064*** (0.022)			0.064***	(0.021) 0.044** (0.018)
2012	0.040**	−0.068**	0.001	−0.063	0.018	0.114***	−0.022
	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.019)
2014	0.144***	−0.147***	−0.096***	0.029	−0.033	0.050**	−0.007
	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Indigenous*Class	−0.001**	0.006***	0.003**	0.005***	0.001	−0.0005	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.435***	0.762***	0.715***	0.619***	0.372***	0.205***	0.642***
	(0.015)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.067)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Observations	4,842	845	837	1,860	522	2,397	1,480

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.11 Interaction between Ethnicity and Class in Peru

	Left Ideology	Industry	Services	Nationalism	Populism	Liberal Values	Democracy
Indigenous	0.067***	0.018	−0.045***	0.173***	0.097***	−0.044***	−0.073***
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Class	−0.0005***	−0.001***	−0.0004***	−0.001***	0.001**	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Rural	−0.010	0.003	−0.012	0.038**	−0.106***	−0.040***	−0.003
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Education	0.005***	−0.002	0.001	0.001	−0.002	0.008***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
2008	−0.023**				−0.100***	0.011	0.050***
	(0.010)				(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.011)
2010	−0.016	0.017	−0.030***		−0.234***	0.038***	−0.001
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)		(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.010)
2012	−0.034***	−0.027**	−0.022**		−0.275***	0.005	0.034***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)		(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.010)
2014	−0.028***	−0.086***	−0.036***	0.033**	−0.220***	0.005	0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Indigenous*Class	0.0003	0.001**	0.0005	−0.002*	−0.001*	−0.002***	−0.001
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Constant	0.474***	0.654***	0.745***	0.445***	0.517***	0.254***	0.549***
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Observations	5,771	5,101	5,116	1,575	6,249	6,480	6,423

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.12 Ethnic Self-Identification and Programmatic Preferences in Bolivia

	Left Ideology	Industry	Services	Nationalism	Populism	Liberal Values	Democracy
Indig Self-ID	0.098***	0.123***	0.043**	0.056***	0.087**	−0.009	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Class	−0.001***	−0.002***	0.00003	−0.001***	−0.0003	0.001**	0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Rural	−0.005	0.030*	0.028**	0.062***	−0.106***	−0.018	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Education	0.004***	−0.001	0.003**	−0.001	−0.006	0.007***	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
2000	−0.009 (0.013)						
2002	−0.042*** (0.014)						
2004	0.026*			0.002			
	(0.013)			(0.017)			
2006	0.005					0.059***	
	(0.015)					(0.015)	
2008	0.040**					0.050***	0.060***
	(0.019)					(0.019)	(0.015)
2010	0.033*	(0.020)	−0.073*** (0.023)	−0.077*** (0.018)		0.048**	(0.020) 0.050*** (0.016)
2012	−0.009	−0.070***	−0.013	−0.070*	0.036	0.106***	−0.029*
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.016)
2014	0.102***	−0.153***	−0.096***	0.015	−0.015	0.027	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Constant	0.450***	0.653***	0.688***	0.641***	0.247***	0.190***	0.620***
	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.064)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Observations	4,804	1,232	1,223	2,294	692	2,843	1,951

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.13 Ethnic Self-Identification and Programmatic Preferences in Peru

	Left Ideology	Industry	Services	Nationalism	Populism	Liberal Values	Democracy
Indig SelfID	0.061***	0.00003	−0.025**	0.155***	0.023	−0.047***	−0.071***
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Class	−0.0005***	−0.001***	−0.0004***	−0.001***	0.0004	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Rural	−0.004	0.009	−0.017*	0.053***	−0.095***	−0.045***	−0.009
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Education	0.004***	−0.002*	0.001	−0.0001	−0.003	0.009***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
2008	−0.022**				−0.100***	0.011	0.050***
	(0.010)				(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.011)
2010	−0.014	0.018	−0.031***		−0.232***	0.036***	−0.004
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)		(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.010)
2012	−0.033***	−0.027**	−0.022**		−0.275***	0.005	0.034***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)		(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.010)
2014	−0.030***	−0.085***	−0.035***	0.027*	−0.219***	0.007	0.029***
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Constant	0.483***	0.661***	0.738***	0.456***	0.534***	0.244***	0.538***
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Observations	5,771	5,101	5,116	1,575	6,249	6,480	6,423

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX D

METHODS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES – CHAPTER 5

Table D.1 Matching Questions in LAPOP (Voter) and PELA (Elites) Surveys, 2010-2011

Variable name	Elite	Voter	Question
Ideology	ID1	L1	As you remember, when people talk about politics they normally use the Left Right expressions. This card goes from Left to Right. Where would you place your political ideas?
State Economy	EM1	N/A	Could you tell me where you favor more an economy that is regulated by the State or by the market? Use a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means the greatest presence of the state in the economy and 5 means the greatest regulation through the markets. (***note: In 2011, 1-10 scale with 1 being more state and 10 being more market).***
State Industry	ROES1a	ROS1	1-7 scale where 1 means very much in disagreement and 7 means very much in agreement. "The state should be the owner of the most important industries in the country"
State Services	ROES1b	ROS2	1-7 scale where 1 means very much in disagreement and 7 means very much in agreement: The state should be responsible for ensuring the wellbeing of the people.
	ROES1c	ROS3	1-7 scale where 1 means very much in disagreement and 7 means very much in agreement: The state should be the most responsible for generating employment.
	ROES1d	ROS4	1-7 scale where 1 means very much in disagreement and 7 means very much in agreement: The state should implement policies to reduce inequality.
	ROES1e	ROS5	1-7 scale where 1 means very much in disagreement and 7 means very much in agreement: The state should be responsible for providing pensions
	ROES1f	ROS6	1-7 scale where 1 means very much in disagreement and 7 means very much in agreement: The state should be the primary responsible for providing health services
Nationalism	RRII2	N/A	On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means very negative and 10 means very positive, how do you value the Free Trade agreement between the United States and Latin America?
Liberal Values	VAL1	D6	How much do you approve or disapprove of same sex couples' right to marriage? Use a scale from 1-10 where 1 means that you disapprove firmly and 10 means that you approve firmly.

Figure D.1 Programmatic Preferences of all Parties in Bolivia (2010)



Figure D.2 The Ideological Distribution of Political Parties in Bolivia (1993-2010)



Figure D.3 Ethnicity and Programmatic Representation in Bolivia (EMD)



Figure D.4 Ethnoracial Identities and Programmatic Representation in Bolivia (Means)



Figure D.5 Ethnoracial Identities and Programmatic Representation in Bolivia (EMD)



Figure D.6 Programmatic Preferences of all Parties in Peru (2011)



Figure D.7 The Ideological Distribution of Political Parties in Peru (1995-2011)



Figure D.8 Ethnicity and Programmatic Representation in Peru (EMD)



Figure D.9 Ethnoracial Identities and Programmatic Representation in Peru (Means)



Figure D.10 Ethnoracial Identities and Programmatic Representation in Peru (EMD)



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